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Abstract 
Passenger transportation poses challenges to American cities in the form of air pollution, traffic 
congestion, auto collisions, and barriers to mobility.  Public transit has the potential to be part of 
a solution to these urban problems, yet transit agencies across the country clamor for more 
resources.  Transit finance in the U.S. is heterogeneous, and rarely approached with a 
comprehensive view of transit‟s social benefits. 
 
This thesis suggests a framework for a more rational magnitude and incidence of public transit 
funding based on a more comprehensive view of transit‟s social benefits.  I take up the case of 
the Chicago metropolitan region and quantify the transit system‟s major emissions, safety, 
congestion, and mobility benefits.  Next, I survey and highlight current practices in transit 
finance from other cities in North America and Western Europe.  Finally, I assess the size, 
structure, and distribution of burden of Chicago‟s current transit funding status quo against 
theoretical and practical principles of transit funding and offer a range of financing alternatives 
to solve the current fiscal crisis in Chicago. 
 
I find evidence that the social benefits of public transportation in Chicago outweigh its costs, 
suggesting that preserving transit services there is justifiable.  Transit‟s benefits accrue to a 
variety of jurisdictions in diverse and measurable ways which the current funding structure 
does not approximate.  I find evidence that of the multiple beneficiaries of transit in the region, 
the subsidy structure in Chicago disproportionately benefits auto drivers who receive 
significantly more congestion benefits than they pay for.   Last, I propose several policy options 
to increase public subsidy to transit in Chicago, and suggest that one particularly theoretically 
appealing alternative may be to establish tolls on existing roadways. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: P. Christopher Zegras 
Title: Assistant Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
 
Thesis Reader:  Frederick P. Salvucci,  
Title: Senior Lecturer, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis suggests a framework for paying for public transportation operations with a more 
rational view of transit‟s social benefits.  I take up the case of the Chicago metropolitan region 
and quantify the transit system‟s primary emissions, safety, congestion, and mobility benefits.  
Next, I survey and highlight best practices in transit finance from other cities in North America 
and Western Europe.  I assess the size, structure, and distribution of burden of Chicago‟s 
current transit funding status quo against theoretical and practical principles of transit funding, 
and I finish by offering a range of financing alternatives to solve the current fiscal crisis in 
Chicago. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a way to think about determining the optimal incidence 
and magnitude of public funding for public transportation, illustrated by the case of Chicago.  
To do so, I aim to achieve the following objectives: 
 Understand the nature of public transit‟s social benefits in the context of an individual 
city. 
 Develop and apply methodologies to quantify the size of public transportation‟s social 
benefits, and identify its primary beneficiaries; 
 Highlight best practices and pitfalls in transit funding from other large transit systems in 
North America and Western Europe; 
 Give public transit policymakers in Chicago and the Illinois Legislature a number of 
options to pay for transit in the Chicago metropolitan area. 
1.2 Research Motivation 
The passenger transportation sector poses great challenges to U.S. cities and indeed the world: 
greenhouse gas and local pollutant emissions, petroleum use, and traffic congestion, accidents, 
and high costs of mobility.  The rise of the automobile coincided with post-World War II urban 
developments and dispersed land use patterns, and aggravated problems of urban poverty and 
segregation (Squires, 2002). 
1.2.1 The Challenge of the Automobile 
In the past half-century, automobile use has grown dramatically.  Demographic trends, public 
policies, and urban development patterns since World War II have resulted in large increases in 
travel demand, particularly via private automobile.  A growing population, women entering the 
workforce, smaller households, declining relative costs of car ownership, falling auto 
occupancies, and other factors have caused vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) to increase steadily in 
recent decades, as shown in Figure 1.  In 1950, Americans owned just under 300 cars per 
thousand people.  In 2004, the same figure is around 800 cars per thousand people (Davis and 
Diegel, 2006, 3.1). 
 
Land development patterns have compounded the challenge.  Sprawling growth patterns have 
resulted in dispersed origins and destinations, diluting the effectiveness of alternative modes 
such as public transit, as Figure 2 demonstrates.  Between 1969 and 2001, average household 
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VMT has risen from 34 to 58 miles per day (NHTS, 2004).  Although transit ridership has 
stabilized since 1980, the growth in auto use has meant that transit‟s market share has dwindled 
to around 2% of all trips in the U.S. (NHTS, 2004). 
 
Figure 1.  Trends in Vehicle Miles Traveled in the U.S.   
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Source: 1970-2005 historical data from Davis and Diegel (2006); 2005-2030 projections from U.S. DOE, 
Annual Energy Outlook (2007) 
 
Figure 2.  Trends in Public Transit Ridership in the U.S. 
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Source: adapted from Gordon, 1991 and NTD, 2005. 
 
The growth in travel by private automobile has been accompanied by a number of social 
problems: increased congestion, automobile dependence, and environmental degradation.   
 
Because all VMT growth since 1980 has occurred on a fairly static roadway system, traffic 
congestion has grown rapidly.  Between 1980 and 2000, VMT doubled while lane-miles of road 
capacity grew by only 4% (FHWA, 2003), causing the cost of urban congestion (measured in 
Projections Historical 
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excess time and gasoline spent in traffic) to quintuple since 1982 (TTI, 2005).  Because they made 
up over 90% of total vehicle miles traveled in 2003 (BTS, 2006), automobiles are the primary 
drivers of rising congestion.  According to the Texas Transportation Institute (2005), congestion 
now makes average peak travel times 50% longer than off-peak times in large cities.  
 
Today, the transportation sector produces 28% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, the fastest-
growing emissions source (EPA, 2004, 2-25), and automobiles make up around two-thirds of the 
sector‟s emissions (EPA, 2006, 2-2).  Global warming poses the potential for significant harm 
(Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007).  Ground-level air pollution is a public health threat to the 146 million 
Americans who live in urban areas exceeding federal air quality standards for ozone and 
particulate matter (EPA, 2003, 2-1), and automobiles are responsible for around half of ozone 
precursors (see Table 5).  The growth in overall auto travel has tended to undermine the net 
environmental gains from cleaner, more efficient vehicles.  Despite improvements in 
automotive technology to increase fuel economy and decrease emissions, these gains have been 
offset by increased driving and investment in larger and more powerful vehicles (Howitt and 
Altshuler, 1999).   
 
Figure 3.  U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Source 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
Transportation Industrial Residential Commercial
A
n
n
u
a
l 
T
g
 C
O
2
 E
q
.
From Direct Fossil Fuel Combustion From Electricity Consumption
 
Source: U.S. EPA, 2004, 2-10 
 
Transportation consumes 67% of all U.S. petroleum products (EIA, 2005, 5-3), and the sector 
uses fossil fuels for 99% of its energy (EPA, 2006, 4).  America‟s reliance on imported oil, the 
remaining sources of which are concentrated in a small number of countries, continues to cause 
price instabilities and geopolitical concerns. 
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Figure 4.  Proven World Oil Reserves, 2005 
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Source: EIA, 2007, quoting BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2006) 
1.3 The Promise of Public Transportation 
Public transit has the potential to be a part of the solution to these challenges.  In economic 
terms, motorists impose external costs in the form of air pollution, accidents, noise, and 
congestion, and thus the implied underpricing of car travel results in its overconsumption.  
Since it is difficult to tax these external costs efficiently and make prices equal marginal costs, a 
“second-best” way to correct these externalities is to “subsidize its substitute” (Wijkander, 
1985), i.e. public transportation.  Most transit systems in the United States do not make enough 
money in fares to cover their operating and capital expenditures, so the gap between fares 
collected and operating expenses incurred is arguably bridged with public funds to compensate 
for transit‟s implied social benefits, outlined below. 
1.3.1 Environmental Sustainability 
Transit has the potential to provide important environmental benefits. 
 Energy consumption and emissions on a per-passenger-mile basis is lower than that of 
automobiles (Shapiro, Hassett, & Arnold, 2002). 
 Transit investments, particularly rail, may be a requirement for more compact, 
“smarter” urban development, which can be served by a variety of transportation 
modes, including walking, biking, and mass transit. 
 Because public transportation concentrates the means of propulsion into more 
centralized places such as power plants and bus fleets, it may be more easily adapted to 
new, cleaner technologies. 
1.3.2 Congestion Relief 
The availability of a grade-separated alternative to the automobile may tend to mitigate the 
severity of roadway congestion in cities.  By allowing travelers a means to bypass traffic, the 
city may potentially achieve higher levels of mobility for transit riders and auto drivers alike. 
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1.3.3 Safety Benefits 
As a relatively safe mode of travel per passenger-mile traveled, public transit may avoid a great 
deal of the public and private costs of traffic accidents, including collisions, injuries and 
fatalities, and downstream costs such as emergency response and health care. 
1.3.4 Scale Economies 
In economic terms, transit‟s increasing returns to scale may mean that the market will naturally 
result in a monopoly producer.  If marginal costs are lower than average costs, marginal cost 
prices will not cover total production costs.  According to theory, a subsidy is required to avoid 
the monopolist under-producing and overcharging for its services.  Transit exhibits signs of 
scale and density economies (Mohring, 1972), although the precise nature of this phenomenon is 
debated (Berechman and Giuliano, 1985), especially if passenger time is excluded.  At the least, 
because transit often operates under capacity outside of the peak of the peak, the marginal cost 
of a passenger is often extremely low (the vehicle would be operating anyways), so fares should 
be held low. 
 
Theoretically, a transit agency could achieve scale economies in its unit costs, either by 
allocating common assets like wayside equipment across more passengers (“economies of 
density” (Braeutigam, 1999)), or by increasing vehicle size to save labor costs (Frankena, 1979).  
However, as Kennedy and Elgar (2005) point out, larger vehicle size may offset gains from 
increased frequencies. 
1.3.5 Scalable Capacity and Agglomeration 
In dense, rapidly congesting urban areas, the high capacity and economies of density of public 
transport, especially rail corridors, may be the only way to maintain adequate mobility to help 
cities grow.  In the face of growing passenger demand, public transit tends to experience several 
natural synergies.  And if history is any guide, individual travel demand will likely continue to 
rise (see Figure 1).  As passenger demand increases: 
 In the short term, transit tends to become more efficient through higher load factors, 
whereas auto transport tends to become less efficient through congestion effects.   
 In the medium term, capacity on a transit line can be increased with investments like 
new signal control systems, expanded vehicles, or dedicated busways, whereas 
widening roads, especially in dense cities, can be less financially and politically feasible. 
 In the long term, a growing transit system may exhibit economies of scale to the rider 
(Small, 1992, 58-60).  Larger passenger flows can trigger higher frequencies, shorter 
waiting times, and perhaps more extensive service, so the passenger will have access to 
more services and opportunities per fare paid.  In this sense, an individual‟s choice to 
take public transit may confer positive external benefits to other riders.  
 
Furthermore, a body of economic literature (e.g., SACTRA, 1999) points to economies of 
agglomeration in the core of cities – i.e., that firms are more productive simply because of their 
proximity to other firms and a labor pool within a dense urban environment, and public transit 
may be an essential ingredient of this recipe (Graham, 2005).  Empirical evidence for this 
positive externality from transport investment suggests that its effects are real but small, and 
must be tied to transit-supportive land use policies (Banister and Berechman, 2001). 
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1.3.6 Equity and Low-Cost Mobility 
The cost of car ownership is a significant barrier to accessing opportunity in a modern economy 
for many households, especially the poor.  In 2005, transportation costs consumed over 17% of a 
typical household‟s budget,1 and over 25% for the poorest households.  The American 
Automobile Association estimates the full cost of owning and operating a typical mid-size 
sedan is around $7,800 per year (AAA, 2007), three-quarters of which are fixed costs.  The large 
fixed outlays involved in owning a car form a formidable barrier to mobility.  
 
By contrast, the cost of public transit is low and variable with use, thereby enabling low-cost 
mobility for the car-less who might not otherwise be able to travel.  Interestingly, Lewis and 
Williams (1999, 146) note that to the extent these “captive” riders travel off-peak, they pay the 
greatest fares relative to the marginal costs of services they consume.  Low-cost access is 
intertwined with an equity argument, as well: public transport allows everyone, including those 
unable to use a car for any reason – age, low income, physical disability, etc. – a baseline of 
mobility to access the goods and services necessary to be a contributing member of society. 
1.3.7 National Policy Goals 
Finally, transit may help achieve policy objectives to reduce consumption of energy, particularly 
petroleum imports.  Transit is less reliant on petroleum fuels than autos, and transit use might 
mitigate demand.  Delucchi and Murphy (2006) estimate that the cost of military expenditures 
to protect oil resources for U.S. interests is on the order of $3-33 billion each year.  An American 
Public Transportation Association study estimated that if transit‟s mode share were to double, 
the U.S. would save approximately 1.4 billion gallons of petroleum per year (ICF, 2007).  Greene 
and Ahmad (2005) estimate the cost of U.S. oil dependence at $150-$250 billion per year.  While 
such economic benefits are difficult to quantify for an individual transit system, national leaders 
may see an advantage in subsidizing transit to achieve these geopolitical goals. 
1.3.8 Summary of Potential Transit Benefits 
In summary, transit provides a variety of potential benefits. 
 Reducing the air pollution and other environmental costs of autos; 
 Bypassing and mitigating roadway congestion; 
 Encouraging smart growth that reduces travel demand; 
 Reducing auto collisions and safety costs; 
 Providing mobility to the poor, elderly, and disabled who are unable to drive; 
 Supporting the density needed for urban agglomeration economies; 
 Counteracting monopolist prices; 
 Easing the burden of auto ownership and providing equitable mobility; and 
 Achieving national policy objectives such as reducing foreign oil consumption. 
These possible benefits argue for transit subsidies.  The ideal size of such subsidies will vary 
from setting to setting, depending on transit demand, the level of automobile externalities, and 
the particulars of the city itself. 
                                                     
1 U.S. BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2005, TR00 item, middle quintile of pre-tax income 
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1.4 Transit Finance as Urban Policy 
Despite public transit‟s potential to be a major part of a solution to many of the difficulties 
posed by the transportation sector, the way we pay for public transit operations, I argue, is 
often disconnected from these potential benefits.  Rationales to publicly fund mass transit 
abound, and public subsidies to transit have persisted despite declining mode share.  Yet transit 
agencies across the country clamor for more funding, threatening fare increases or service cuts, 
and seem to lack the financial operating resources they need to be more a more effective 
solution to urban problems.  What then is the problem? 
 
Part of the answer lies in the way we provide public funds for transit operations.  There is no 
consistent or singular urban transit finance policy in the U.S., and passenger fares rarely cover 
more than half of operating expenditures.  As a result, major cities pay for their transit systems 
in very different ways, from sales taxes to toll bridges, in a variety of political and institutional 
contexts.  Furthermore, the way we pay for transit today often bears little rational connection to 
the needs, benefits, or envisioned role of public transportation in a metropolitan area.   
 
At their core, public transportation finance mechanisms represent large allocations of tax dollars 
in urban areas, yet their opacity may tend to shield them from critical public attention.  These 
mechanisms often fail to keep pace with rising costs, and are usually established in ad hoc, 
politically pragmatic means rooted in the political context of a particular time.  Because altering 
such arrangements requires public action, these arrangements often remain in place for years, 
until a deep enough financial crisis creates enough political will to change.  Transit finance 
arrangements are infrequently crafted with a comprehensive view of the benefits that transit 
provides.  Opportunities to change transit funding structures are as powerful as they are rare.  
As a large source of public expenditure, much of which affects central cities, transit finance 
mechanisms are more accurately viewed as significant pieces of U.S. urban policy. 
 
The explanation is partly historical.  The first major federal funding program, the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964, was passed in part because between 1954 and 1963, 194 transit 
companies went out of business, leaving governments with the responsibility to continue 
providing service to its citizens (Wachs, 1989, 3).   
 
The explanation is also partly institutional.  Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and 
other agencies often conduct regional planning processes to coordinate land use and 
transportation planning under a shared vision of a future transportation network, but these 
organizations rarely control operating funds.  And when they do, their role is limited to federal 
capital dollars.  While building new lines may be important, operating funds are equally 
necessary to maintain reasonable service frequency and extent. 
 
In a vacuum of federal policy, and with little impetus for thoughtful change outside of 
perceived crises, urban public transit financial policy in America has been cobbled together with 
little regard for what an optimal subsidy amount might be, or how it should be structured. 
1.5 Thesis Question and Outline 
I examine this question of optimal transit finance through the case of public transportation in 
Chicago, where the current funding structure is being challenged.  Transit in Chicago appears 
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to be at a crucial window of political opportunity to change the way it is funded.  Frustrated 
with what they perceive as an inadequate and outdated financial arrangement, transit providers 
and policymakers are currently making the case to overhaul the amount and distribution of 
public subsidy.  Chapter 2 introduces the Chicago case.   
1.5.1 The Ideal 
Because transit funding in the U.S. is the heterogeneous product of incrementalism, Chicagoans 
have little to go on as they search for a new public transportation finance mechanism.  To help 
fill the void, this thesis attempts to step back from stopgap measures and first poses the 
question: Ideally, how should public transit be paid for?  Who should pay, and how much? 
 
I propose a conceptual framework for a way to pay for public transportation that tries to more 
closely match the magnitude and incidence of transit‟s key social benefits to its payment 
structure.  The structure I propose takes the beneficiary principle as its core: those who receive 
benefits from public transportation should more closely bear its costs.  In theory, public 
transportation is subsidized because it provides a host of social benefits to a variety of groups.  
Historically, tax sources have often been rooted in a pragmatic mix of geographic area of service 
and some measure of ability to pay.  But if current levels of subsidy are inadequate to maintain 
services, how should this gap be covered?  An ideal subsidy mechanism, I argue, would pay for 
public transit operations with revenues derived from actors and jurisdictions according to the 
benefits received, as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Proposed Theoretical Basis for Transit Subsidy 
Quantifiable 
Benefit ($m) Auto Drivers
Directly Served 
Communities
General 
Metropolitan Area State or World
Congestion
Less time and gas 
spent in 
congestion
Less local 
pollution from 
congestion
Less ground-level 
pollution from 
congestion
Less GHGs from 
avoided 
congestion
Economic ---
Mobility benefits 
to riders
Agglomeration 
Economies
---
Safety
Fewer accidents 
with other autos
Increased safety 
costs of transit
---
Lower medical + 
emergency costs
Emissions ---
Less local 
pollution
Different/Less 
ground-level 
pollution
Less GHGs from 
efficiency
Total:
Beneficiary 
 
 
In such an arrangement, the social benefits of public transportation are quantified and divided 
amongst four categories of beneficiaries.  Revenues are generated so as to align the magnitude 
and incidence of transit‟s burdens with its beneficiaries, and the public subsidy is equal to or 
less than the sum of benefits. 
 
To suggest an answer to the question of ideal funding in the context of Chicago, I deconstruct 
and quantify the primary social benefits of transit services in the region in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
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While some transit benefits are varied and difficult to quantify, I focus on several for which 
existing literature is strong, and for which there is good data for Chicago.  Chapter 3 quantifies 
transit‟s air pollution benefits to Chicago, Chapter 4 measures the degree to which transit 
avoids costs associated with auto accidents, and Chapter 5 evaluates transit‟s contribution to 
congestion relief, as well as its value to passengers as an alternative to driving. 
1.5.2 The Actual 
Second, this research examines the operability of theoretically ideal finance instruments in a 
real-world context by asking:  How do other cities pay for public transit?  What lessons from others 
can be applied to Chicago?  I explore the feasible ways that financial mechanisms can be designed 
so as to capture the social benefits as public revenues for transit.  Chapter 6 describes the role of 
fares in transit finance, surveys the operating revenues of 15 large urban transit systems in 
North America and Western Europe, and highlights patterns and best practices in funding. 
1.5.3 The Possible 
Third and finally, Chapter 7 combines the results of the preceding sections to make specific 
recommendations to Chicago transit policymakers.  Given that transit funding in Chicago is 
probably inadequate to maintain existing services, how could Chicago pay for its transit?   
 
In the real-world setting of Chicago, the immediate question is, who should pay?  Because 
transit is funded from different of sources, sponsor jurisdictions in Chicago seem to find 
themselves in a game of chicken, where no one wants to pay, and each group is using the 
others‟ inaction as an excuse for their own, yet current operating revenues are insufficient to 
maintain services.  Therefore, I compare the incidence of transit‟s benefits with the current RTA 
funding structure to identify constituencies who may be receiving more benefits than they are 
paying. 
 
After assessing the theoretical results, and drawing on the lessons learned from other cities, I 
offer a range of specific policy recommendations for Chicago to expand and shift the burden of 
transit funding. 
1.6 Research Methodology and Sources 
The purpose of this thesis is to suggest a framework for policymaking.  As such, it is rooted 
heavily in existing literature on transportation economics, finance, and policy, and finds most 
data from publicly-available documents.  The case study on Chicago introduced in Chapter 2 
draws in part from my experience at the Chicago Transit Authority in the summer of 2006, but 
also relies on a number of past MIT theses on similar topics (Kirschbaum, 2004; Schofield, 2004; 
Misiak, 2005). 
 
In the quantification of benefits in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I draw heavily from an economic 
literature focused on measuring the “full” social costs and benefits of transportation (e.g., Small, 
1999; Greene, Jones, and Delucchi, 1997; Litman, 2005).  The benefits of transit are often cast as 
avoided costs of the automobile system.  In some cases, I formulate my own methodologies for 
quantifying social benefits and costs for transit in Chicago, such as extrapolating historical 
trends to predict congestion effects.  Like much of the literature, I often confront the problem of 
the appropriate counterfactual – costs and benefits compared to what?  For the most part, I 
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attempt to measure how much would Chicago stand to lose in a hypothetical no-transit scenario 
after reaching a medium-term equilibrium.  I find specific data and statistics for the Chicago 
region from a variety of publicly-available documents such as the U.S. EPA, the Illinois 
Department of Transportation, the National Transit Database, and the Texas Transportation 
Institute.   
 
The survey of transit finance in other cities in Chapter 6 relies on mine and others‟ previous 
research completed for Transport for London (Antos, 2005; Favero, 2006).  Finally, the ideas 
presented in the conclusion are largely my own, except where noted. 
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2 Transit Finance in Chicago 
To explore the question of optimal transit finance, I take up the case of public transport in 
Chicago, where the adequacy of transit funding is currently being challenged.  Transit in 
Chicago appears to be at a political window of opportunity to change its transit funding 
arrangements, providing a useful lens for me to examine how a city can and should pay for 
transit services. 
2.1 The Chicago Metropolis 
The greater Chicago metropolitan area in northeastern Illinois is home to around 8.4 million 
people, centered on downtown Chicago where the Chicago River meets Lake Michigan.  
Although the metropolis includes some parts of southern Wisconsin and northwestern Indiana, 
the most common spatial definition of the region includes the six Illinois counties of Cook, 
Lake, McHenry, Kane, DuPage, and Will counties.  Cook County, which encompasses the City 
of Chicago and 128 other local governments, is the most populous and urban of the six-county 
region.  Unusually for American cities, the jurisdiction of the City of Chicago more or less 
approximates the urban form of the city, including most land areas within five miles of the 
central business district (CBD, also called “the Loop”).  The portion of Cook County that is not 
the City of Chicago is referred to as “Suburban Cook County,” while the five surrounding 
counties are called the “collar counties.”  As shorthand, I refer to “Chicago” to denote the entire 
six-county region, while the “City of Chicago” indicates the central city. 
   
Figure 5.  Political Jurisdictions in the Chicago Metropolitan Area 
                   
Source: RTA, 2007a 
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Similar to other mature U.S. cities, the growth of the Chicago metropolitan area in recent 
decades has been characterized by a stabilizing population and economy in the central city, and 
much stronger population and income growth in the suburbs (see Figure 6).  Since 1990, the six-
county region‟s population has grown at about 1% per year, but the majority of this growth has 
come from the suburban collar counties as the central city remains stable.  For example, in the 
decade between 1990 and 2000, the population of Cook County grew by 5%, while suburban 
McHenry County grew by 40%.  Balancing this unbalanced growth, however, is the magnitude 
of Cook County:  in 2000, it accounted for 67% of the region‟s population (RTA, 2007a). 
 
Figure 6.  Growth in Sales Tax Base in the RTA Region, 1985-2003 
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Source: Extrapolated from Kirschbaum, 2004, figure 3-4 
 
The suburban collar counties have traditionally been faster-growing and more wealthy than the 
urban core.  Unemployment rates in 2005 were 5.7% for Cook County, and between 3.7-4.6% in 
the collar counties (RTA, 2007a, ex. 8-9).  Jobs in Chicago have been decentralizing: despite a 
growing absolute number of jobs since 1980, Cook County‟s proportion of regional jobs has 
declined from 79% to 67% (RTA, 2007a, 8-10).  In 2005, median household income in the City of 
Chicago was $41,015, Cook County‟s was $48,950, and the same indicator in the collar counties 
ranged from $68,000 and above. 
 
As the Chicago metropolitan area has been growing most strongly in its suburbs, its overall 
urbanized area population density has fallen as well.  From 1970 to 1990, Chicago‟s urbanized 
area land mass grew 24% from 1,277 to 1,585 square miles, while its population grew only 1%.  
The result has been an 18% drop in urbanized area density from 1970 to 1990 (Orfield, 1997, 3-
6).  Population density is higher in the center city where some areas reach over 20,000 
inhabitants per square mile, while areas of the collar counties can be under 100 people per 
square mile (NIPC, 2002). 
2.2 Transit Institutions in Chicago 
In 1974, the Illinois General Assembly created the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) to 
consolidate all public transit services in the six counties in the greater Chicago metropolitan 
area (thereby known as the RTA Region).  The RTA, as a special-purpose unit of government 
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and a municipal corporation of Illinois, provides financial oversight over the major transit 
operators in the metropolitan area, or “service boards:” 
 The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) operates core city buses and heavy rail rapid 
transit (“the El” for “elevated”).  The bus network operates around 2,000 buses per day, 
while 1,190 vehicles serve eight routes and 222 miles of track on the rapid transit 
system.   
 Metra operates 11 separate radial commuter rail lines which terminate in the CBD and 
primarily serve stations outside the City of Chicago.  The commuter rail network runs a 
fleet of 1,100 vehicles (Metra, 2007, 6) to 230 stations, some of which are as far as 50-60 
miles from the CBD. 
 Pace, a suburban bus company operating primarily in suburban Cook County and the 
collar counties, operates a fleet of around 360 buses, and vans.  In summer 2005, Pace 
took control of the regional paratransit service, a demand-responsive system of vans 
and taxis for those with disabilities. 
 
Table 2.  Transit Service Consumption by Service Board, 2005 
 Passenger 
Miles (mill.) 
% Passenger 
Trips (mill.) 
% Average Trip 
Length 
(miles) 
CTA 1,918 51% 490 82% 3.9 
Metra 1,548 41% 69 12% 22.5 
Pace 273 7% 37 6% 7.4 
Total 3,740  596   
Source: NTD, 2005 
2.3 The Structure of Transit Finance in Chicago 
In 1983, the Illinois legislature passed the RTA Act, which continues to define operating funding 
and governance of public transit services in Chicago today. 
2.3.1 Operating Revenue Generation 
Under the RTA Act, the RTA receives an increment added to the statewide 6.25% sales tax 
collected in the six-county region: 0.75% in Cook County, which includes the City of Chicago, 
and 0.25% in the five suburban collar counties.   That is, for every $100.00 of taxable goods sold 
in the region, the state collects an additional $7.00 in Cook County and $6.50 in the collar 
counties, of which $1.00 for transactions in Cook County or $0.25 in the collar counties is 
dedicated to the RTA.  In addition, for every $4.00 raised for the RTA this way, the state 
provides a $1.00 match in the form of the Public Transportation Fund.  In 2005, this generated a 
total of $876 million, or around 80% of all public subsidies to transit operations.  The remaining 
20% comes largely from discretionary funds from the state, including appropriations from 
general funds, partial reimbursement of reduced fares, and other assistance (RTA, 2007a).  In 
2005, all public subsidies to RTA transit services totaled $1,096 million. 
 
In addition, the 1983 RTA Act requires that the three service boards collectively meet a 50% 
“recovery ratio,” similar to a farebox recovery ratio but which includes all system-generated 
revenues and excludes some expenditures. 
Page 24 of 122 
2.3.2 Operating Revenue Distribution 
The RTA Act distributes 85% of these revenues among the three service boards by formula, 
based on where the sales tax was generated, as follows: 
 
Table 3.  Distribution of Non-Discretionary RTA Sales Tax and Matching Revenues 
  Origin of Sales Tax 
  City of Chicago Suburban Cook 
County 
Collar Counties 
Destination 
of Sales Tax 
CTA 100% 30% 0% 
Metra 
0% 55% 70% 
Pace 0% 15% 30% 
 
The RTA allocates the remaining 15% of funds by its own discretion, although for much of the 
RTA‟s history, almost all of this has been awarded to the CTA. 
2.3.3 Capital Funds 
Although I limit my analysis to operating funds, it is important to note that transit in Chicago 
also received approximately $450 million in federal capital funds in fiscal year 2007 (CATS, 
2006, 3-2).  These funds are authorized under several sections of the 2005 spending bill Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), 
and are primarily backed by the federal gasoline tax.  Several other capital sources also backed 
public transit in Chicago (RTA, 2007a, 1-D). 
2.4 Problems with Transit Finance in Chicago 
The RTA funding structure has been unchanged since 1983, which has produced several 
consequences. 
 
Since sales tax revenues are tied to their originating jurisdiction through the service boards as 
described in Table 3, and because population and economic growth has been focused more 
strongly at the metropolitan periphery, as shown in Figure 6, funding for the CTA‟s core bus 
and rail services has not kept pace with inflation since 1983.  On the other hand, revenues for 
Pace and Metra‟s primarily suburban services has risen faster than inflation, as shown in  (CTA, 
2005).  The distribution of revenues has favored suburban services, particularly commuter rail, 
because even as sales tax receipts have been growing fastest in the suburbs, the ridership and 
infrastructure needs of the central city have remained strong. 
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Figure 7.  Annual Growth of Public Transit Subsidy in Chicago 1985-2005 
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Source: CTA, 2005.  *Note: excludes paratransit funds. 
 
The practical extent of transit services since 1983 has changed beyond the structure established 
in the RTA Act.  For instance, residents outside the City of Chicago and even Cook County 
regularly use the CTA (CTA, 2005), the metropolitan statistical area of Chicago has expanded to 
include counties beyond the RTA region, and operators often bear the operating costs of 
services outside the jurisdiction from which they derive funding.  In addition, the mandated 
50% fare recovery ratio for all service boards does not account for capital investments, which 
has arguably worked in favor of capital-intensive rail and against operations-heavy bus 
services. 
 
Perhaps correlated with this financial emphasis on suburban services, fares on the CTA have 
risen above inflation and ridership has fallen, while Pace and Metra‟s fares have remained 
below inflation since 1985, and Metra ridership has risen (CTA, 2005). 
2.5 The Politics of Subsidy in Chicago 
Frustrated with what they perceive as an inadequate amount and distribution of public subsidy, 
transit providers under the Regional Transportation Authority are making the case to alter and 
augment its funding structure.  Under a political campaign labeled “Moving Beyond 
Congestion” (MBC), the three transit agencies in Chicago have requested approximately $700 
million in additional funds over three years from the Illinois Legislature (RTA, 2007a). 
 
Transit supporters have worked hard to make the case for increased public funding, yet few 
sources seem willing to come forward with the money.  In 2004, the Chicago Transit Authority 
claimed that revenues were insufficient to continue existing services, and passed two versions 
of its 2005 budget called “gridlock” and “mobility” to call attention to its financial needs (CTA, 
2004).  But the CTA‟s call apparently fell on deaf ears, and the agency in response raised fares, 
shed responsibility for paratransit, and borrowed capital debt to pay operating expenses for two 
years.  In 2006, all three operators agreed to repeat the call for funding under the leadership of 
the Regional Transit Authority.  This campaign has produced a host of materials in hopes of 
convincing legislators and voters to increase transit subsidies (RTA, 2007b). 
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Echoing the earlier conclusions of scholars that transit in Chicago faces a “structural deficit” 
which cannot be solved with fare increases (Anderson, 2004), a March 2007 audit by the Illinois 
General Auditor found that “RTA revenues are insufficient to pay the continuing cost of 
programs or funding new services” (Holland, 2007, 4).  Releasing his report, the Auditor 
commented that “even if you double the fares, it's not enough to solve the problem” of 
inadequate funding (McKinney, 2007). 
 
Yet so far, public transportation needs in Chicago seem to be getting little support.  In June 
2006, the Illinois Legislature told Chicago that it would not bail out mass transit in the following 
year.  In February 2007, Illinois Governor Blagojevich proposed a budget to the Illinois 
Legislature that did not include new funds for public transportation in Chicago (Illinois OMB, 
2007). 
 
In a move of brinksmanship, transit operators in Chicago have passed a consolidated operating 
budget for 2007 that is based on $140 million of revenues that do not yet exist, in hopes of 
securing more funds from the Illinois Legislature (RTA, 2007a).  The Regional Transit Authority 
has declared that its current operations cannot continue without increased public subsidy.  As 
this thesis goes to press, the RTA continues to operate as if it had a full year of revenues, and it 
is unclear what may happen in the final months of the year if supplemental funds are not 
identified. 
2.6 How This Thesis Fits 
The purpose of this research is not to criticize the RTA statute.  Indeed, many others have 
shown that the 1983 RTA Act suffers from distortions (Kirschbaum, 2004; Anderson, 2004; 
Schofield, 2004; CTA, 2005; Misiak, 2005; Hamos, 2005).  Instead, I emphasize not why the RTA‟s 
funding structure should be changed, but how it should be changed.    Because transit funding 
policy in the U.S. is the heterogeneous product of incrementalism, Chicagoans have little to go 
on.  They have no ideal against which to compare themselves.  The Moving Beyond Congestion 
campaign has not explicitly justified its funding request against any concrete reference point of 
need or optimal subsidy.  Instead, the RTA‟s operating budget shows the funds needed to 
maintain current services, and the MBC final report includes a “wish list” of capital projects.  
The campaign lays out a vision for transit‟s role within the city, and describes a menu of 
financing options for how to pay for it, but stops short of choosing one option and implicitly 
identifying who should bear the burden.  In this thesis, I attempt to provide some more rational 
framework for transit funding against which to compare the current funding arrangements. 
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3 Measuring the Energy and Air Emissions Benefits of Transit 
With a view to a funding structure based on social benefits, the purpose of this chapter is to 
verify and quantify the air pollution and energy benefits of public transportation in Chicago.  
Indeed, one oft-cited justification for transit subsidy is the relatively low energy consumption 
and air emissions of public transportation compared to private automobiles.  Transportation is 
the largest domestic source of greenhouse gases, depends almost entirely on fossil fuels, and is a 
major contributor to the urban air pollution that currently exceeds federal standards in Chicago.  
Public transportation in particular is often touted as a potential solution to these problems, and 
is claimed to provide a number of air quality benefits to the region it serves.  As a building 
block for a funding mechanism, it is important to verify and quantify these benefits. 
 
However, modal comparisons of energy and environmental performance are complex.  Urban 
transport modes rely on different fuels and propulsion technologies, each of which affect air 
quality in different ways, and road congestion alters the energy consumption of private cars.  
To account for these complexities, I perform a top-down comparison of the energy and 
environmental performance of public and private passenger transportation in the Chicago 
metropolitan region.  My analysis integrates a variety of data sources to build an emissions 
inventory, models the interaction between mode choice and emissions through auto congestion, 
and comments on the relative advantages and disadvantages of public transit in the future. 
3.1 Current Air Quality in Chicago 
Broadly speaking, passenger transport in Chicago contributes to two categories of air emissions: 
ground-level pollutants that pose public health costs, and stratospheric greenhouse gases that 
contribute to global climate change.   
 
Table 4.  Classification of Transportation-Related Air Pollutants 
Effect Pollutant Range 
Climate Change 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Global 
Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases Global 
Public        
Health 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Metropolitan 
Particulate Matter (PM) Metropolitan 
Volatile Organic Compounds / 
Hydrocarbons (VOC) 
Metropolitan 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) Local 
3.1.1 Current Ground-Level Pollution in Chicago 
Ground-level “criteria” pollutants, so named because they are regulated directly by the Clean 
Air Act, include oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and sulfur (SOx), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs, approximate to hydrocarbons), and particulate matter (PM).  These 
contribute to ground-level pollution such as ozone, causing human health concerns at a local 
and regional scale. 
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Ground-level ozone and particulate matter pose health risks to the Chicago region.  The 
metropolitan area currently exceeds the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for both of these pollutants.  In 
2004 and 2005, the EPA designated the Chicago region as a “moderate non-attainment area” for 
both ozone and particulate matter because air quality monitoring stations around the city 
exceeded certain threshold levels (CATS, 2005).  Breathing ground-level ozone may only induce 
coughing or chest pains, but prolonged or repeated exposure reduces lung functions, and may 
cause asthma and scar lung tissue.  The Illinois EPA estimated that the Chicago region 
accounted for over 85% of the air quality warnings it issued statewide in 2005 based on an index 
of pollutants. For roughly half of monitored days in 2005, the Air Quality Index for Chicago-
specific sectors was “moderate” and “unhealthy for sensitive groups.”2  The American Lung 
Association (2007, 95) gave Cook County‟s air a grade of “F” because of high ozone days 
between 2003 and 2005. 
 
Concerns over Chicago‟s air quality are amplified because a large number of metropolitan 
inhabitants are exposed to the poorest-quality air in the state, posing a public health risk.  In 
addition, the EPA has recently tightened existing regulations, making the further reduction of 
pollutants a long-term concern.  For example, the EPA strengthened the 1-hour ozone standard 
to a more stringent 8-hour standard. 
 
Passenger transportation is a significant contributor to air pollution in Chicago.  The sector 
relies on fossil fuel combustion, which produces NOx, VOCs, and CO.  Ground-level ozone, in 
turn, is formed when NOx and VOCs react with heat and sunlight.  In 2001, EPA inventories 
show that passenger transportation was responsible for about half of these ozone precursors 
and over three-quarters of the RTA Region‟s carbon monoxide (Table 5).  Other economic 
sectors are responsible for the majority of emissions of PM and SOx, so these pollutants are 
excluded from this analysis. 
 
Table 5.  Pollutant Emissions in RTA Region (2001) and Nationally (2002) 
Emission type (tons) NOx VOC CO PM2.5 SO2
Transport's Share of Total Chicago Region Emissions 51% 27% 61% 6% 3%
Transport's Share of Total U.S. Emissions 56% 45% 82% --* 5%  
Source: Illinois data from U.S. EPA AirData, Emissions by Category Report. “Passenger Autos” is 
category 11-(all), “Railroads” is category 12-05, and may include freight rail in addition to commuter rail. 
National data from EPA, 2003, figs. 2-5, 2-19, 2-36, 2-54. 
 
While the Chicago area has attained the federal standard for carbon monoxide, these emissions 
are still a localized concern.  Carbon monoxide is an odorless, poisonous gas released due to 
incomplete fuel combustion, but disperses rapidly.  If concentrated amounts are inhaled, carbon 
monoxide restricts oxygen to the brain and other organs, impairing cognitive abilities and can 
cause brain damage or death.  Despite my reliance on a single emissions factor, CO emissions 
vary based on emissions control technology, vehicle speed, and air temperature.  The California 
Air Resources Board estimates that idling below 10 mph can produce as much as 3-9 times the 
carbon monoxide as traveling at 30 mph or higher (CARB, 2000, 6.2-3).   
                                                     
2 IEPA (2006) p. 17, fig. 9, highlights the Chicago region as home to 91 of 105 Air Quality Index warnings 
in 2005. 
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Therefore, CO emissions from transportation are of particular concern after a cold start and 
when cars idle in traffic, which can create temporarily high concentrations of the gas, or 
“hotspots.”  This analysis relies on regional averages, which may understate the danger of 
localized hotspots. 
3.1.2 Current Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Chicago 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) have very little public health impacts, but instead contribute to the 
greenhouse effect globally.  The International Panel on Climate Change (2007) declared with 
“very high confidence” that greenhouse gas emissions from human activity are causing global 
warming.  The report states that the warming of the climate is unequivocal, and projects an 
average global temperature rise of roughly 0.2° C per decade if current trends continue.  
According to the report, scientists are becoming increasingly certain about predictions of 
changes in wind patterns, precipitation, sea level rise, melting ice, and extreme weather events. 
 
Because of the worldwide nature of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions are a 
fundamentally different problem than ground-level pollution.  Carbon dioxide poses little 
immediate health risks to nearby populations, but because the gas eventually joins everyone‟s 
atmosphere, carbon emissions from anywhere are a concern everywhere. 
 
Although many greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, carbon dioxide (CO2) is the 
leading anthropogenic greenhouse gas, and its concentration in the atmosphere now “far 
exceeds” pre-industrial levels (IPCC, 2007).  Carbon dioxide made up 85% of the anthropogenic 
greenhouse effect in the U.S. in 2003 (EPA, 2006, 2.1), and that proportion climbs to over 95% in 
transportation. Therefore, this analysis focuses on carbon dioxide, but expresses greenhouse 
gases as “carbon dioxide equivalents” to account for non-CO2 GHGs as well. 
 
In Illinois, transportation was responsible for 27% of the state‟s greenhouse gas emissions in 
1998 (DNR, 1998, 7).  On a national level, the sector accounts for nearly 30% of all anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions in the U.S., the largest single domestic source (EPA, 2006, 3).   
3.2 Transportation Consumption in Chicago 
Underlying much of transportation‟s air emissions is the consumption of passenger transport.  
In 2005, public transportation in Chicago provided approximately 211 million vehicle miles 
(NTD, 2005), while autos produced around 55 billion vehicles miles of passenger travel.3  This 
analysis omits freight, and transit non-revenue service. 
 
                                                     
3 The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT, 2006a, Tables FC-4 and TVT-1) reports 59.8 billion 
VMT in the six-county region in 2005, but also states that 91% of VMT in urban areas is by 4-tire 
passenger vehicles, while 9% is by single and multiple unit trucks.  Because this analysis compares only 
passenger transportation, total VMT is estimated at 59.8 × 0.91 = 54.5 billion vehicle miles.  This 59.8 
billion figure is 3.7% lower than the 60.5 billion VMT reported by TTI (2005). 
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Table 6.  Transportation Consumption Statistics in RTA Region, 2005 
Mode Vehicle-Miles % Passenger-Miles % Passenger Trips %
Trip 
Length
Pax per 
Vehicle
CTA Bus 66,572,049         0.12% 781,977,753       1.1% 303,244,197       3.3% 2.6     11.7
CTA Rail 68,920,555         0.13% 1,136,464,595    1.7% 186,759,524       2.0% 6.1     16.5
Metra Rail 38,260,317         0.07% 1,548,276,634    2.3% 68,950,955         0.7% 22.5   40.5
Pace (All modes) 36,918,305         0.07% 273,384,845       0.4% 36,879,312         0.4% 7.4     7.4
Transit Subtotal 210,671,226       0.39% 3,740,103,827    5.5% 595,833,988       6.5% 6.3     17.8
Cars and Trucks 54,456,495,730   99.61% 64,422,034,449   94.5% 8,616,027,076    93.5% 7.5     1.2
TOTAL 54,667,166,956   100.00% 68,162,138,276   100.0% 9,211,861,064    100.0%  
Source: IDOT, 2006a; NTD, 2005.  Auto passenger-miles and passenger-trips calculated as discussed in 
text. 
3.2.1 Average Vehicle Occupancy and Trip Length 
Converting automobile vehicle miles to passenger-miles and passenger-trips requires two key 
auto statistics: average vehicle occupancy and average trip length.  The National Transit 
Database provides equivalent data for transit.  The Chicago Area Transportation Study, in its 
transportation model underpinning the TIP conformity analysis, uses a number of average 
vehicle occupancies depending on time of day and trip purpose.  I find the direct average of 
these rates by trip purpose, weighted by the traffic volume occurring at those time periods to 
produce an average of 1.18.4  Average trip length for automobiles is found by taking an average 
trip length from CATS weighted by national travel volume by trip purpose. 5  By these figures, 
transit in the six-county Chicago region captures a passenger-mile market share of around 5.5%, 
but a passenger-trip share of around 6.5%. 
3.3 Energy Consumption from Transportation in Chicago 
Public transportation in Chicago operates on a number of different fuels.  CTA buses run on 
diesel, while the CTA rail system operates on electricity.  Metra commuter rail trains run 
primarily on diesel fuel, but one line runs on electric power.  Pace vehicles operate on diesel 
fuel and regular gasoline.  This analysis omits paratransit and non-revenue fleets. 
                                                     
4 CATS, 2005, Appendix B, p. 74-76, Tables 7.2 and 7.5.  Occupancy rates range from 1.00 to 1.34.  This 
figure is not out of line with other recent estimates.  A 1997 study estimated that the average vehicle 
occupancy for Chicago was 1.29 ± 0.02 passengers per vehicle using accident data and windshield screen 
counts in the Chicago MSA for cars, vans, and trucks (FHWA, 1997, 3-8).  The 2001 National Household 
Travel Survey suggests a national occupancy rate of 1.1 passengers per vehicle for work commute trips, 
and 1.6 passengers for all trips NHTS, 2001, Table A-14).  The Mobility in Cities Database (UITP, 2001) 
reports Chicago‟s average vehicle occupancy as 1.1. 
5 CATS (2005) in their TIP conformity analysis estimates trip lengths based on trip purpose: 10.6 miles for 
home-to-work, 5.3 miles for home-to-other, and 5.7 miles for other purposes.  The NHTS (2001) estimated 
that nationally, around each of these three categories accounted for around one third of all VMT, so a 
weighted average for Chicago based on these figures yields an average auto trip length of 7.5 miles. 
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Table 7.  Transportation Energy Consumption Statistics in RTA Region, 2005 
Mode
Gallons of    
Diesel 
Gallons of 
Gasoline kWh Electricity
CTA Bus 24,428,000        -                    -                    
CTA Rail -                    -                    408,603,200      
Metra Rail 24,125,000        -                    100,576,936      
Pace (All modes) 5,335,716          707,600            -                    
Transit Subtotal 53,888,716        707,600            509,180,136      
Cars and Trucks -                    2,682,585,997   -                    
TOTAL 53,888,716        2,683,293,597   509,180,136      
  Energy consumed 
in BTUs (000) %
3,590,916,000       0.98%
1,394,154,118       0.38%
3,889,543,506       1.07%
872,800,252          0.24%
9,747,413,876       2.67%
355,442,644,543   97.33%
365,190,058,419   100.00%  
Source: NTD, 2005, Table 17 
 
I estimate gasoline consumed on Chicago‟s road system by applying an average fuel economy 
(EPA, 2005a) to the total number of vehicle miles traveled in the six-county region. Assuming 
that the mix of vehicles on the road in Chicago is little different from the rest of the country,6 
and that all 4-tire passenger vehicles run on gasoline,7 cars on Chicago roads in 2005 consumed 
around 2.7 billion gallons of gasoline.  To compare energy usage, all fuel types are converted to 
common units: British Thermal Units, or BTUs. 
3.4 Air Pollution from Transportation in Chicago 
To estimate the volume of air pollutants generated by each mode, national average emissions 
factors are applied to current travel patterns in Chicago.  However, data for emissions factors 
are found in several different sources, and depend on the type of vehicle, the vehicle‟s age, fuel 
consumed, and driving conditions.  A comprehensive transportation emissions model using 
hundreds of emissions factors such as MOBILE6 is beyond the scope of this analysis.  Table 8 
shows the emissions factors used in this analysis. 
 
Table 8.  Modal Emissions Factors Applied 
grams Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline
Cars and Trucks (per mile) 382     394     1.43    1.16 0.60 1.56 1.59 16.27
Diesel Buses (per mile) 3,695  --- 23.18 --- 0.58 --- 3.19 ---
Diesel Locomotives (per mile) 6,349  --- 107.63 --- 6.28 --- 16.77 ---
Electric Power (per MWh)
VOC COCO2
220,763.41 12.70 88.90
NOx
362.87  
Source: discussed in text. 
 
The EPA provides emissions factors for carbon dioxide for all fleets based on fuel usage (EPA, 
2005b).  Emissions from electricity generation for CO2 and NOx are taken specifically from 
environmental disclosure statements from Chicago‟s supplier for railroads, Commonwealth 
                                                     
6 NHTS (2001) provides evidence that the Midwest region of the U.S. is little different from the average 
national fuel efficiency.  Compared to the NHTS national average of 20.2 MPG, the “East and West North 
Central Midwest” regions of the U.S. showed fleet averages of 20.3 and 20.0 MPG, respectively (Table A3, 
Energy Information Administration / Household Vehicles Energy Use: Latest Trends). 
7 Diesel-powered passenger cars are a very small component of the U.S. auto fleet.  In 2004, 0.4% of new 
vehicles sold on retail markets were diesel (Davis and Diegel, 2006, 4.5).  In 2003, diesel-powered light 
vehicles consumed 2.2% of all highway transportation energy (Davis and Diegel, 2006, 2.4). 
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Edison, as filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission (ComEd, 2006).  For VOC and CO 
emissions from electric generation, Illinois statewide figures from a U.S. Department of Energy 
dataset are used (Leonardo Academy, 2004, Table 3). 
 
Emissions factors for NOx, VOCs, and CO for autos are from the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, and cars and trucks in the Chicago area are assumed to have the same emissions as 
the national light-duty gasoline auto fleet nationally (BTS, 2006, Table 4-38).  Using the same 
dataset, diesel transit buses fall into the category of diesel heavy-duty vehicles for emissions of 
CO and VOCs (HC), and Pace vanpools are treated as gasoline cars and trucks.  I calculate 
Metra‟s commuter rail diesel locomotives ground-level emissions by separating into them two 
groups based on the “tier” of emissions with which they comply,8 applying EPA‟s emissions 
factors (EPA, 1997), and deriving a weighted average.   
 
Nitrogen oxide emissions factors for buses and commuter rail locomotives must be selected 
with care, since technology and regulations are rapidly decreasing emissions rates.  Detailed 
testing of existing diesel urban transit buses is difficult to find and depends on how frequently 
the bus starts, stops, and idles.  Studies from public health literature use a central estimate of 
28.7 grams/mile (Cohen, Hammitt, and Levy, 2003).  In 2003, New York City MTA estimated 
their buses typically emitted around 24.5 grams NOx/mile (EESI, 2004).  However, recent 
experience from other transit agencies shows that new diesel buses with emission control 
technologies can achieve NOx rates of 17.9 grams per mile.9  Diesel-electric hybrids with filters 
may be able to run at 10.0 grams NOx per mile, or less than half that of conventional buses 
(EESI, 2004).  Since some of the transit buses in Chicago are equipped with these new 
technologies, I use the last three numbers in a weighted average based on the composition of 
the CTA‟s current fleet, for an average of 23.2 grams/mile. 
3.4.1 Ground-Level Pollutants from Transportation in Chicago 
 
Table 9 shows the results of applying emissions factors for ground-level pollutants to 
transportation services consumed. 
                                                     
8 Only Metra‟s MPI MP36PH Locomotive fleet was purchased after 2002 and complies with Tier 1 
standards; the rest of the fleet is treated as Tier 0.  These 27 locomotives represent 19% of the overall fleet 
(RTA, 2006, Commuter Rail Locomotive Rolling Stock). 
9 WMATA measured this performance from an Orion model year 2004 diesel buses equipped with a 
Series 50 Engine, Exhaust Gas Recirculation, and particulate filters similar to those in use by the CTA 
(Melendez et al., 2005). 
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Table 9.  Total Ground-Level Pollutants in RTA Region from Transportation 
Mode Lbs. NOx emitted %
Lbs. VOC 
emitted % Lbs. CO emitted %
CTA Bus 3,401,525          2.2% 85,124               0.0% 468,184             0.0%
CTA Rail 326,883             0.2% 11,441               0.0% 80,086               0.0%
Metra Rail 9,158,736          6.0% 843,149             0.4% 1,434,475          0.1%
Pace (All modes) 1,089,593          0.7% 64,394               0.0% 451,847             0.0%
Transit Subtotal 13,976,736        9.1% 1,004,108          0.5% 2,434,592          0.1%
Cars and Trucks 139,188,150      90.9% 187,794,031      99.5% 1,952,718,408   99.9%
TOTAL 153,164,886      100.0% 188,798,139      100.0% 1,955,153,000   100.0%  
3.4.2 Greenhouse Gases from Transportation in Chicago 
Surface passenger transportation in Chicago generates a significant volume of greenhouse 
gases.  Since carbon dioxide is the leading greenhouse gas in the transportation sector, the EPA 
advises simply inflating CO2 calculations by 100/95 to reach estimated CO2 equivalents from 
fossil-fuel based transportation (EPA, 2005b), which is followed here for CTA bus, Pace, Metra, 
and cars and trucks.  Following EPA guidelines, I compute CO2-equivalent emissions by 
calculating carbon dioxide emissions and then adding a small amount for non-CO2 GHGs. 
 
Both the CTA and Metra purchase electricity to power their trains from the private supplier 
Commonwealth Edison (Illinois Commerce Commission, 2005), which in 2005 derived 89% of 
its electricity from nuclear power, thereby emitting relatively little CO2 (ComEd, 2006). 
 
Table 10.  Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions in RTA Region from Transportation 
Mode
Lbs. CO2 Emitted 
(000)
Lbs. CO2 Equiv. 
Emitted (000)
CTA Bus 341,948             0.6% 359,945             0.6%
CTA Rail 198,867             0.4% 198,867             0.4%
Metra Rail 386,657             0.7% 407,007             0.7%
Pace (All modes) 89,289               0.2% 93,989               0.2%
Transit Subtotal 1,016,761          1.9% 1,070,275          1.9%
Cars and Trucks 52,042,168        98.1% 54,781,230        98.1%
TOTAL 53,058,929        100.0% 55,851,505        100.0%  
3.5 Comparing Transportation Modes 
A fair comparison between transportation modes will use passenger-mile and passenger-trip 
figures.  Economic theory suggests that transportation is an intermediate good whose demand 
is derived from the spatial distance between other demanded goods.  Travelers, according to 
this theory, do not consume transportation for transportation‟s sake, they travel to reach some 
other good such as a job, shopping, opportunities, and the activities of daily life.  Thus what is 
important to transportation networks is the throughput and distribution of passengers, not 
vehicles, from place to place. 
 
From a social perspective, a modal comparison based on passenger-miles may underestimate 
the energy efficiency of public transit because transit trips tend to be shorter.  If the true 
measure of success in transportation provision is accessibility, not mobility, and if travelers 
derive utility from trips, regardless of mode or length, a comprehensive measure of a 
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transportation system performance may be the provision of passenger-trips, not passenger-
miles.  A mile on a train may not be directly comparable to a mile in a car because the 
automobile system operates in built environments where longer trips are required for 
comparable levels of accessibility (Holtzclaw, 2007).  For instance, a rail passenger might access 
his job with a 5-mile trip, achieving the same amount of accessibility as someone who drives 10 
miles to their job.  Transit riders may simply travel shorter distances in motorized vehicles than 
automobile drivers by living in dense, compact development friendly to automobile substitutes 
such as walking, bicycling, and transit.  Behind each transit passenger-mile may be fewer 
passenger-miles altogether, and behind each transit passenger-trip may be more walking and 
biking trips.  The Transportation Research Board‟s latest modal comparison of energy and 
emissions assumes that one mile on transit would be the equivalent of four miles in an auto 
(TCRP, 2003).  To keep this analysis conservative, I assume that one passenger-mile on transit is 
equivalent to one passenger-mile by auto. 
3.6 Results: Modal Performance 
I measure the performance of passenger transport modes in Chicago on a per passenger-mile 
and per-trip basis.  In this analysis, I use unlinked transit trips. 
3.6.1 Results: Ground-Level Pollution 
 
Table 11.  Energy and Ground-Level Pollution by Mode, Per Passenger-Mile 
Mode
BTUs per pax-
mile (000)
Lbs. NOx per 
thous. pax-mile
Lbs. VOC per 
thous. pax-mile
Lbs. CO per 
thous. pax-mile
CTA Bus 4.6                  4.35                0.11 0.60
CTA Rail 1.2                  0.29                0.01 0.07
Metra Rail 2.5                  5.92                0.54 0.93
Pace (All modes) 3.2                  3.99                0.24 1.65
Cars and Trucks 5.2                  2.16                2.92 30.31
Transit Average 2.6                  3.74                0.27 0.65  
 
Table 12.  Energy and Ground-Level Pollution by Mode, Per Passenger-Trip 
Mode
BTUs per trip 
(000)
Lbs. NOx per 
thous. trips
Lbs. VOC per 
thous. trips
Lbs. CO per 
thous. trips
CTA Bus 11.8                11.2                0.3                  1.5                  
CTA Rail 7.5                  1.8                  0.1                  0.4                  
Metra Rail 56.4                132.8              12.2                20.8                
Pace (All modes) 23.7                29.5                1.7                  12.3                
Cars and Trucks 38.9                16.2                21.8                226.6              
Transit Average 16.4                23.5                1.7                  4.1                   
 
In sum, transit emits less hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide but more NOx than cars and 
trucks.  While public transportation produces over 90% fewer VOCs per passenger-mile, and 
only a fraction of the carbon monoxide as cars, its reliance on diesel fuel for buses and 
commuter trains results in higher NOx emissions.  Other studies have found similar results 
(Barth, Younglove, and Tadi, 1996). 
 
Public transport‟s various modes have differing environmental performance, depending on the 
mode‟s energy efficiency, as well as the pollution-intensity of the energy it consumes.  On 
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average, RTA services moved passengers around Chicago at half the energy as private cars in 
2005, but the propulsion technology determines differing emissions.  For example, Metra‟s 
commuter rail operations emit NOx at a particularly high rate even though it is fairly energy 
efficient, due in part to the age of the diesel locomotive fleet. 
 
On a per-trip basis, public transit tends to compare more favorably, mostly because transit trips 
are shorter than automobile trips.  For example, buses in Chicago emit rougly twice the NOx as 
cars per passenger-mile, but slightly less NOx than cars per passenger-trip.  Since Metra trips 
tend to be fairly long (22.5 miles on average), commuter rail‟s performance worsens on a per-
trip basis, especially in NOx.  However, even though Metra trips use more energy per trip, each 
trip is responsible for fewer emissions of CO and VOCs than an auto trip. 
 
With the exception of NOx, which a per-trip analysis tends to reduce, public transit in Chicago 
emits fewer ground-level pollutants than private cars. 
3.6.2 Results: Greenhouse Gases 
In contrast to ground-level pollution, public transit emits fewer greenhouse gases on nearly all 
measures.  GHG emissions from public transportation are about a third of private autos per 
passenger-mile, and a typical car trip emits almost four times as much CO2-eq. as a typical 
transit trip.  Bus modes perform well on a per-trip basis, since bus trips tend to be fairly short. 
 
Table 13.  Greenhouse Gases by Mode per Passenger-Mile and per Passenger-Trip 
Mode
Lbs. CO2 Equiv. 
per pax-mile
CTA Bus 0.46                  
CTA Rail 0.17                  
Metra Rail 0.26                  
Pace (All modes) 0.34                  
Cars and Trucks 0.85                  
Transit Average 0.27                  
Lbs. CO2 Equiv. 
per trip
1.2                    
1.1                    
5.9                    
2.5                    
6.4                    
1.7                     
 
CTA rail appears to perform very well on this metric, both because of its baseline efficiency, and 
because the electricity the trains use is produced by low-carbon sources.  If the electric power 
consumed by rail were produced at the Illinois state average CO2 emissions rate which relies 
more heavily on coal (Leonardo Academy, 2004), or roughly triple that of ComEd, transit in 
Chicago would emit only around 30% more CO2 overall.  This would cut transit‟s advantage 
from third to a half of the emissions per passenger-mile as autos.   
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Figure 8.  Air Emissions by Mode, Per Passenger-Mile 
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3.7 Quantifying the Air Pollution Benefit of Transit 
Because public transportation in Chicago emits air pollutants at a lower rate than private 
transport, transit use avoids a certain amount of regional and global air pollution.  To quantify 
this air quality benefit, I predict the air pollution that would have otherwise occurred in the 
absence of transit and compare to the current situation.  If there were no public transportation 
in Chicago, I assume that transit riders would drive at the current average vehicle occupancy. 
 
The interaction between mode choice and emissions through traffic congestion complicates the 
comparison between these modal scenarios.  Increased congestion will tend to decrease fuel 
economy and increase emissions rates per mile, and to the degree that public transportation use 
reduces congestion, transit produces ancillary air pollution benefits.  Thus, quantifying public 
transport‟s effect on air pollution in a metropolitan area takes two dimensions: directly avoided 
emissions through greater efficiency, and indirectly avoided emissions through automobile 
congestion relief. 
 
To model the air pollution impacts of congestion, I express excess gasoline consumed in traffic 
(TTI, 2005) as a function of traffic density, measured in auto VMT per road centerline-mile.  This 
indicator controls for historic growth in VMT and roadway capacity, and says intuitively that 
congestion is a product of how many cars are on a given stretch of road. 10  As Figure 9 shows, 
fuel consumed in congestion has been historically correlated to traffic density. 
 
Figure 9.  Excess Fuel Consumed in Congestion in Chicago 
                                                     
10 All data are from TTI (2005), and financial figures are inflated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Urban 
Consumer Price Index to 2003 dollars. 
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Source: TTI, 2005 
 
I make the simplifying assumptions that emissions per gallon are roughly similar between 
normal and congested speeds, that all modes of transit are not affected by, and do not 
contribute to congestion, and that VMT is added to the road network with roughly the same 
spatial and temporal distribution as existing traffic. This is a conservative estimate, since idling 
probably produces higher emissions levels.  Without transit, traffic density and congestion 
would increase, and excess gasoline consumed from congestion in the no-transit scenario would 
increase by 44 million gallons.11  By applying the emissions factors in Table 8 to excess fuel, I 
obtain emissions from congestion. 
 
The overall differences between the current situation and the no-transit scenario are shown in 
Table 14.    
 
                                                     
11 To calculate emissions savings with mileage-based emissions factors, 44 million gallons of saved fuel is 
the equivalent of 44 million gal. × 20.3 miles per gallon = emissions equivalent of 893.2 million “miles.”  
Congestion does not cause an increase in distance traveled; this figure is used to calculate the emissions 
equivalents of idling and traveling for longer durations to cover the same distance. 
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Table 14.  Quantity of Emissions Saved by Transit in Chicago, 2005 
Efficiency Savings 
(tons) NOx VOC CO CO2 Equiv.
With Transit 69,474             85,637             886,842           55,851,505       
Without Transit 66,800             90,127             937,161           56,770,338       
Savings from Transit (2,674)              4,490               50,318             918,833           
from CTA Bus (777)                995                  10,539             138,004           
from CTA Rail 965                  1,497               15,589             326,226           
from Metra (2,637)              1,665               20,637             391,945           
from Pace (226)                332                  3,554               62,658             
Congestion Savings 
(tons) NOx VOC CO CO2 Equiv.
Saved Emissions 1,036               1,397               14,528             407,565           
TOTAL (tons) (1,639)              5,887               64,846             1,326,397          
 
In every pollutant except nitrogen oxides, transit in Chicago is providing a net environmental 
benefit.  Transit saves the region roughly 1.3 million tons of greenhouse gases each year.  
However, transit‟s net addition of nitrogen oxide emissions is a serious concern, since ozone is 
the product of both VOCs and NOx.  Dividing the avoided costs by service board may be 
unrealistic given the network interdependencies of transit, but it does illustrate how different 
propulsion technologies have different environmental effects.  The CTA has a negligible effect 
on the region‟s NOx emissions as a whole, because its dirtier bus operations are balanced by its 
cleaner rail operations.  Metra, which runs primarily on older diesel locomotives, increases the 
overall NOx emissions in Chicago. In fact, these results suggest that if the sole objective were the 
reduction of NOx, Chicago‟s air would be better off if passengers aboard CTA buses and Metra 
trains drove cars.  However, the other effects of transit tend to offset this drawback.   
3.7.1 Financial Value of Transit’s Emissions Reductions 
However, not all reductions of air pollution provide equal benefits.  To consider appropriate 
amounts and sources of transit finance, I place an economic value on the reduced air pollution.   
 
Attaching a dollar figure to the value of improved air quality is difficult, because the connection 
between tailpipe emissions and human health and economic costs depends on a number of 
uncertain intervening factors.  For example, hydrocarbons and NOx  react with sunlight to 
produce ozone, but the costs of these emissions depends on weather, time of day, the number of 
people exposed, and the duration and concentration of exposure.  Similarly, the cost of carbon 
dioxide emissions will hinge on how the planet‟s ecosystems will respond to warming (AEA, 
2005a), and how climate change will effect the global economy. The recent Stern Review of 
Global Climate Change in Britain predicted costs of global warming between 5-20% of world 
GDP (Stern, 2006), suggesting that the range of carbon emissions costs could be very large. 
 
Despite these methodological difficulties, researchers have produced estimates of the social cost 
of air emissions.  While a thorough literature review is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
evaluation methodologies include contingent valuation, hedonic analysis, and stated and 
revealed preferences.  Data comes from a wide variety of disciplines such as insurance costs, 
epidemiological studies, air circulation and meteorological models, and econometric analysis.  
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Most analyses model “pathways” between emissions and health and environmental effects, 
using dose-response models (Krupnick, Rowe, and Lang, 1997).  To account for uncertainty in 
these estimates for my purposes, I select a range of social cost values. 
 NOx.  The primary driver behind the cost of nitrogen oxides is costs due to bronchial 
illnesses and deaths.  Litman (2005) estimates a cost of $15,419 per ton for mortality, and 
AEA (2005b) estimates €4,400 – €12,000.  I use $6,000 - $25,000. 
 VOCs.  Hydrocarbons and other organic compounds are another precursor to ground-
level ozone with local and regional effects.  One European study (AEA, 2005b) estimated 
the cost of VOCs between €950-€2800 per tonne.  Litman (2005), updating Wang, Santini, 
and Warinner (1994), cites $14,419 per ton.  Holland and Watkiss (2002) estimated €2100 
per tonne in Europe.  I use the range of $1,500 - $14,419. 
 CO.  Costs of carbon monoxide include acute CO poisoning, cardiovascular effects from 
chronic inhalation, and the effects of more than 2,000 deaths per year in the U.S. (Mott, et 
al., 2002).  However, because CO is very local and rapidly disperses, the cost to human 
health is relatively low.  Delucchi and McCubbin (1996) estimate a range of $10-$90 per 
ton, while Litman (2005) updates Wang, Santini, and Warinner (1994) and estimates $435 
per ton.  I use the range of $10-$435 per ton. 
 CO2.  The IPCC (2007) predicts costs between $20-80 per ton by 2030, and $30-155 per 
ton by 2050.  A review of academic literature suggested a mean value of $93 per ton, 
with a range as high as $350 per ton (Tol, 2005).  To account for this range of uncertainty, 
I use $20 and $350 per ton. 
 
Table 15.  High and Low Estimates of Social Costs of Air Emissions 
 Social Cost per Ton 
Pollutant Low High 
Nitrogen Oxides $6,000 $25,000 
Volatile Organic Compounds $1,000 $14,419 
Carbon Monoxide $10 $435 
Carbon Dioxide eq. $20 $350 
Source: discussed in text. 
 
Page 40 of 122 
Table 16.  Quantity and Value of Air Emissions Saved from Transit 
Efficiency Savings
Reduced by 
Transit
Social Cost 
per Ton Total Cost
Social Cost 
per Ton Total Cost
NOx (2,674)               6,000$             (16,046,255)$      25,000$           (66,859,397)$      
VOC 4,490                1,500$             6,734,837$         14,419$           64,739,741$       
CO 50,318              10$                  503,184$            435$                21,888,484$       
Ground-Level Subtotal (8,808,235)$        19,768,827$       
CO2-Equivalent 918,833            20$                  18,376,656$       350$                321,591,483$     
Total Efficiency Savings 9,568,421$         341,360,310$     
Congestion Savings
NOx 1,036                6,000$             6,213,242$         25,000$           25,888,509$       
VOC 1,397                1,500$             2,095,742$         14,419$           20,145,669$       
CO 14,528              10$                  145,280$            435$                6,319,659$         
Ground-Level Subtotal 8,454,264$         52,353,837$       
CO2-Equivalent 407,565            20$                  8,151,294$         350$                142,647,638$     
Total Congestion Savings 16,605,557$       195,001,475$     
TOTAL Savings 26,173,978$       536,361,785$     
Low Estimate High Estimate
 
 
From a financial perspective, the value of the air pollution avoided by public transit is in the 
range of $26-$536 million per year.  The biggest source of variance between these low and high 
estimates is the social cost of greenhouse gases.  This range reflects the considerable uncertainty 
between tailpipe emissions and economic and public health costs, but suggests that transit‟s 
overall impact on air quality in Chicago is positive. 
3.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
To test the sensitivity of the calculations in these results, I tested a range of parameters as shown 
below.  The low range of the carbon per megawatt-hour of electricity models the effect of transit 
consuming average Illinois electricity.  Overall, while my results do display some sensitivity, 
the range tested here does not change the direction or conclusion of the research. 
 
Table 17.  Sensitivity Analysis of Emissions Calculations 
Parameter
Initial 
Value
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Initial Values
Lbs. CO2 per MWH Electricity 487 1152 350 0.36 0.25 -- -- 2.30 1.60 -- -- 1.17 1.36
Average Vehicle Occupancy 1.18 1.60 1.00 -- -- 0.63 1.01 -- -- 4.7 7.5 0.96 1.58
0.27 1.33
Transit Lbs. 
CO2 / PMT
Mill. Tons 
CO2-eq. 
Saved by 
Transit
Range 
Tested
Transit Lbs. 
CO2 / Trip
1.70
Auto Lbs. 
CO2 / Trip
6.4
Auto Lbs. 
CO2 / PMT
0.85
 
3.9 Remarks on Results 
The results of this analysis lead to several observations. 
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3.9.1 Damages from Electricity Generation 
Because public transit is partially powered from an electrical grid, transit‟s ground-level air 
pollution could in fact be even less harmful than that of automobiles depending where the 
power plants are.  Because ozone is only a human health problem if people are exposed, a 
remote generating power plant could lessen human health impacts.  However, ground-level air 
pollutants also damage ecological systems. 
3.9.2 Addressing Previous Research 
This analysis provides some insight into the ongoing academic debate over the social 
desirability of urban public transit.  For example, Winston and Maheshri (2006) dismiss the 
environmental benefits of rail transit by pointing to rail‟s low load factor, high consumption of 
electricity which produces pollution, and reliance on heavy fuels, concluding that transit has “at 
best, an ambiguous effect on the environment.”  This analysis does account for transit‟s load 
factor, pollution produced by electricity generation, and the environmental effects of diesel fuel, 
and concludes that the net environmental effect of rail transit is measurably positive for the 
Chicago region.  
3.9.3 Including Full Lifecycle Emissions 
It can be argued that a true comparison of energy efficiency between modes should include 
estimates of energy to construct the facilities upstream.  Rail operating emissions seem low, for 
example, but rail requires much heftier initial construction costs and energy than roads.  
However, the academic literature on “well-to-wheel” lifecycle analyses concludes that the 
modal difference is small.  The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the total lifecycle cost 
of fuel production (extraction, refining, etc.) and vehicle production for cars and buses are 
approximately 1.4 times the direct emissions, while the same proportion for electric rail is about 
1.1 (EPA, 2006, 14-1).  In a detailed analysis of vehicle lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, 
Delucchi et al. (2002) estimated that public transit persistently emits 26-79% less greenhouse 
gases than typical autos per passenger-mile, even when accounting for fuel, vehicle 
maintenance and storage, infrastructure construction, and vehicle assembly.  Even if 
transportation does benefit from energy-intensive capital investments, it seems that lifecycle 
energy costs do not differ substantially across modes. 
3.9.4 Technology and NOx 
In the future, public transit‟s disadvantage relative to autos in NOx emissions is likely to persist.  
The CTA and Pace plan to replace older buses with new vehicles which emit as much as 90% 
less CO and VOCs, but NOx emissions reductions will be “in the 5 to 15% range” (CTA, 2007, 
84).  As Metra replaces older diesel locomotives with newer Tier 2 compliant engines with 
roughly half the emissions as the Tier 0 machinery it primarily operates now, NOx emissions 
will fall (EPA, 2007), but the long service life of locomotives will limit the speed of this effect. 
 
However, automobiles will likely achieve comparable emissions reductions at a similar pace. 
Future technology is projected to dramatically improve NOx emissions in Chicago more than 
mode choice.  In its MOBILE6 model, the EPA instructs Metropolitan Planning Organizations to 
use emissions rates for NOx which drop steeply in future years (EPA, 2001, 1-7).   The air quality 
Page 42 of 122 
conformity analysis for Chicago‟s TIP shows an 80% reduction of NOx and a 27% increase in 
vehicle miles traveled by 2030.12 
3.9.5 Future Environmental Role of Transit 
In the future, ground-level air pollution from passenger transport might conceivably be 
eliminated nearly entirely.  Tighter regulations of propulsion technology, from cleaner fuel 
combustion to tailpipe emissions capture, might drive criteria pollutants from engines to near 
zero.  Offsetting this trajectory, however, may be rising overall volumes of travel, and growing 
scientific knowledge that the types and amounts of pollution previously thought safe are indeed 
unsafe.   
 
While controlling ground-level pollution has been achievable by both increasing overall fuel 
economy and controlling emissions per gallon, there appears to be no viable analogous 
technology to the latter for carbon dioxide.  Until de-carbonized fuels or carbon sequestration 
become viable, reducing CO2 emissions per passenger-mile traveled in transportation may have 
to come from improved fuel economy, cleanly-generated electricity, or higher passenger loads 
per vehicle.  Ultimately, public transportation‟s environmental advantage may remain because 
electrification and high passenger load factors are feasible and realistic. 
3.10  Air Emissions: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I built an inventory of key air emissions from the surface passenger 
transportation in Chicago and compared the environmental performance of travel modes 
within the sector.  I found that public transportation provides mobility to passengers with less 
air pollution than the private automobile.  On local pollutants, the results are mixed: transit 
loses its environmental advantage in NOx due to its reliance on diesel, but contributes 
significantly less hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide.  On global pollutants, transit‟s 
greenhouse gas emissions are roughly a third of private cars per passenger mile.  On energy, 
public transit‟s energy use is roughly half of cars per passenger mile. 
 
In addition, I quantified the net environmental benefit of public transportation by constructing a 
hypothetical no-transit scenario and comparing to the current situation, including the results of 
a simple congestion model.  I concluded that without transit, air quality would be affected in 
two ways: first, accommodating equivalent levels of travel demand with automobiles would 
decrease NOx slightly but increase every other type of emission, including the emissions of 1.2 
million tons of greenhouse gases per year.  Second, the additional vehicles on the road would 
cause increased congestion, further degrading air quality.  I conjecture that public transit‟s 
future environmental advantage may stem from its ability to run on relatively clean electric 
power and achieve high passenger loads, but that technology is likely to improve emissions for 
all modes. 
 
Finally, I attached a range of financial values to the emissions avoided by public transit, and 
calculated that the net benefit to air quality in Chicago from transit was between $26 and $536 
                                                     
12 CATS (2005) section 5.2, table 2, p. 24 indicates VMT growth; sections 10.1 and 10.3, tables 8 and 9, 
pp.89-90 show NOx and particulate matter reductions. 
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million per year.  This range largely reflects uncertainty around the economic costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
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4 Measuring Safety Benefits of Transit 
It is often argued that public transportation is a safer mode of transportation than private 
automobiles.  Transit, the theory goes, avoids a great deal of public and private costs from 
traffic accidents, including external costs that everyone in society pays for above and beyond 
collision insurance.  Because of the relatively high safety costs of auto travel, transit is 
sometimes touted as a way to avoid some of these costs.  This chapter attempts to quantify the 
safety benefits that public transportation services in Chicago provide to the region.  
4.1 The Theory: Why Do We Care? 
Why should the government care about transportation safety?  To some extent, drivers know 
the risks they take when they choose to drive, and mandatory insurance programs make certain 
that only those who drive pay for each other‟s medical and collision expenses.  However, 
insurance programs do not internalize all costs of driving – some costs are external and are paid 
by those who do not drive, or who do not incur the costs.  Put another way, auto drivers do not 
face the full social marginal costs of their actions when they make daily decisions to drive, so 
their consumption decisions are not economically efficient.  Indeed, many recent studies on the 
external costs of automobiles identify safety as the largest cost component, above air and noise 
pollution (INFRAS, 2004; Lindberg, 2001). 
 
When a crash happens in the U.S., parties besides the affected drivers and their insurance 
programs pick up a portion of the costs in a number of ways.  Government health care 
programs pay medical costs for uninsured people, senior citizens (through Medicare), the poor 
(through Medicaid), and those prevented from working (through Worker‟s Compensation).  
States typically pay for emergency roadside assistance programs with revenues from all 
taxpayers.  When an accident causes traffic delays, hundreds or thousands of motorists could be 
forced to waste time and fuel, and others inconvenienced.  Miller calculates that external costs 
of highway travel reach one-third of total costs (Miller, 1997, 298).  Blincoe (1996) estimates that 
the driver involved in the crash and insurance programs ultimately pick up 76.4% of the costs of 
accidents, while government and other parties pick up the remaining 23.6%. 
 
Besides these average external costs, there is an increasing marginal cost to driving as well.  
Simply put, your chance of getting into an accident depends on how many other cars are on the 
road with you.  Newbery (1988) suggested that accident rates will increase as the square of 
traffic flow, an idea that Steimetz (2004, 36) notes is similar to kinetic gas theory: “the number of 
collisions between „particles in a box‟ is proportional to the square of the number of particles in 
the box.”  Like congestion, insurance costs per vehicle mile traveled have been shown to rise as 
roads become more saturated with vehicles (Edlin and Mandic, 2006) (see Figure 10).   
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Figure 10.  U.S. Automobile Insurance Collision Costs by Traffic Density 
 
Source: Edlin and Mandic, 2006 
 
When you decide to drive, you theoretically account for the possibility you might be involved 
in a crash, but you do not consider that your joining the road will increase the possibility of a 
crash for everyone else already on it.  Because marginal social costs are therefore higher than 
marginal private costs, there is an economic rationale for government action to raise the price to 
marginal social costs, or to correct for the external costs in some other way. 
 
Like congestion, accident costs are partly external.  From a moral perspective, it may be 
government‟s duty to do everything it can to stop all traffic accidents because of the value of 
human life.  From an economic perspective, though, government may not be obliged to 
eliminate accidents, since the benefits of car travel are worth some risk.  But it is government‟s 
job to correct the market failure wherein auto drivers do not face the full marginal social cost of 
their actions, and where one subset of society is imposing external costs on everyone in society.  
Zero-car households, for example, pay taxes for accident response services they do not use.  By 
reducing the external crash costs of driving automobiles, government can assure a more 
efficient and equitable outcome. 
4.2 National Patterns in Traffic Safety Costs 
The magnitude of fatalities, injuries and property damage of automobile crashes are significant 
on a national scale.  In 2004, over 41,000 Americans were killed in vehicular accidents, which 
equates to over 100 people per day (NHTSA, 2005).  In addition, crashes caused over 5.3 million 
non-fatal injuries, and damaged around 28 million vehicles (Blincoe et al., 2002).  Since 1975, the 
overall number of traffic fatalities has held roughly steady in the U.S.  However, vehicle-miles 
traveled have been rising, so the average fatality rate per vehicle-mile traveled has been on the 
decline (NHTSA, 2005). 
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Figure 11.  U.S. Automobile Traffic Fatalities and Fatality Rate Since 1975 
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Source: Data from 1975-2000: NHTSA 2000 Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes: 2000, Table 5. 
Data from 2001-2004: NHTSA Traffic Annual Assessments (multiple years). 
 
Traffic accidents result in large economic costs.  Miller (1997, 297) estimated that the social costs 
of automobile accidents totaled $367.9 billion in 1993.  The U.S. Department of Transportation 
estimates that the economic costs of automobile crashes in 2000 totaled $230.6 billion, or roughly 
2.3% of the total national GDP (Blincoe et al., 2002).  Included in this figure are medical costs, 
lost market productivity, travel delays, and property damages, as shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  Components of U.S. Automobile Accident Costs, 2000 
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Source: (Blincoe et al., 2002) 
 
It should be noted that the financial value of a human life used in analyses like these is a 
statistical construct only.  Economists use a variety of valuation techniques to determine this 
value, most commonly built from the discounted future value of earnings, but also from 
contingent valuations, juries‟ values, willingness to pay for risk reduction, and wage-risk 
studies (Miller, 1997).   
4.3 Accident Costs in Chicago 
Automobile accidents are costly for Illinois and the Chicago metropolitan region as well.  In 
2005, a total of 433,000 car crashes on Illinois roads killed 1,363 people and injured 112,000 
Total: $230.6 billion 
Vehicle Miles Traveled 
Fatalities 
Fatalities per VMT 
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(IDOT, 2006b).  Using an economic value of $7,500 per crash, $1,150,000 per statistical life, and 
approximately13 $45,000 per injury, the Illinois Department of Transportation estimates that 
crashes cost the state‟s economy $9.8 billion in 2005.  Blincoe et al. (2002)‟s national study 
estimates Illinois‟ accident costs at $9.0 billion in 2000. 
 
Table 18.  Social Costs of Accidents in Chicago 
Social Cost Type 2005 Cost
Collision (baseline) 7,500$              
Injury (any severity) 45,000$            
Fatality 1,150,000$         
Source: IDOT, 2006b 
 
The costs of automobile collisions are not distributed evenly across all travel.  For example, 
crash rates in Illinois are highest amongst young drivers, males of all ages, drivers on urban 
roadways, and drivers with a blood-alcohol level greater than zero (IDOT, 2006b).    
 
Figure 13.  Illinois Automobile Crash Rate by Age of Driver, 2005 
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Source: IDOT, 2006b 
 
Nor was the economic burden of automobile crashes evenly distributed geographically.  The 
Chicago metropolitan region appears to bear a higher proportion of these costs than its 
magnitude of travel would suggest.  The six-county RTA Region, home to 55% of the state‟s 
vehicle-miles traveled, suffered 70% of the state‟s crashes and 64% of the associated costs.  
Applying Blincoe‟s (1996) estimate of external costs means that auto drivers in the RTA Region 
imposed external costs on the order of $1.2-1.4 billion which they did not pay.  Accidents 
appear to be more frequent in the Chicago metropolitan area relative to the rest of the state, but 
the accidents tend to result in more injuries and less fatalities for higher economic cost (Table 19 
and Table 21. 
 
                                                     
13 IDOT does not report this figure directly; it is interpolated here by subtracting the reported injury and 
fatality costs from the total cost. 
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Table 19.  Auto Accident Statistics in the RTA Region and Illinois, 2005 
VMT Population Crashes Fatalities Injuries Crash Costs
RTA Region 59,842,302,610     8,091,720      295,297    612           74,425      6,267,652,500$   
Rest of Illinois 48,017,669,900     4,327,573      126,225    751           37,918      3,516,647,500$   
Illinois 107,859,972,510   12,419,293    421,522    1,363 112,343 9,784,300,000$   
% RTA 55% 65% 70% 45% 66% 64%  
Source: IDOT, 2006b 
 
This pattern persists within the RTA Region as well between Cook County and the Collar 
Counties.  Although 58% of region‟s vehicle travel occurred in Cook County, the county 
suffered a higher share of the region‟s crashes and associated costs. 
 
Table 20.  Auto Accident Statistics in the RTA Region and Cook County, 2005 
VMT Population Crashes Fatalities Injuries Crash Costs
Cook County 34,756,129,460     5,376,741      209,165    378           49,430      4,227,787,500$   
Collar Counties 25,086,173,150     2,714,979      86,132      234           24,995      2,039,865,000$   
RTA Region 59,842,302,610     8,091,720      295,297    612           74,425      6,267,652,500$   
% Cook County 58% 66% 71% 62% 66% 67%  
Source: IDOT, 2006b 
 
Table 21 summarizes these trends by calculating crash rates and per-vehicle-mile crash costs.  
 
Table 21.  Auto Accident Rates in Illinois by Proximity to Chicago, 2005 
Crashes per 
mill. VMT
Fatalities per 
bill. VMT
Injuries per mill. 
VMT
Crash Costs per 
VMT
Cook County 6.02 10.9 1.4                   0.12$               
Collar Counties 3.43 9.3 1.0                   0.08$               
RTA Region 4.93 10.2 1.2                   0.10$               
Rest of Illinois 2.63 15.6 0.8                   0.07$                
Source: IDOT, 2006b 
 
It seems that more central or urban areas exhibit higher crash rates per VMT and somewhat 
higher aggregate crash costs per VMT, though accidents in more urban areas tend to result in 
more injuries and less fatalities. 
 
Similar to Edlin and Mandic‟s (2006) findings, Illinois roads with higher traffic densities appear 
to suffer from higher crash rates.  After surpassing a certain density, which the RTA Region 
appears to have done, additional VMT per centerline-mile tends to increase the crash rate. 
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Figure 14.  Automobile Crash Rates by Traffic Density in Illinois 
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Source: (IDOT, 2006b; IDOT, 2006a) 
 
Remember that these figures categorize VMT and accidents where they occur, not by origin of 
driver.  For example, a Lake County resident involved in a crash in Cook County would be 
counted towards Cook County.  Public health research suggests that urban residents face safer 
travel choices, mostly because they drive less – either by driving shorter distances, or 
substituting other modes for automobiles.  Ewing et al. (2003) found that for every 1% decrease 
in sprawl in counties in large U.S. cities (as measured by density and street accessibility), the 
traffic and pedestrian fatality rate decreased by 1.5%.  Lucy (2003) studied the danger of traffic 
fatalities and homicides in different built environments in 15 U.S. metropolitan areas, and 
concluded that “the exurbs are the most dangerous parts of metropolitan areas” because of 
traffic fatalities associated with relatively high car use and high speeds.  
 
This pattern appears to hold for the RTA Region as well.  As traffic density increases, fatalities 
tend to decrease even as crashes become more frequent.  Specifically, crashes tend to be less 
frequent, but more fatal in the suburban and rural counties.  In addition, several counties in 
Illinois appear to be home to particularly lethal roadways, perhaps “hotspots” or remote areas 
traversed by regional interstates.  However, this correlation is weak. 
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Figure 15.  Automobile Fatality Rates by Traffic Density in Illinois 
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Source: IDOT, 2006a; IDOT, 2006b 
 
Figure 16.  Automobile Safety Costs by Traffic Density in Illinois 
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4.3.1 Role of Public Transportation in Traffic Safety 
If auto travel is dangerous, to what degree can encouraging transit use reduce auto accident 
costs?  Like mobility, safety costs are most appropriately measured on a per-passenger mile 
basis, since the purpose of a transportation system is to move people and goods, not vehicles.   
 
Public transit has safety risks as well – some of which are difficult to compare to auto travel.  
U.S. transit agencies reported a total of 248 fatalities and 19,000 injuries in 2004, and there were 
135 cases of trains derailing or buses going off the road in 2004 (APTA, 2006, 26).  The risk of 
personal injury, theft, or other crimes by passengers onboard transit vehicles is significant, and 
private autos arguably pose no analogous concern.  Because transit stations and vehicles are 
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open, public spaces, they are home to criminal activity.  Finally, while fatality rates tend to be 
higher for occupants in cars compared to non-occupants, the opposite is true for public 
transportation.  Transit vehicles pose higher risks to non-occupants than to occupants.  Buses 
and rail vehicles tend to operate in dense urban environments replete with pedestrians, 
bicyclists, and rail grade crossings, whereas a large portion of roadway travel occurs on grade-
separated, exclusively auto roads.  While accident rates for autos appear to be a function of the 
number of autos in a given area of road space, accident rates for transit vehicles may be a 
function of the number of other moving objects in the operating environment. 
 
Table 22.  U.S. Transportation Fatalities by Mode and Occupant Type, 2000 
Occupant
Occupant Non-Occupant Total %
Automobiles 20,492            7,004              27,496            75%
Light Trucks 11,418            8,877              20,295            56%
Motorcycles 2,862              78                   2,940              97%
Transit Buses 19                   77                   96                   20%
Light Rail 5                     12                   17                   29%
Large Trucks 741                 4,189              4,930              15%
--- 2000 Fatalities ---
 
Source: Semmens, 2003, Table 1 
 
However, a fair modal comparison of safety risks will compare safety impacts per passenger 
mile traveled.  This is the marginal choice facing a passenger when deciding how to travel.   
 
Figure 17.  U.S. Transportation Fatality Rate per PMT by Mode, 1995-2000 Average 
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Source: Semmens, 2003; FTA, 2004 
 
As shown in national figures in Figure 17, there is evidence that on a per-passenger-mile basis, 
transit causes less passenger injuries and deaths to occupants and non-occupants alike.  
Commuter rail causes a higher rate of fatalities, primarily to non-occupants; however, the 
mode‟s relatively low passenger-miles of travel compared to heavy rail and bus mean that 
transit‟s average is only marginally increased. 
 
The U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports that the fatality rate of transit is nearly 10 
times less than automobiles, but these numbers may include non-urban VMT and exclude 
transit fatalities to non-occupants.  Therefore, Figure 17 presents a six-year national average of 
fatality rates by mode including urban auto travel only.  Based on this national data, auto travel 
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is responsible for roughly 1.5 times more fatalities per passenger mile than transit.  Miller (1997) 
reports that safety costs per passenger-mile are five times less for rail than for private autos.  
4.4 Quantifying Transit’s Safety Benefit to Chicago 
This analysis has presented evidence that safety costs are probably lower on public 
transportation than in private automobiles.  Theoretically, faced with the decision to take transit 
or drive, a traveler choosing transit might save themselves and the region safety costs. 
 
I estimate the contribution of public transit to transportation safety in the Chicago metropolitan 
region by imagining the region‟s safety costs without transit.  I extrapolate direct increased 
safety costs by applying the average per-mile cost to transit travel described in Table 21.  I 
predict indirect safety costs on a per-mile basis based on the trend identified in Figure 16.  In 
addition, I estimate added safety costs of transit by extending average per-passenger-mile costs.  
To express uncertainty, I use a range of estimates. 
 
SAUTO = f(V) 
 
STRANSIT = f(P) 
 
EAUTO  = f     V +                           (based on Figure 16) 
                                      -   
              C 
 
 
                                             × SAUTO    +     (V +          ) ×  EAUTO      -      STRANSIT  ×  P 
 
 
Where: SAUTO = safety cost per auto vehicle mile 
 STRANSIT = safety cost per transit passenger mile 
 EAUTO = incremental indirect safety cost per auto vehicle mile (based on traffic density) 
 V = automobile vehicle-miles traveled 
 P = transit passenger-miles traveled 
 O = average automobile occupancy 
 C = roadway capacity in centerline-miles 
  
The Illinois Department of Transportation estimated that accidents cost the RTA Region $6.3 
billion in 2005, or the equivalent of around 10¢ per vehicle mile.  Those costs were higher in 
Cook County (12¢ per vehicle mile), but were made up of different kinds of accident costs.  
Although around half of transit passenger miles took place on the CTA in Cook County, many 
of the passenger miles on Metra and Pace may have occurred in the Collar counties.  To reflect 
this uncertainty, I use Cook County and RTA Region averages for high and low estimates for 
SAUTO. 
 
Estimating STRANSIT for the RTA Region is difficult, mostly because the standard reporting 
system for incidents is incomparable to that of the automobile system.   The National Transit 
Database stopped reporting detailed safety statistics in 2002.  Furthermore, fatalities caused by 
P 
O 
P 
O 
Transit Safety 
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train collisions at grade crossings are reported as rail fatalities, even though “impacts with 
vehicles and pedestrians at rail-highway crossings accounted for 92% of passenger train costs” 
nationally in 1993 (Miller, 1997, 300).  On average between 1999 and 2001, however, transit 
services in the RTA region reported approximately 1750 incidents, 1600 injuries, and 37 deaths 
per year (NTD, 1999-2001, Tables 22, 23, 24).  By assuming that this average rate has not 
changed in 2005, and by applying the economic costs described in Table 18, I estimate that 
transit in Chicago incurred safety costs of around $128 million in 2005.  Similar results are 
obtained by assuming that the differential fatality rates in Figure 17 are proxy for overall safety 
cost rates.  Over two-thirds of transit deaths were reported by Metra (NTD, 1999-2001; Federal 
Railroad Administration, 2007), many of which may have occurred at grade crossings, so the 
intrinsic safety of transit may be even greater than what is reported here, and my estimates are 
probably conservative.   To reflect the uncertainty of these assumptions, I use a range of $100-
$150 million as high and low estimates of STRANSIT. 
 
To account for the weak correlation shown in Figure 16, I take as a low estimate that the traffic 
density effect on safety costs is zero, and the trend line as a high estimate.  Vehicle-miles 
traveled V and roadway capacity C are from IDOT (2006a), while transit passenger-miles 
traveled P is from NTD (2005).  Average vehicle occupancy O is taken from section 3.2.1.  
 
Table 23.  Estimated Safety Benefits of Transit in the RTA Region, 2005 
Savings in $ Millions Low High Central
Saved Fatalities 32               34               
Saved Injuries 3,875          4,432          
Saved Crashes 15,377        18,753        
Safety Costs Saved Directly 326$           379$           
Safety Costs Saved From Lower Traffic Density -$            276$           
Transit Safety Benefits 326$           655$           491             
External to Government 77$             155$           116             
Internal to Drivers 249$           501$           375             
-              
Transit Safety Costs Incurred (150)$          (100)$          (125)            
External to Communities Served by Transit (35)$            (24)$            (29)              
Internal to Transit Service Providers -- -- --
-              
Net Safety Benefits of Transit 291$           631$           461              
 
I estimate that if all passenger-miles traveled on transit were to occur on roads, adjusted for 
average vehicle occupancy, the RTA Region would incur between $326-$379 million in 
additional collision costs on its roadways.  In addition, traffic densities would rise slightly, but 
because I found only weak evidence that this would increase the probability of accidents and 
hence the average costs per mile, I conservatively estimate that this effect would cause between 
$0-$276 million in incremental safety costs.  Offsetting these losses would be reduced accidents 
from transit itself, which I estimate between $100-$150 million.   
 
However, some of these costs are internal, while some are external.  The RTA service boards 
carry accident insurance similar to auto drivers.  Applying Blincoe‟s (1996) estimate that 24% of 
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the traffic safety benefits (net of transit safety costs) are external, I estimate an external benefit to 
society of $77-$155 million, and an internal benefit to auto drivers of $249-$501 million, and I 
estimate an external cost to communities served by transit of $24-$35 million, while the internal 
costs to the transit service boards are internalized as insurance expenses.  In total, I estimate the 
net safety benefits of public transportation in Chicago between $291-$631 million. 
 
Considerable uncertainty is reflected in these approximations, but they provide a rough idea of 
the magnitude of safety benefits from transit services in Chicago.  Broadly, my findings suggest 
that transit is safer than cars in Chicago, so the safety benefit of choosing transit is measurable 
and positive.  The phenomenon of an accident externality through increased traffic density may 
be applicable to Chicago, and I have included it as a high estimate, but further research is 
needed. 
 
Lastly, and perhaps most promisingly for transit, the external costs of automobile accidents 
appear to be highest where public transportation can best mitigate them by providing an 
alternate means of mobility– in urban areas. 
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5 Measuring the Congestion Relief and Mobility Benefits of 
Transit 
Another potential justification for public transportation is that transit is said to relieve 
congestion on the roads and provide a low-cost alternative means of mobility.  In view of a 
potential new transit funding structure, it is worth quantifying these benefits, and measuring to 
whom they accrue.  
 
However, quantifying these benefits of transit can be difficult, since the demands for transit and 
roadway capacity are interrelated.  Congestion indicates an equilibrium between alternative 
modes.  To measure the congestion relief provided by transit, I compare the current situation in 
Chicago to a hypothetical city without transit.  Recognizing the difficulties in constructing this 
counterfactual, I suggest ways to measure congestion costs and mobility benefits without transit 
based on a medium-term equilibrium. 
5.1 Why Congestion Happens 
Practically, congestion occurs because human societies organize daily activities so as to capture 
the value of coinciding periods of work, leisure, and rest (Downs, 1992).  We come into the 
office in the morning because everyone is more productive together in the same building at the 
same time, so our colleagues can join our meetings and answer our phone calls.  We endure 
chronic traffic slowdowns because it‟s worth it – whatever is at the end of our trip is more 
valuable than the congestion we suffer through.  To a certain extent, then, some congestion is 
inevitable and a sign of economic strength.  The optimal level of congestion is not zero.  
Without proper planning and accommodation, however, congestion becomes a real problem 
that hinders economic growth. 
 
Physically, congestion happens because drivers supply their own time in the production of 
transportation services on roads, yet the quality of the service provided depends on the rate at 
which vehicles can pass by a given point, so growing traffic density results in slower speeds 
(Mohring, 1999). 
 
Economically, roadway congestion occurs because road capacity has traditionally been given 
away without market price signals.  Traffic occurs because drivers on the road consider only 
private, not social costs when deciding to drive.  When deciding where and when to travel, a 
driver only accounts for the traffic she expects to experience, not the contribution her trip will 
make to overall traffic levels and hence the external cost she will impose on every other driver.   
 
For example, imagine that adding one additional car to a 100-car road at rush hour might slow 
everyone‟s travel time by 1 second.  This driver, perhaps on a 5 minute trip, will face a private 
cost of 5:01 and decide to drive, ignoring the cumulative effect of the 1-second penalty she 
imposes on everyone else.  Because each car experiences a slowdown, the marginal social cost of 
her decision to drive is her private cost (5:01) plus the public cost (100 cars × 1 second = 100 
seconds = 1:40), or 6:41.  More drivers, facing similar choices, continue joining the road until 
congestion becomes intolerable.  In economic terms, this is a classic “tragedy of the commons:” 
because drivers consider only private cost, not the higher marginal social cost of their actions, 
they overconsume, the common good is degraded, and everyone is worse off (Hardin, 1968).  
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Each driver acts rationally according to the incentives before him, yet collective inefficiency 
persists. 
 
Theoretically, this implies that auto driving is underpriced and probably overconsumed, 
especially in peak periods.  All drivers are imposing external costs on another, and no driver 
pays the true marginal social cost of their actions.  Empirical evidence shows that roadway 
congestion is an exponential function.  As more cars join a roadway with finite capacity, 
marginal costs diverge sharply from average costs past a critical point, and congestion increases 
rapidly until the road reaches “forced flow:” stop-and-go traffic or even gridlock depending on 
the design of the street network.  Figure 18 illustrates this relationship: 
 
Figure 18.  Engineering and Economic Representations of Congestion 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from TRB, 2000; Mohring, 1999 
 
Without a way to charge higher prices for a finite quantity of road space at times of peak 
demand, demand will always exceed supply, and levels of congestion will always exceed the 
optimal amount. 
5.2 Congestion Pricing’s Promise for Congestion Relief 
Since the 1950s, transportation economists have been calling for “congestion pricing,” or 
imposing a variable road toll to make drivers face the true marginal social cost of their decisions 
(Vickrey, 1963).   By this logic, the toll would be the difference between average costs and 
marginal social costs where motorists‟ willingness to pay equaled marginal social costs.  While 
consumers are accustomed to peak pricing in goods like airplane tickets, cell phone calls, and 
movie theatres, congestion pricing on roads has proven politically and pragmatically difficult.  
Pricing strategies for road space are fraught with political, informational, and practical 
problems (King, Manville, and Shoup, 2007). 
 
Perhaps the strongest explanation for policymakers‟ reluctance to price road space is 
policymakers‟ perception that mobility is too fundamental to price.  Peaking is inherent to 
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transportation because of the way we organize human activities, and the cost of shifting travel 
to off-peak times or pricing some trips off the road is perceived to be very expensive, especially 
where other modes are unavailable. 
5.3 Road Construction’s Role in Congestion Relief 
In the absence of first-best congestion tolls, or regulatory mechanisms such as parking limits or 
signal priority, one politically acceptable policy alternative to congestion relief in the U.S. has 
been to build roads.  However, this policy is limited by the high cost of road-building in mature 
networks, and the temporary relief provided by new road capacity. 
 
Increasing urban roadway capacity in the U.S. is becoming increasingly onerous for a variety of 
reasons.  A cascade of environmental legislation, such as the National Environmental Policy 
Act, internalized many previous external environmental costs of highway construction, making 
road-building more expensive relative to prior decades.  Large-scale demolitions and takings 
for right-of-ways are increasingly infeasible in dense, built-out cities.  Network spillovers effects 
during construction periods and required mitigation costs are high in mature road networks.  
The financial resources in the Highway Trust Fund are projected to be in deficit by 2009 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2007), so the cost of road building may be rising at the same time 
that available funds are dwindling. 
 
Furthermore, absent congestion charging, building more roads tends to provide only fleeting 
relief to mature transport networks.  More road capacity increases the relative attractiveness of 
driving and soon attracts even more traffic (sometimes away from transit), and reinforces auto-
dependency in land use and car ownership patterns.  A growing academic literature points out 
that road construction will tend to induce traffic demand through feedback mechanisms in trip 
distribution through land use, and any new roads will quickly fill up to similar levels of 
congestion as the roads they were meant to relieve.  In a literature review of induced demand, 
Cervero (2002) estimated the long-term elasticity of auto travel with respect to lane-miles of 
capacity at 0.73, and concluded that “there is no question that road improvements prompt 
traffic increases”.  Winston and Langer (2006) concluded that every $1.00 of federal spending on 
roadway construction resulted in $0.11 of congestion relief.  As Mogridge (1990) states, traffic 
expands to meet the available road space.  Consensus may be growing in transportation 
planning that we cannot build our way out of congestion.   
5.4 Transit’s Role in Congestion Relief 
Another politically acceptable alternative to address congestion in the U.S. has been to subsidize 
alternative modes of transport such as transit. 
 
The appeal of subsidizing transit is that it provides moderate congestion relief without 
explicitly charging for automobile mobility, and allows additional trip-making irrespective of 
roadway congestion.  Practically, subsidizing one transport mode may be politically easier than 
taxing another.  In a congested city, public transport‟s role may not be to relieve congestion 
directly, but to bypass congestion – which contributes to relief somewhat, but also enables 
mobility. 
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5.4.1 Importance of Grade Separation 
Grade separation for transit is important to this strategy: without it, transit‟s potential to relieve 
congestion is reduced.  Urban rail transit operating on its own right-of-way will be independent 
of roadway congestion.  Transit buses contribute to congestion reduction because they take up 
the equivalent of about two passenger cars of road space yet can carry ten times as many 
passengers.  But buses still get stick in traffic caused by other cars on the road.  This problem 
often leads to the irrational situation where bus riders, frustrated that the bus is too slow, 
choose to drive instead.  This adds to traffic, reduces fare revenues, and slows the bus further.  
This encourages even more passengers to abandon the bus, and the cycle repeats until the bus is 
nearly empty and heavily subsidized, traffic is even slower, and everyone is worse off.  Indeed, 
imposing reserved bus lanes on clogged urban routes would in some cases increase passenger 
flows, but policymakers face the political conundrum that when the road is lightly trafficked, 
“buses don‟t need it,” and when the road becomes congested, “buses can‟t have it” (Wilson, 
2006). 
5.4.2 Road-Transit Equilibrium in Congested Corridors 
In strategic corridors at peak periods, increasing transit capacity may be the best way to 
alleviate congestion for everyone.  There is considerable empirical evidence that grade-
separated, parallel alternative modes will tend to reach equilibrium where door-to-door travel 
times are equal.  In theory, some travelers in a given market will be indifferent to everything but 
travel times on peak, and will switch to whichever mode is fastest.  In these situations, 
roadways may congest only up until travel times equal transit travel times.  Transit quality will 
thus “pace” auto congestion, because transit sets the lowest acceptable travel speed 
(Suchorzewski, 1973).  Lewis and Williams (1999) document this phenomenon in several high 
demand U.S. corridors, including the Loop-O‟Hare and Loop-Midway corridors in Chicago.   
 
If it is mass transit that will determine long-run equilibrium travel speeds on a mature 
transportation network‟s most congested corridors, the only real policy to increase travel speeds 
to all modes is to improve the performance of the transit system (Lewis and Williams, 1999, 100-
103).  This is a twist on the saying, “a fleet is only as fast as its slowest ship.” 
 
Figure 19.  Representation of Perceived Travel Costs without and with Transit 
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5.4.3 A Little Bit Can Go a Long Way 
Critics of transit subsidy in the name of congestion relief often argue that public transportation 
accounts for too small a portion of overall travel to have a significant influence on roadway 
congestion.  On a national scale, this is probably true.  But national averages tend to mask that 
congestion is highly concentrated spatially and temporally in dense urban areas where the 
prospects for transit use are greatest.  Furthermore, because congestion costs tend to rise 
exponentially with increases in travel, luring even small traffic volumes off of busy roads in 
peak periods may confer disproportionately large benefits to those who remain.  Indeed, “a 5-
10% reduction in traffic volumes on a congested highway typically causes a 10-30% reduction in 
congestion delay” (Litman, 2005, 5.5)..  Three years after London began its congestion charge, an 
8-17% reduction in vehicles has resulted in a 26-30% reduction in congestion measured in 
vehicle-hours of delay (Transport for London, 2006a).  Viewed another way, if all public transit 
riders were to drive instead, they would impose large congestion penalties on all existing 
drivers. 
5.4.4 The “Backfill” Phenomenon 
Just as induced auto demand tends to offset the congestion relief provided by new road 
capacity, the same phenomenon may also offset much of the relief provided by transit capacity.  
Because demand for automobile travel appears to be so elastic, most urban road capacity freed 
up by transit riders may be quickly “backfilled.”  Economists have described the idea of “latent 
demand,” that is, demand that is inhibited or shifted off-peak because of the cost of congestion 
alone (Small, Winston, and Evans, 1989).  In the context of severe road congestion, congestion 
costs alone may be the primary determinant of travel demand, all other things being equal, so 
any measures to augment capacity or divert demand may have only moderate effects on 
congestion (Small, 1992, 113).  If a policy removes cars from the road, congestion costs decrease, 
and elastic auto drivers who had been just on the margins are encouraged to travel once again, 
or shift their travel to the peak. 
 
Several studies have attempted to quantify this backfill phenomenon vis-à-vis public 
transportation.  In the months following the inauguration of BART service between Oakland 
and San Francisco, an evaluation found that the line diverted 8,750 automobile trips from the 
parallel San Francisco Bay Bridge, but that these trips were soon replaced with 7,000 new 
automobile trips (Sherret, 1980).  That is, 80% of the road capacity freed by transit use was 
backfilled by more cars.  Although the growing literature on induced demand focuses on 
backfill from new highway, not transit capacity, the conclusions are broadly consistent.  While 
the backfill phenomenon does partially undermine transit‟s ability to reduce congestion, it does 
point to transit‟s potential to increase total mobility without increasing congestion.  This 
phenomenon also indicates the elasticity of demand for auto travel with respect to congestion 
costs. 
5.5 Congestion in Chicago 
Automobile congestion in Chicago is relatively severe and is the primary way proponents in 
Chicago seek to justify government support for transit services.  Between 1982 and 2003, as the 
metropolitan region‟s population grew by 13%, VMT increased by 73% on a road network 
which only grew by 26% (TTI, 2005).  Underlying this situation is the spatially and temporally 
peaked nature of travel demand, as shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21. 
Page 60 of 122 
 
Figure 20. The Temporal Distribution of Trips in Chicago 
 
 
Source: CATS, 2005, 7.2 
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Figure 21.  The Spatial Distribution of Automobile Congestion in the RTA Region, AM Peak 
 
Source: Murga, 2007 
 
Chicago is among the top ten major U.S. cities in most indicators that the Texas Transportation 
Institute uses to measure congestion.  Chicago was the third worst congested American city in 
2003 measured by overall costs (a combination of lost time and excess fuel consumption), 
behind New York City and Los Angeles.  Chicago is second only to Los Angeles measured by 
the travel time index, an indicator of how much more on-peak travel costs relative to off-peak. 
 
However, these indicators represent only costs to automobile travelers, and are an incomplete 
measure of how much congestion affects most people‟s daily lives (Litman, 2006).  Drivers in 
New York City, for example, may face the nation‟s second highest congestion costs, but a 
substantial proportion of New Yorkers do not drive automobiles on a daily basis.  Measured in 
delay per traveler, New York City ranks 18th in the country.  Chicago ranks 7th in delay per 
traveler. 
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Supporters of public transportation in Chicago argue that transit‟s ability to reduce congestion 
is a primary rationale for continued government funding.  Indeed, the congestion argument 
may be a powerful one in a political calculus where only 8% of motorized trips in the region are 
served by transit, yet some funding for transit is needed from the other 92%.  Getting the 
majority to commit resources to a service used by a minority requires powerful arguments that 
the service provides communal benefits to all.  The promise of congestion relief may be a good 
way to convince people who aren‟t riding transit that they benefit from it.  
5.6 Modeling Transit’s Role in Congestion Relief in Chicago 
Because of the interactions between transit and the automobile, congestion in a given 
metropolitan region is the result of an equilibrium between travel demand and costs, including 
the quality and availability of alternatives.  To quantify the value of public transit‟s congestion 
relief, I compare the current situation to a hypothetical no-transit city, but the no-transit 
counterfactual can be difficult to predict.  Here, I develop a methodology to imagine medium-
term congestion levels in the absence of transit. 
5.6.1 The Elasticity of Travel Demand 
Some argue that public transport does nothing to reduce congestion – that without a transit 
system, few passengers would otherwise be driving (Cox and O‟Toole, 2004).  These arguments 
implicitly assume that demand for auto travel with respect to congestion is perfectly elastic.  
Given that transportation is primarily an intermediate good to access other activities, and that 
many transit passengers have access to automobiles, the idea that transit riders would simply 
avoid or shift travel in the absence of transit is unlikely.  
 
Others argue that public transport does a lot to reduce congestion - that without a transit 
system, all transit riders can and will drive the exact same trips.  The Texas Transportation 
Institute (2005) reports “congestion savings from public transportation,” by forcing all public 
transit travel onto the road networks at its current distributions, recalculating travel costs, and 
taking the difference.  This calculation assumes that demand for auto travel with respect to 
congestion costs is perfectly inelastic.  This TTI figure is, I believe, an upper bound of the short-
term congestion savings from transit. 
 
A third view, more conservative than the TTI figure, is that travel demand is somewhere in 
between.  If transit were eliminated, former riders would respond in a variety of ways, with 
several demand elasticities depending on the timeframe. 
 In the immediate term, many transit riders may drive, causing congestion to spike 
exponentially.  Some transit riders‟ mobility may be restricted simply because they do 
not own a car.  However, the limited parking supply in central areas would likely 
become a more severe constraint to mobility than congestion. 
 In the medium term, car ownership could increase, travel patterns would readjust, and 
many travelers may be forced to peak-shift or be deterred from driving because of 
congestion costs alone. 
 In the long term, the land use system will adjust to the new road demand and capacity, 
perhaps by sprawling.  In this situation, some economic growth may simply shift to 
another metropolitan area. 
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To make this analysis conservative, I predict transit‟s value by modeling the medium-term 
condition of a city without transit by assuming a mid-range elasticity of demand with respect to 
congestion costs.  
 
To estimate the slope of this demand function, I turn to the backfill rate introduced in section 
5.4.4 and assume a backfill rate of 75% based roughly on Sherret (1980) and Cervero (2002).  In 
theory, if 75% of the roadway capacity liberated by new transit capacity is backfilled by elastic 
auto demand, I assume the inverse is also true.  That is, eliminating transit capacity will only 
add 25% of existing transit demand onto the roads in the same spatial and temporal patterns.  In 
a no-transit scenario, the remaining three-quarters of transit riders would peak-shift, at some 
expense.  
5.6.2 The Cost of Peak Shifting 
As traffic grows in severity, costs rise sharply enough that travelers either a) shift to an off-peak 
time, b) spill over to alternate routes, c) carpool, or d) decide not to travel.  The cost of these 
compensatory measures is probably more than zero, but less than the private average travel 
costs in the congested conditions – otherwise, you would choose to endure the trip.  To keep 
this estimate conservative, I omit these costs to form a lower bound.  However, recognizing that 
transit ridership may be concentrated in peak hours, these omitted costs are likely to be high, 
lending some credibility to the TTI estimate of avoided congestion costs. 
5.6.3 The Nature of Congestion Costs 
In addition, I assume that congestion costs are the only determinant of automobile travel in 
Chicago that differs between the with-transit and no-transit scenarios.14  Although Mohring 
(1999) and others (Small, 1992, 69, 87) model congestion as a function of the volume/capacity 
ratio or vehicle flows on one specific road segment, this kind of analysis is difficult to adapt to 
an entire metropolitan region.  Therefore, I express congestion costs published by the Texas 
Transportation Institute as a function of traffic density, measured in auto VMT per road 
centerline-mile.  This function controls for historic growth in VMT and roadway capacity, and 
implies intuitively that congestion is a product of how many cars are on a given stretch of 
roadway. 15 
 
On a national level, the relationship between traffic density and congestion appears to hold 
broadly across many different city types, but the pattern is strongest among large cities where 
the streets are likely close to capacity already.  The historical data for Chicago specifically 
appear to be no different, and in fact may even be approaching its limits faster than other large 
cities. 
 
                                                     
14 Since congestion costs are the only component of travel costs that change between the two scenarios, I 
use congestion costs and travel costs interchangeably in this chapter. 
15 All data are from TTI, 2005, and financial figures are inflated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Urban 
Consumer Price Index to 2003 dollars. 
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Figure 22.  Congestion Costs in 85 U.S. Cities, 1982-2003 
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5.7 Results: Transit’s Congestion Relief in Chicago 
Traffic density is a good predictor of congestion costs in the six-county Chicago region, and in 
accordance with theory, the relationship appears to be exponential.  Similar to gasoline 
consumed, congestion costs in Chicago can be expressed as a function of VMT divided by the 
capacity of the roadway network, i.e. traffic density.  
 
The Texas Transportation Institute‟s Urban Mobility Report calculates congestion by 
establishing free-flow speeds for each road link depending on road type and direction, 
estimating congested speeds based on daily vehicles per lane, and taking the difference.  Thus 
my expressing congestion as a function of traffic density may approximate TTI‟s methodology.  
In any case, density seems to predict TTI‟s congestion costs. 
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Figure 23.  Historical Congestion Costs in Chicago by Traffic Density 
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Source: TTI, 2005 
5.7.1 Results: A Mathematical View 
In a hypothetical Chicago without transit, I predict auto travel by converting transit passenger 
miles to auto vehicle miles using the average vehicle occupancy described in section 3.2.1.   
Transit riders would likely join the roadway system at the average vehicle occupancy rate.  This 
assumption may be a liberal estimate, as vehicle occupancies might increase in the absence of 
transit, especially given parking constraints.  This function makes the simplifying assumption 
that any VMT is added to or subtracted from the road network with roughly the same spatial 
and temporal distribution as the existing traffic. 
 
The six-county region in 2003 experienced 60.5 billion VMT on a road network of 23,850 road 
centerline-miles, resulting in a traffic density of 2.54 million annual VMT per road centerline-
mile, and estimated16 congestion costs of $4.08 billion.  This translates into a cost of roughly 
6.7¢/VMT.  In addition, transit services in 2003 provided 3.6 billion passenger miles traveled.  
Therefore, without transit, I suggest that Chicago would experience congestion according to the 
following traffic density: 
 
 
                                                     
16 TTI (2005) reports congestion costs of $4.27 billion, but this data point is slightly above the line of best 
fit in the graphs above, so the estimated congestion cost by the trend line is $4.08 billion. 
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V +    P × (1 – R) ×          
 
 
                   C 
 
Congestion Costs = f(D) = 9.316e(0.0024 × D) = $4.40 billion 
 
Where: V = automobile vehicle-miles traveled 
 P = transit passenger-miles traveled 
 R = medium-term backfill rate of automobiles 
 O = average automobile occupancy 
 C = roadway capacity in centerline-miles 
 D = automobile traffic density 
 
My results suggest that the difference between current congestion levels and their levels in the 
absence of transit is approximately equivalent to at least $323 million.  That is, if 25% of transit 
passengers were to join the roadways at the current spatial and temporal distribution of auto 
travel for a 1.5% increase in overall VMT, average congestion costs would rise from 6.7¢ to 7.3¢ 
per vehicle mile. Because these costs are incurred by all vehicles on the roadways, this 1.5% 
increase in travel would cause overall congestion costs to rise by at least 9.5%. 
 
This is probably a conservative estimate, for a number of reasons.  Transit use is often 
disproportionately high during peak periods compared to autos, so transit riders might join the 
most congested roadways at their most congested times, imposing high marginal costs.  Parking 
constraints might also lead to high parking costs, imposing high additional costs on autos. 
In addition, the 75% of transit riders whom I have assumed would shift their travel patterns 
would likely do so at some cost (either inconvenience or additional congestion), which I do not 
estimate.  Further research is needed to quantify this cost, but it suggests that an accurate 
quantification of congestion costs may be higher than these estimates. 
5.7.2 Results: a Graphical View 
These same numbers can be derived graphically, as shown in Figure 24.  Specifically, the 
congestion cost function can also be used to derive an inverse demand function for automobile 
travel in Chicago.  As above, I assume that congestion costs are a function only of automobile 
(not transit) travel.  Implicitly, I omit the congestion effects of transit buses.17 
 
Figure 24 begins with curve MAC, a schematic representation of how rising demand produces 
rising congestion costs, given static roadway infrastructure.  With a transit system, travel costs 
are T, and both auto travel TM and transit travel MB is consumed at equilibrium B.  Without a 
transit system, 25% of former transit riders continue to drive in the same distribution of current 
travel (NA), while 75% either peak-shift or are deterred entirely by travel costs of S at 
equilibrium A.  We now have two points: prices are lower and more is consumed at B, and 
                                                     
17 While buses in mixed traffic contribute to roadway congestion (perhaps more congestion per vehicle 
than cars), CTA and Pace buses comprised only 0.2% of vehicle miles traveled in the RTA district in 2005. 
1 
O 
=  D = 2.57 million VMT per centerline-mile 
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prices are higher and less is consumed at A.  These points indicate the downward-sloping 
demand curve for auto travel with respect to congestion. 
 
In their calculations, it appears that Texas Transportation Institute assumes overall demand for 
travel is inelastic and follows the dotted red line to point C.  As described in section 5.6.1, this is 
probably an upper bound. 
 
Figure 24.  Conceptual Diagram Modeling Transit’s Congestion Savings 
 
 
The change in welfare between with-transit costs T and no-transit costs S for the original autos 
TM (STMN) are the real congestion benefits a transit system provides.  Using actual data for 
Chicago, as shown in  
Figure 25, this area is calculated to be $323 million.  To reflect the uncertainty associated with 
the assumed backfill rate of 0.75 and the unknown cost of compensatory peak-shifting, I take 
$323 million as a lower bound, and the TTI figure of $1,577 as an upper bound. 
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Figure 25.  Estimating Congestion Savings from Transit in Chicago 
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5.8 Sensitivity Analysis of Congestion Relief 
Table 24 indicates that my analysis is sensitive to initial parameters.  By definition, the real 
congestion benefits of transit services in the Chicago region could be zero if auto demand is so 
elastic that the backfill rate is 100%.  On other hand, if auto demand with respect to congestion 
costs is so inelastic that the backfill rate is 0%, transit‟s congestion relief benefit reaches $1,577 
million.  This analysis is only intended to be a rough measurement of a likely lower bound of 
transit‟s role in congestion relief, and the value of a transit network to its riders. 
 
Table 24.  Sensitivity Analysis of Initial Parameters to Congestion Model 
Parameter 
Baseline 
Used Range Tested 
Congestion Relief 
($m) 
Auto “Backfill” Rate 0.75 
 
1.00 – 0.50 $0 - $671 
Avg. Auto Occupancy 1.18 1.60 – 1.00 $236 - $486 
 
5.9 Consumer Surplus and Low-Cost Mobility Benefits 
Although the elasticity of auto demand tends to moderate transit‟s congestion relief effects, the 
extra trips on transit may represent value to the passengers.  Here, I attempt to quantify this 
value as passengers‟ consumer surplus.  Consumer surplus also gauges the utility passengers 
derive from the transit service, thereby capturing a host of benefits such as travel time and 
avoided costs of car ownership.  While predicting the utility that might be derived if 
Congestion Savings 
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government undertook other activities besides transit is beyond the scope of this paper, 
consumer surplus provides an important measure of the value of mobility to transit passengers.  
A number of economic evaluations use this technique (Winston and Maheshri, 2006; Small, 
1999, 142-147; Nelson et al., 2006). 
5.9.1 The Value of Low-Cost Mobility 
A passenger chooses to travel because she derives utility from the trip above and beyond her 
travel costs.  However, for low-income residents, the fixed costs of car ownership may be an 
obstacle to work-based trips with value to the metropolitan economy.  A transit system 
provides mobility at relatively low and incremental costs to the user.  The loss of transit, 
therefore, might price transit-dependents out of the mobility market altogether.  The potential 
value of enabling economic activities or mobility is captured in the transit riders‟ willingness to 
pay, or consumer surplus. 
5.9.2 Extending the Congestion Model 
The congestion relief model can be extended to measure this benefit.  Figure 26 models the 
effect of eliminating transit on roadway congestion levels.  The markets for automobile and 
transit travel are shown, with the lower diagram for transit drawn in reverse.  The current with-
transit city finds equilibrium points of B and Y, where drivers endure costs of T, and BD (or YV) 
transit use occurs.  Because transit exhibits network economies of density, average transit costs 
to travelers decline with service consumption due to reduced waiting times (Small, 1992; 
Mohring, 1972).  Transit trips ZV represent transit riders with a relatively high consumer 
surplus, such as captive riders.  Eliminating transit increases demand for autos (shifts the 
demand curve Auto Demand1 outward to Auto Demand0), and may make demand more 
inelastic because fewer alternatives exist.  Former transit riders BC join the road network 
following its current distribution patterns, increasing road travel costs from T to S, while former 
passengers CD either shift their travel times, or not travel at all.  Auto drivers still on the road 
suffer losses STBN, transit riders‟ consumer surplus WYV is lost, and the 25% of transit riders 
switching to auto gain welfare ANR. 
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Figure 26.  Modeling Congestion and Mobility Benefits of Transit 
 
 
Data for Chicago is estimated using elasticities of demand as defined by the Chicago Transit 
Authority to derive the demand curve for transit.  In its predictions of the impacts of fare 
changes, CTA uses a demand elasticity with respect to fares of -0.28 on-peak, and -0.56 off-peak 
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calculation, I take these two figures as upper and lower bounds.  The small welfare loss in the 
automobile market from reductions in the number of autos (ANR in Figure 26) amounts to $34 
million, so I estimate transit mobility benefits lost if transit is eliminated at $1,150-$558 million. 
 
Figure 27.  Mobility Benefits of Transit, Measured by Consumer Surplus 
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5.10 Who Benefits? 
This analysis has shown that in rough terms, transit in Chicago is providing measurable 
congestion and mobility benefits to auto drivers and passengers.  With a view to understanding 
the implications for a subsidy structure, how are these benefits distributed?   
5.10.1 Congestion Reduction 
Most congestion in Chicago is occurring within the central city, which is also where transit use 
is the highest.  Based on the CATS travel demand model with congested speeds for 2005, 76% of 
the automobile vehicle-hours of delay in the six-county region on a typical weekday morning 
happened on roads in Cook County, three-quarters of which was within the CTA‟s service 
district (approximately equivalent to the City of Chicago).  By inferring trip origins based on the 
travel matrix used by CATS to compute the congested speeds for home-based work trips, this 
analysis shows that trips beginning in Cook County and the CTA Service Area accounted for a 
disproportionately small share of this congestion.  Table 25 and Figure 28 illustrate the results, 
along with a comparison of population. 
H 
I 
K 
J 
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Table 25. Automobile Congestion by Location and Trip Origin in the RTA Region 
by Congestion 
Location % of RTA by Trip Origin % of RTA
2005/6 Census 
Estimate % of RTA
Cook: CTA Service Area                 954,521 61%                 405,395 19% 3,700,000             44%
Cook: Outside CTA Svce. Area                 242,947 15%                 520,882 24% 1,588,655             19%
Cook County (total) 1,197,468             76% 926,277                43% 5,288,655             63%
Lake 151,150                10% 327,144                15% 713,076     8%
McHenry 25,857                  2% 261,851                12% 312,373     4%
Kane 35,672                  2% 288,981                13% 493,735     6%
DuPage 121,667                8% 187,871                9% 932,670     11%
Will 37,891                  2% 184,377                8% 668,217     8%
Collar Counties 372,237                24% 1,250,225             57% 3,120,071             37%
Total RTA Region 1,569,705             2,176,502             8,408,726             
Auto-Hours of Delay (AM Peak) Population
 
Source: adapted from Murga, 2007.  Total auto-hours of delay do not equal because the calculations for 
congestion location are based on a shorter AM time period.  Population figures are from U.S. Census, 
2005 and 2006 estimates.  CTA service area population is an estimate based on CTA, 2003.   
 
Figure 28.  RTA Region's Relative Contribution to Automobile Congestion, and Population 
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Source: adapted from Murga, 2007 
Thus, although the region‟s congestion happens mostly in the urban core, the drivers causing it 
predominately originate in the outlying areas.  The 5 collar counties are home to 37% of the 
RTA Region‟s population and only 24% of its congestion, yet drivers beginning in these 
counties create 57% of the regional congestion in the morning peak.  By contrast, those in the 
CTA service area are responsible for only 19% of the region‟s traffic delays, yet 61% of 
congestion occurs in this area.  These results are probably the result of a higher transit mode 
share in the CTA, and the fairly long auto trips from the collar counties to the Loop.  Since the 
CTA serves 82% of the region‟s transit trips (Table 2), and most Metra passengers are accessing 
downtown Chicago, transit ridership appears to be highest where auto congestion is 
concentrated.  If transit riders were to drive instead, they would likely join the road network in 
its most congested conditions, where the marginal congestion cost of their joining would be 
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high.  This situation implies that the congestion relief benefits from transit accrue 
disproportionately to auto drivers who originate in suburban Cook county and the collar 
counties. 
5.10.2 Mobility Benefit 
This analysis suggests that transit riders derive utility from their travel, implying a mobility 
benefit that accrues to their origins and destinations.  This benefit might be captured with fares, 
but differential pricing is difficult in mass transit, and the effectiveness of such a strategy is 
unknown. 
5.11 Congestion and Mobility: Conclusions 
Traffic congestion in Chicago occurs for a variety of reasons, from the organization and 
scheduling of human activities, to the lack of price signals in driving.  Traditional policy 
responses to traffic have been to construct more roadway capacity or subsidize public 
transportation.  Congestion pricing is dogged with difficulties, and growing evidence implies 
we cannot build our way out of congestion, but public transit can be a way to moderate 
congestion and provide mobility benefits.  I speculate on several mechanisms through which 
this may be true. 
 
This chapter explores the role of public transit in congestion relief in Chicago.  I suggest a way 
to quantify the congestion and mobility benefits from Chicago transit services by comparing the 
current congestion levels to a hypothetical no-transit scenario in a mathematical and graphical 
way.  I construct this counterfactual scenario by modeling a city where congestion has reached a 
new medium-term equilibrium in the absence of public transportation.  Since automobile 
congestion appears to be exponentially related to growth in auto travel on the roadways, I 
predict congestion costs using estimated vehicle miles of travel.   
 
Next, I acknowledge that because transit‟s value may be in allowing travel irrespective of 
congestion, not all transit riders directly contribute to congestion relief, but I assert that this 
mobility has value.  I suggest a simple way to quantify this using consumer surplus. 
 
Finally, I map out the incidence of transit‟s congestion and mobility benefits, and conclude that 
the current equilibrium between transit use and automobile congestion in Chicago is a delicate 
balance.  Most congestion occurs in and around the central city, yet is disproportionately caused 
by drivers hailing from outlying areas.  Most congestion also occurs where transit use is the 
highest implying that gains or losses of transit passengers would have significant consequences 
for auto traffic.  The models I construct here indicate that if 25% of transit riders were to switch 
to the roadway system along current patterns, this 1.5% growth in overall VMT would cause 
congestion costs to increase by almost 10%. 
 
In financial terms, this chapter concluded that public transportation in Chicago confers direct 
congestion benefits to auto drivers somewhere in the range of $323-1,577 million, depending on 
the elasticity of demand for auto travel with respect to congestion costs.  This range is almost 
certainly conservative, since at the lower bound I have discounted the congestion effects of 75% 
of transit riders and omitted any inconvenience or congestion costs associated with their 
compensatory measures.  In addition, insofar as public transportation enables passenger 
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mobility despite congestion conditions and at a low cost to the passenger, transit provides a 
mobility benefit in the range of $558-$1,150 million, as valued by passengers. 
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6 How Other Cities Do It: Lessons Learned from Transit 
Finance in North America and Western Europe 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly survey the operating funding mechanisms of other 
major transit systems which may provide lessons for the current situation in Chicago.  First, I 
outline the role of the U.S. Federal Government in transit finance.  Second, I make remarks on 
the role of passenger fares in the funding of transit operations, and caution against relying on 
farebox revenues as an indicator of efficiency.  Third, I describe the primary revenue sources for 
transit operations, the mechanisms by which the revenues are generated for 15 major transit 
systems Western Europe, Canada, and the U.S.  Fourth, I summarize the major themes and 
patterns that emerge from this survey, and describe their relevance to the development of an 
ideal funding framework. 
6.1 Transit Finance: the Status Quo 
There is no singular urban public transit finance model for large cities in the U.S. or Western 
Europe.  All transit agencies charge passenger fares, yet these revenues are largely a product of 
a policy decision than an indicator of efficiency, and rarely cover the full costs of system 
operations.  The U.S. federal government provides some funding to all transit agencies, 
although mostly in the form of capital grants, while central governments in Western Europe 
play a larger role in capital and operating assistance.  Beyond these two sources, American mass 
transit systems rely on some form of government subsidy, but the structure and magnitude of 
these subsidies vary widely from agency to agency.  Transit funding structures in Western 
Europe derive subsidies from a rich mix of local, regional, and central government levels which 
offer important insights to the American context but which are sometimes difficult to compare. 
 
Furthermore, these funds are derived from a variety of government jurisdictions in vastly 
different political and institutional contexts.  Urban and suburban services are sometimes 
operated – and funded by – separate agencies with separate financial arrangements.  Some 
agencies receive significant revenues from their state government, while others function with 
entirely regional or local funding.  Central governments in Western Europe play a bigger role in 
transit operating revenues than does the U.S. Federal government.  Some funding mechanisms 
provide stable revenues year-on-year, while others are more exposed to political or economic 
fluctuations. In sum, funding varies widely. 
6.2 U.S. Federal Role in Transit Finance 
The U.S. federal government does play a role in public transportation finance, although largely 
through the administration of capital grants.18  In the 1970s and 1980s, federal operating 
assistance was central to defining the subsidies from other levels of government (Wachs, 1989), 
but this practice ended in the 1990s.  Revenues from a federal gas tax, currently set at 
18.4¢/gallon and 24.4¢/gallon for gasoline and diesel fuel respectively (EIA, 2007b, Table EN-
1), are allocated to the federal Highway Trust Fund and Mass Transit Account.  These accounts 
are separate from general government revenues, and the proceeds are spent in multi-year 
                                                     
18 Sections of this chapter draw from Antos (2005), and Antos and Zegras (2007). 
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transportation spending bills, the most recent of which is SAFETEA-LU (for “Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users”) in 2005.  Although the 
federal government allows local “flexing” of highway funds for mass transit projects, the early 
administrative and financial modal division tends to hinder intermodalism. 
 
Under SAFETEA-LU‟s allocation rules, transit agencies in large urban areas are not eligible for 
operating grants.  Some federal funds are applied to operating costs in large agencies as 
preventive maintenance and other funds, but these amounts are small and account for only 7% 
of operating funds in large cities (NTD, 2005, 25).  Approximately two-thirds of all federal 
capital funding amounts for large urban transit agencies is allocated by formula based on 
characteristics of the metropolitan area, need, population, and national goals.  Some funds are 
reserved for the FTA‟s New Starts program, which awards capital funds to construct new 
transit projects on a competitive basis.  All federal funds come with certain conditions, many of 
which are governed by environmental legislation and agencies. 
 
Even though the federal government‟s involvement in urban transit operating finance is limited 
to capital projects, its influence is still fairly significant in capital funds.  In federal fiscal year 
(FFY) 2007, Illinois is slated to receive $416 million in formula funds (FTA, 2006a), the vast 
majority of which is dedicated to the Chicago metropolitan area ($382m) (FTA, 2006b).  In 
addition, Chicago transit is currently the successful recipients of New Starts funds, and federal 
sources for capital transit finance in Chicago totaled $439 million (CATS, 2006, 3-2).  
6.3 The Role of Passenger Fares in Transit Finance 
The amount of operating funds generated from passenger fares varies widely among large 
transit properties in the U.S., Western Europe, and Canada.  Fares likely represent the value of 
the marginal transit trip to the transit rider, while subsidies represent the payment by 
government for the benefits generated by transit use.  Though some cities manage to increase 
fares in small, frequent increments, most transit agencies raise fares in fairly hefty and 
infrequent proportions.  However, some of the increases in the most recent years may be the 
product of differentiated fares between cash and smart cards.  As the technology becomes more 
ubiquitous, many transit agencies have increased cash fares above pass or smart card fares to 
discourage the use of cash. 
 
Over the past ten years, fare revenues have accounted for a dwindling share of transit operating 
funding in the U.S.  More specifically, while funding for all public transit in U.S. cities over 1 
million inhabitants has risen by about 30% in real terms overall, fare revenues have increased 
by only 12% (NTD, 2005).  Therefore, from almost 42% of operating funds in 1996, this 
proportion has fallen to around 36%, as shown in Figure 29.   
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Figure 29.  U.S. Transit Operating Revenue Sources in Large Cities 
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Source: NTD, 2005, Table 28.  All agencies, all modes, cities over 1 million inhabitants. 
 
However, these national trends mask significant variation between agencies.  Among agencies 
operating more than 900 vehicles in maximum service, fare revenues cover anywhere from 16% 
(Houston Metro) to 55% (New York MTA) of operating costs in 2005.  Also, any average of large 
U.S. transit agencies will be skewed by New York City, which alone accounts for a third of the 
nation‟s transit riders alone. 
 
Figure 30.  Fare Recovery Ratios for Large U.S. Transit Agencies 
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Source: NTD, 2005, Table 119  
6.3.1 Fare Recovery as Policy Decision, Not Efficiency Measure 
Fare levels are usually set by a policy decision and can be unrelated to the efficiency of a transit 
agency.  The magnitude and sporadic nature of fare increases in comparison to inflation suggest 
that fares are often more the product of a political decision than the inevitable outgrowth of 
economic or operational requirements.  Fare increases are often highly politicized.  Since 1983, 
the RTA Act governing transit services in the Chicago metropolitan region has mandated that 
the combined budgets of the service boards achieve a 50% revenue recovery ratio.  Los Angeles 
County MTA has restricted fare increases because of a 1996 legal Consent Decree (FitchRatings, 
2006).   
 
Despite the allure of judging a transit agency‟s efficiency by its fare recovery ratio, a transit 
operator might be more fairly judged along two measures: 1) its unit costs of production, which 
are largely a function of labor costs and human resource allocation, and 2) its capacity 
utilization.  An agency‟s ability to fill its available seats may be largely a function of service 
planning decisions, the relative attractiveness of driving, and the city‟s urban form, in its 
consequent tendencies to both concentrate flows of passenger demand and determine 
accessibility gained per trip length. 
 
The fare recovery ratio is a poor proxy for both of these more accurate efficiency measures.  As 
to the first, passenger fares in the U.S. are rarely tied to the costs of labor or materials.  For the 
second, even a transit agency‟s ability to more fully utilize its capacity can be unrelated to a fare 
recovery ratio.  For example, imagine two bus routes could provide the same number of 
vehicle-miles, capacity utilization, and passenger-miles, as shown in Figure 31.  If the average 
                                                     
19 Agencies operating over 900 vehicles in maximum service.  “PT Fare Revenues” plus “DO Fare 
Revenues” divided by total operating funds applied.  Agencies with VOMS > 900 (entries 9186, 6048 and 
4105 removed as outliers). 
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trip length on the first route is half that of the second, it will turn each seat over twice as 
frequently and produce double the fare revenue as the second.  Is this first line twice as efficient 
as the second?  Since trip lengths are partially a function of the urban environment‟s 
accessibility and the marginal cost of providing longer trips is often minimal, fare revenues are 
often several steps away from capacity utilization.  Similarly, the design of a transit network 
could encourage or discourage transfers, inflating or deflating the fare revenues, depending on 
the agency‟s transfer policies.  It seems inaccurate to evaluate a transit system‟s performance 
based solely on fare recovery ratio. 
 
Figure 31.  Hypothetical Bus Routes  
 
 
 
Table 26 shows that the fare ratio in these same U.S. agencies is often unrelated to how well 
they utilize their capacity.  For example, commuter rail services in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and 
Chicago attract more trips per vehicle-hour than New York‟s Metro-North services, yet these 
achieve half to three-quarters of the fare recovery ratio.  Boston‟s heavy rail system captures a 
very high number of trips per vehicle hour, despite its relatively low recovery ratio.  Capacity 
utilization on bus systems does appear to be correlated with fare recovery ratio, however.  In 
short, it is often misleading to judge the efficiency of a multimodal transit agency in a large city 
by its fare recovery ratio.  Two better indicators, I argue, are its unit costs of production, and its 
capacity utilization. 
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Table 26.  Fare Recovery Ratio and Capacity Utilization of Large U.S. Transit Agencies  
Fare Ratio Comm. Rail Bus Heavy Rail
New York Metro-North RR 59% 50.1            -             -             
New York MTA 55% -             74.0            98.1            
New York Long Island RR 46% 48.8            -             -             
Washington D.C. WMATA 42% -             44.8            105.4          
Chicago CTA 41% -             44.9            50.5            
Chicago Metra 38% 55.4            -             -             
NJ Transit 37% 38.0            30.1            -             
Philadelphia SEPTA 37% 54.1            49.1            107.6          
Boston MBTA 29% 56.3            51.6            164.1          
Baltimore MTA 29% 56.3            40.5            67.8            
Chicago Pace 28% -             23.4            -             
Los Angeles LACMTA 24% -             50.4            -             
Pittsburgh 22% -             27.8            -             
Denver RTD 19% -             28.3            -             
King County Metro 19% -             29.3            -             
Pax Trips per Vehicle-Hour
 
Source: NTD, 2005 
6.3.2 Dangers of Focus on Fare Revenue 
I speculate that emphasis on fare revenue in the short-term could lead to behavior that is 
ultimately counterproductive to a transit agency‟s long-term goals of balanced and growing 
ridership.  Faced with insufficient operating funds and lacking the will or ability to raise fares, 
an agency might look to trim its most lightly-used or marginal services – usually off-peak and 
non-radial services, or services to far-flung, lower-density areas.   From the agency‟s 
perspective, this is entirely logical: the agency minimizes fare revenue losses while saving 
operating costs, and the short-term problem is solved.  But such focus on preserving transit 
services only where they yield the highest fare revenues could be short-sighted.  
 
In the long term, feedback loops in auto ownership and land use may offset any temporary 
financial gains to the agency.   
 If transit services are trimmed to serve the peak-hour commute only, transit commuters 
are likely to buy cars for their non-commute travel needs.  With the marginal cost of 
driving now relatively low because so much of auto ownership is sunk costs (AAA, 
2007), marginal mode choice decisions are now much less favorable to transit.  Running 
transit only where its fare recovery ratio is high will ultimately undermine ridership and 
in the long run, efficiency. 
 If transit services are reduced, the accessibility of nearby land is reduced, the next 
prospective tenant will be less likely to ride transit, and the real estate market and local 
zoning may be less likely to produce the population density needed to support public 
transit. 
 By concentrating resources on peak-hour commuting to the downtown central business 
district only, the agency is likely to face higher operating unit costs because its services 
will be more peaked and less balanced.   
Ridership losses accompanying these phenomena might lead to further fare revenue losses, 
undercutting some of the primary benefits of a transit system. 
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6.4 The Role of Other Operating Subsidies in Transit Finance  
Beyond passenger fare revenues and a small amount of federal funds, then, all U.S. transit 
agencies must rely on public subsidies from local, regional, state, or other sources.  In addition, 
Central Governments in Western Europe do play a role in operating subsidies.  The amount and 
structure of these subsidy structures vary widely from agency to agency and evade general 
characterization.  In the U.S., entire NCHRP reports describe the heterogeneity of transit 
funding mechanisms from the state and local levels (e.g., NCHRP, 2006).  Therefore, this section 
briefly describes the institutional and political context of 15 large transit agencies, the major 
revenue streams that pay for operating expenditures, the jurisdiction of their source, and the 
mechanism by which they are decided upon, collected, and allocated to the transit agency. 
 
I label each operating subsidy revenue source by jurisdiction, as shown in  
Table 27. 
 
Table 27.  Classification of Operating Revenues 
Jurisdiction Criteria 
Fares Collected directly from passengers.  Ex-post reduced fare 
reimbursements not included where possible. 
Other Own-
Source 
Generated by some specific action of the transit agency beyond core 
transit services (investments, leasebacks, advertising, real estate, 
congestion charges, tolls, parking etc.) 
Federal Originating from the U.S. Federal or Central Governments, and 
earmarked directly for public transit. 
State Originating from a U.S. state, or some jurisdiction larger than a 
metropolitan area but smaller than a national government.  
European “regions” are included if significantly larger than the 
metro area. 
Regional Generated solely in the larger metropolitan region, which may 
include multiple counties or states.  Revenues from municipalities as 
part of a regional arrangement are counted here. 
Local Originating from the central city only, or from smaller government 
units corresponding to municipalities. 
Other Any source for which more information is unavailable, or which 
does not fit in the above categories. 
6.4.1 New York MTA 
The funding structure for the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) is 
organized around seven operating units: New York City Transit, Long Island Railroad, Metro-
North, a Capital Construction operation, and a Bridges & Tunnels unit.  In 2006, tolls on major 
tunnels and bridges into Manhattan are budgeted to gross over $1.2 billion in tolls while 
requiring $392 million in expenses, netting around $900 million to help cross-subsidize mass 
transit operations. 
 
In 2006, the MTA budgeted an $8.6 billion financial plan (NY MTA, 2006) including farebox 
revenues of $3.7 billion, and significant amounts carried over from unexpected subsidies in 
2005.  MTA debt service amounts to $1.34 billion annually.  
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Table 28.  FY06 New York MTA Operating Revenues ($ millions) 
Farebox Revenues 3,734.0$         43% Fares
NYC Transit 2,762.9$     32%
Metro-North Comm. Rail 451.3$        5%
LIRR 448.8$        5%
Long Island Bus, Staten Island RR, Other 70.7$          1%
Bridges & Tunnels Tolls (Gross) 1,238.0$         14% Own-Source
Dedicated Taxes 2,621.1$         30%
MMTOA (business, sales tax) 1,274.0$     15% State
Petroleum Business Tax 616.0$        7% State
Mortgage Recording Tax (MTA District) 391.0$        5% State
Urban Tax (mortgage tax in NYC only) 327.5$        4% Local
Other 12.6$          0% Other
State/Local Subsidies 568.0$            7%
ow: New York City 160.5$             2% Local
ow: Suburban NY Counties 164.5$             2% Regional
ow: New York State directly 190.9$             2% State
ow: Connecticut DOT 52.1$               1% Regional
Other Revenue 440.0$            5% Other
Total Operating Revenues 8,601.1$          
Source: NY MTA, 2006 
 
Beyond farebox revenues and toll proceeds, the remaining revenues are derived from a variety 
of small taxes and funds, some of which are local and other which are statewide, and all of 
which are largely removed from annual appropriations processes.  The biggest of these is the 
Metro Mass Transportation Operating Assistance fund, a mix of taxes earmarked for transport.  
While some funding sources are expressly allotted to different modes, particularly revenues 
generated in suburban areas dedicated to the commuter railroads, enough funding comes with 
no strings attached that the MTA is able to exercise discretion in where it spends these 
revenues. 
 
In 2006, the MTA received approximately $3.2 billion in state and local subsidies from a wide 
variety of sources of varying levels of relevance to transit, $2.6 billion of which were receipts 
from dedicated taxes outside of annual budget cycles, and the remaining $568 million of which 
were paid by areas benefiting from MTA services: New York State, New York City, 
Connecticut, and suburban New York counties in the service district north of the city and on 
Long Island.  The largest subsidy sources were proceeds from dedicated proportions of 
statewide taxes on businesses, petroleum businesses, a mortgage recording tax, and the state 
sales tax.  An “urban tax” on commercial property mortgages in New York City only provides 
additional revenue for the MTA. 
6.4.2 Washington D.C. WMATA  
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) was established in 1967 as a 
compact between the District of Columbia and adjacent communities in Maryland and Virginia.  
In some ways, WMATA is an institutional anomaly different from most American cities: the 
District of Columbia receives federal funds as its own state and city, the rail system provides 
extensive service in surrounding Maryland and Virginia, and federal lawmakers have strong 
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interest in the city as well.  As such, WMATA spans jurisdictional boundaries on several levels, 
and makes decisions in a complex environment of political oversight (Puentes, 2004). 
 
WMATA‟s construction from 1969 to 1999 has been largely funded by capital dollars received 
directly from the federal government (GAO, 2005).  Recently, WMATA has been grappling with 
the dual challenge of reinvesting in its aging infrastructure and meeting the capacity demands 
of steadily growing ridership. 
 
Table 29.  FY06 WMATA Operating Revenues ($ millions) 
Farebox Revenues 479.1$            46% Fares
Own-Source Revenues 100.0$            10% Own-Source
Operating Subsidy 434.6$            41%
ow: District of Columbia 165.5$                 16% Local
ow: Maryland 164.2$                 16% Regional
ow: Virginia 104.8$                 10% Regional
Debt Service Subsidy 27.5$              3% Other
Reimbursables 11.2$              1% Fares
Total Operating Revenues 1,052.5$          
Source: WMATA, 2005 
 
Of a $1.1 billion operating budget, the Authority recovers 46% from farebox revenues, or 57% if 
one includes non-fare revenues and exclude debt service subsidy and reimbursables.  The rest 
of the cost is made up by local subsidies: a negotiated arrangement between the members of the 
WMATA Compact (WMATA, 2005, 8).  Costs are divided between each district by a series of 
complicated formulas for rail and bus depending on population density, services provided, and 
ridership (WMATA, undated), and each jurisdiction pays their share with different funding 
sources.  The District of Columbia pays mainly from a 20-cent gasoline tax, parking and traffic 
fines, vehicle registration fees, and restaurant and hotel taxes.  Maryland relies on gas tax 
revenues and vehicle fees, while Virginia uses a 2% tax on gasoline retailers in Northern 
Virginia dedicated to WMATA for part of its share, and then supplements that amount with 
general revenues (Puentes, 2004).  Almost all of WMATA‟s subsidies are allocated through 
annual budget processes, making WMATA unusual amongst peer agencies in that it does not 
have a dedicated funding source. 
6.4.3 Philadelphia SEPTA 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) provides all bus, rail, and 
paratransit services in a five-county metropolitan region.  Similar to Chicago, the service district 
consists of the city of Philadelphia, and four suburban counties (Bucks, Chester, Delaware and 
Montgomery). 
 
The State of Pennsylvania also plays a significant role in SEPTA: it appoints two Board 
members, and provides nearly half of all operating subsidies and capital funds.  The 
centerpieces of the state‟s operating funding are two matching grant arrangements between the 
state and recipient counties known as Act 3 and Act 26.  Under these laws, the state generates 
revenues dedicated to public transit via small fees on motor vehicle tires and rental cars, a 3% 
auto lease tax, and a reserved stream of around 1% of the state sales tax, and then supplements 
this amount with additional funds from general revenues and the Lottery Fund.  In recent years, 
especially under the leadership of Governor Rendell, former mayor of Philadelphia, SEPTA has 
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received additional state bonds for capital projects and funds flexed from highway sources, but 
these funds do not recur. 
 
Table 30.  FY06 SEPTA Operating Revenues ($ millions) 
Farebox Revenues 325.9$            34% Fares
Senior Citizen Reduced Fare 52.3$              5% Fares
Shared Ride Program Reimbursement 17.3$              2% Regional
Other Own-Source Revenue 24.5$              3% Own-Source
State Basic Operating Subsidy 203.6$            21% State
Local Funds - Various Programs 72.3$              8%
ow: Philadelphia County 58.1$               6% Local
ow: Suburban Counties 14.2$               1% Regional
State - Various Programs 129.6$            14% State
Route Guarantee 3.0$                0% Other
Federal Preventive Maintenance 31.2$              3% Federal
Highway Flex Funds 92.1$              10% State
Total Operating Revenues 951.8$             
Source: SEPTA, 2006, 15 
 
To access the full subsidy amounts established by the state, local counties must come up with a 
local match at a specified ratio.  Local matches “assigned to” each of the counties are derived 
formulaically based on the deficit carried by the transit services provided in each county, not 
simply based on services provided. 
6.4.4 Boston MBTA 
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) is governed by a 9-member Board of 
Directors, appointed by the Governor.  The MBTA‟s subsidy structure was changed 
dramatically in 1999 to a new funding mechanism known as “Forward Funding.”  Prior to 1999, 
the MBTA operated with a fairly open-ended source of state funds, an arrangement which 
produced low fares, expanding service and ridership, but also rising costs and heavy debt load. 
 
The MBTA now has two stable, dedicated revenue streams: a portion of the state sales tax, and 
assessments on towns in its service district (MBTA, 2006, 11-12).  First, revenues from 1% of the 
5% statewide sales tax (20% of revenue yield) are dedicated to the transit agency, which 
resulted in $704 million in FY05.20  This means that sales taxpayers in all of Massachusetts help 
pay for transit services in the eastern part of the state.  Second, 175 cities and towns in the 
MBTA‟s service area pay the agency population-based fees called “assessments.”  In FY05, these 
assessments ranged from $65 million from the City of Boston to $1,000 from the small town of 
Ashby, located 51 miles from downtown, and totaled $136 million (MBTA, 2005, E-2).  Both the 
sales tax proceeds and the assessments are indexed to inflation but include a ceiling and floor to 
the overall revenue amount for stabilization. 
 
                                                     
20 MBTA (2007), FY2005 column labeled “Revenue Receipts from State Sources.” 
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Table 31.  FY05 MBTA Operating Revenues ($ millions) 
Farebox Revenues 334.0$            26% Fares
Advertising, Real Estate, etc. 40.1$              3% Own-Source
Other Income 30.5$              2% Own-Source
Federal Preventive Maintenance 10.9$              1% Federal
Assessments on Service District 136.0$            11% Regional
State Sales Tax 712.6$            56% State
Total Operating Revenues 1,264.1$          
Source: MBTA, 2007 
 
Historically, sales tax receipts in Massachusetts have risen faster than inflation, so this structure 
might in theory work to the MBTA‟s advantage.  However, in the past five years, receipts have 
been sluggish, ridership has been flat, and rising health care and fuel costs have consumed 
subsidy growth.  In 2002 and 2003, the MBTA received roughly its statutory minimum funding.  
Partially as a result, the Authority increased fares in 2007 for the third time since Forward 
Funding, the rough equivalent of doubling nominal fares in 7 years. 
 
Forward Funding also transferred the repayment of all interest and principal on past and future 
capital debt to the agency‟s balance sheet.  A large debt load of $8.1 billion now burdens the 
MBTA (MA Transportation Finance Commission, 2007, 9) the debt service for which currently 
consumes 30% of operating expenditures. 
6.4.5 Los Angeles LACMTA 
The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, or Metro, is the region‟s MPO, 
public transit operator of buses and 4 rail lines for 1.1 million rides per day, and roadway 
authority.  Metro is bound by a 1996 Consent Decree to expand bus service hours to a certain 
amount and keep fares low (Moody‟s, 2004).  The agency carries around $3.5 billion in capital 
debt. 
 
Table 32.  Amended 2005 LACMTA Financial Plan (includes capital revenues)  ($ millions) 
Passenger Fares, Advertising 276.4$            9% Fares
Sales Tax Proceeds 1,738.5$         58%
Proposition A 621.0$                  21% Regional
Proposition C 640.6$                  21% Regional
California Transportation Development Act 317.4$                  11% State
Other + Carryover 159.5$                  5% Other
Federal, State, Local Grants 635.3$            21% Regional
Financing Proceeds 311.5$            10% Own-Source
Investment and Leaseback Income 50.5$              2% Own-Source
Total Operating and Capital Revenues 3,012.2$          
Source: LACMTA, 200621 
 
Table 32 shows LACMTA‟s overall financial plan, including capital revenues.  Operating 
revenues are not explicitly designated as such, but all known operating expenditures total 
around $1.1 billion.  By this metric, farebox revenues account for just over a quarter of operating 
expenditures. 
                                                     
21 Overall financial plan summarized from LACMTA (2006) page II-7, operating expenses from p. II-10 
line 10 and p. II-11 line 13. 
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The agency receives subsidy for its $3 billion financial plan through four primary mechanisms.  
Proposition A and C, passed by voters in 1982 and 1991 respectively, gives Metro the proceeds 
from two incremental one-half percent sales tax, for a total of one percent, yielding $1.2 billion 
in 2005.  Second, Metro receives revenues from the California Transportation Development Act, 
a one-quarter percent allocation of the entire state retail sales tax which is allocated to California 
counties by the State Board of Equalization.  Finally, California‟s State Transit Assistance is a 
general public transit subsidy derived from a 4.75% tax on the sale price of diesel fuel and 4.75% 
of the state‟s 9-cent per gallon tax on gasoline.  These revenues are allocated to counties to 
improve public transportation – 50% based on county population, 50% as a match to local 
transit operators‟ fare collections.  In this way, almost all of Metro‟s revenues are generated by 
standalone sales tax funding mechanisms outside of annual budget cycles. 
6.4.6 San Francisco (BART) 
San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties established the Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART) District in 1957 to build a new heavy rail system.  Rail operations began in 1972, and 
today the system carries around 310,000 passengers a day.  Fare revenues make up around half 
of BART‟s operating revenues, and the District‟s primary subsidy is an incremental half-percent 
sales tax collected in the three-county area.  The BART District can set this rate collectively.  75% 
of the proceeds from this tax go directly to BART, while the remaining 25% go to the San 
Francisco Bay Area‟s Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), an umbrella financial 
organization for transit.  However, the MTC allocated around $60m in toll revenue capital funds 
back to BART for a project to extend service to the San Francisco Airport.  
 
In addition, BART receives a portion of property tax revenues collected in the three counties 
(rate set by the State of California), as well as various smaller local contributions, paratransit 
reimbursement, and a contribution from San Mateo County which benefits from the San 
Francisco Airport extension. 
 
Table 33.  FY05 BART Operating Revenues  
Farebox Revenues 233.7$            53% Fares
Transaction and Use (Sales Tax in district) 118.9$            27% Regional
Property Tax (in district) 22.4$              5% Regional
Other Income (includes investment income) 17.1$              4% Own-Source
Capitalized Costs (transfers from capital) 33.6$              8% Federal
Local Financial Assistance 16.7$              4% Regional
Total Operating Revenues 442.4$             
Source: BART, 2006 
 
BART currently carries approximately $700 million in outstanding debt (BART, 2006, 4-15), and 
this figure is declining despite the additional debt from the Airport extension.  BART reports 
some operating costs related to capital projects as negative operating revenues – essentially a 
transfer from capital funds for what “should” have been capital. 
6.4.7 San Francisco (Muni) 
The San Francisco Municipal Railway Corporation (Muni) runs bus, light rail, and trolley/cable 
car services in the city proper of San Francisco.  Institutionally, Muni is more akin to a 
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Department to the City and County of San Francisco than a quasi-state agency.  Although Muni 
is closely linked financially and politically to the Mayor and City of San Francisco, its revenue 
structure is largely formulaic and independent of yearly city budgetary processes. 
 
Table 34.  FY05 Muni Operating Revenues ($ millions) 
Farebox Revenues 121.9$            25% Fares
Parking Proceeds (Meters + Violations) 132.3$            27% Own-Source
City General Fund Contribution 98.9$              20% Local
Intergovernmental Local/Regional Taxes 81.6$              17% Regional
Miscellaneous Own-Source (advertising) 4.5$                1% Own-Source
One-Time Lease/Leaseback Revenue 13.6$              3% Own-Source
Capitalized Costs (transfers from capital) 5.2$                1% Federal
Paratransit Reimbursement 15.5$              3% Regional
Transit Impact Development Fee 13.1$              3% Other
Total Operating Revenues 486.6$             
Source: Muni, 2005, 73 
 
Farebox revenues make up 25% of operating revenues, and fares have historically been low 
compared to other transit agencies.  Muni‟s subsidy comes from four main sources.  First, the 
City of San Francisco dedicates to Muni 40% of a 25% citywide parking tax on off-street spaces, 
and the first $7.6 million of parking meter collections (Muni Dept. of Parking & Traffic, 2001).  
Second, the City allocates Muni a portion of its general revenues, an amount which is indexed 
to inflation and determined by formula.  Third, Muni receives formulaic share of the Transit 
Impact Development Fee, a $10 per square foot tax on downtown non-residential buildings 
within a defined area in San Francisco.  Fourth, the agency receives a smattering of local 
sources: a set proportion (0.25% of 8.5%) of sales taxes collected in San Francisco County, 
federal preventive maintenance funds, and an allocation of state sales tax set by MTC. 
 
Many observers feel that Muni‟s funding is stable but inadequate (San Francisco Planning and 
Urban Research Association, 2006).  In past years, Muni has closed budget gaps with one-time 
measures like leaseback deals, but it is controversial for the City to raise parking taxes.  Muni 
has published several proposals for new revenue streams in their annual reports and budgets.  
In addition, Muni receives significant capital subsidies from MTC, which is in turn backed by 
net toll surpluses from the Bay Area Toll Authority on bridges in the region. 
6.4.8 Atlanta (MARTA) 
The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority‟s (MARTA) subsidy structure is 
straightforward: a dedicated 1% sales tax on its immediate service district: Fulton County, 
DeKalb County, and the City of Atlanta.  In FY05, this revenue stream totaled $307m, or 66% of 
all revenues.  Fares contribute $96million or 21% of revenues, and the balance consists of federal 
or own-source revenues. 
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Table 35.  FY05 MARTA Operating Revenues ($ millions)  
Farebox Revenues 96.2$              21% Fares
Other Operating Revenues + Real Estate 4.7$                1% Own-Source
Sales Tax from Service District 307.3$            66% Regional
Federal Preventive Maintenance 40.4$              9% Federal
Investment Income 7.8$                2% Own-Source
Other Revenues 9.6$                2% Other
Total Operating Revenues 466.0$             
 Source: MARTA, 2005 
 
MARTA carries around $2 billion in debt, which consumes around $110million per year in debt 
service.  Interestingly, the sales tax collected for MARTA does not follow closely the de facto 
service area.  Some stations are very close to counties who do not contribute to MARTA.  There 
may be a growing desire for other counties such as Clayton and Gwinnet counties to help fund 
MARTA (Dorsey, 2005). 
6.4.9 Portland (TriMet) 
TriMet covers three counties in the Portland region with 44 miles of light rail and around 500 
buses.  Portland is a relatively young system whose ridership and services have grown rapidly 
in the past twenty years, and service expansions are pending New Starts awards. 
 
Fares cover 23% of operating expenditures.  Smart card technology has enabled TriMet to raise 
fares regularly by small amounts each year.  Unusually for U.S. transit agencies, TriMet is 
strongly linked to regional land use planning through Portland‟s MPO. 
 
Table 36.  FY05 TriMet Operating Revenues 
Farebox Revenues 59.5$              20% Fares
State/Fed Operating Grants 56.1$              18%
Federal preventive Maintenance 30.0$                    10% Federal
State of Oregon (various) 26.1$                    9% State
Payroll Taxes 157.3$            52% Regional
Cigarette Taxes 1.2$                0% Regional
Other Sources (advertising, interest, etc.) 30.5$              10% Own-Source
Total Operating Revenues 304.5$             
Source: TriMet, 2005a 
 
Unique among large transit agencies, TriMet‟s largest funding source is a payroll tax of 0.6318% 
of gross wages earned in the service district in all governments and private businesses (TriMet, 
2005b, 70).  Without guaranteed funding minima or maxima, TriMet‟s subsidy structure is thus 
linked to the economic performance of the entire metropolitan region in the short term.  In the 
long term, however, basing transit funding as a proportion of wages may provide a 
counterweight to the tendency of transit labor costs to rise above the rate of inflation.  In 
addition to the payroll tax, TriMet also receives some state grants and applies most of its federal 
funds to operations. 
6.4.10 Montreal (STM) 
Société de Transport de Montréal (STM) operates bus and heavy rail metro services in Montreal, 
while AMT (Agence Métropolitaine de Transport) operates suburban commuter rail lines.  STM 
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reports to a metropolitan government called MUC, which encompasses all 63 municipalities on 
the island on Montreal.  Fare revenues cover 44% of operating costs, while the mainstay of the 
agency‟s subsidy structure has been contributions from the municipalities within the 
agglomerated City of Montreal.  It is unclear how these amounts are decided. 
 
Table 37.  2004 Montreal STM Operating Revenues ($ millions CAD) 
Farebox Revenues 368.2$            43% Fares
Metro Region of Montreal + Longueuil 264.8$            31% Regional
Province of Quebec 69.6$              8% State
Suburban Contributions for Services 61.1$              7% Region
Advertising, Rents, etc. 17.3$              2% Own-Source
Investments (Federal, Provincial subsidies) 60.8$              7% Federal
One-time Reserve Fund contributions 5.9$                1% Other
Total Operating Revenues 847.7$             
Source: STM, 2005, 44 
6.4.11 Paris (STIF) 
The Syndicat des Transports en Île-de-France (STIF) organizes all public transport in greater Paris, 
while RATP, SNCF, and the OPTILE bus network operate services.  The Regie Autonome des 
Transports Parisiens (RATP) runs the Métro system, the suburban tramways, the major urban 
and suburban bus routes, some suburban lines, and some other services within the urban core 
of Paris, and the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer (SNCF), operates the French national rail 
routes into Paris as well as the rest of the suburban lines.  Because of the particular financial and 
institutional arrangements, STIF is essentially an oversight and monitoring agency with little 
control over revenues or operations (Cour des Comptes, 2005). 
 
Table 38.  2004 Paris STIF Operating Revenues22 (€ millions) 
Farebox Revenue € 1,820 28% Fares
Payroll Tax (Versement de Transport) € 2,540 39% Regional
Employer Subsidies (carte Orange) € 620 9% Regional
Central Government € 610 9% Federal
Local Municipalities € 490 7% Local
Ile-de-France Region € 240 4% Regional
Other sources € 260 4% Other
Total Operating Revenues € 6,580  
Source: STIF, 2005, 37, “Fonctionnement” figures 
 
Fare revenues represent around 28% of revenues.  The centerpiece of transit funding in Paris is 
a payroll tax levied on all companies with more than 9 employees dedicated to transit, called 
the Versement de Transport.  While local governments theoretically set these rates anywhere 
under the maximum allowed by Central Government, in practice most municipalities have 
reached this upper limit.  In the Paris region, the rate ranges from 2.5% of wages in the central 
city to 1.3% in outlying suburbs (FitchRatings, 2003, 6).  Proceeds from this tax made up nearly 
40% of total revenues in 2004, or over €2.5 billion.  The remainder of revenues come local 
governments, employed-subsidized transit passes (carte Orange), and other sources. 
                                                     
22 STIF (2005), p. 37, “Fonctionnement” figures. 
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6.4.12 London (Transport for London) 
When the U.K. Parliament granted the mayor of London broad powers over transportation in 
2000, the mayor created Transport for London (TfL) to consolidate urban public transport, 
suburban bus, major roads, and other modes in one agency.  Prior to 2003, nearly all 
government funding for public transport came from the British central government through a 
discretionary process called the Spending Review.  Although the Spending Review occurs every 
two years with an eye towards a planned third year, the mechanism produced uneven and 
unsteady revenues for transport in the metropolitan region.  In practice, funding levels 
fluctuated widely, creating an atmosphere of start-stop funding which made strategic 
investment and long-term planning difficult. 
 
Several Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) were introduced to London Underground, where 
private companies manage and invest in major portions of infrastructure in the Tube.  The 
purpose of the PPPs was in part to protect public transport from the vagaries of the Spending 
Review by “locking in” levels of infrastructure investment. 
 
Table 39.  2005/06 Transport for London Business Plan (£ millions) 
Farebox Revenue £2,290 45% Fares
Congestion Charging (gross) £254 5% Own-Source
Other Income (incl. investments) £336 7% Other
Central Government grant £2,196 43% Federal
Local Precept tax £20 0% Local
Total Operating Revenues £5,096  
Source: Transport for London (2006b) Table 13A and 13B, pp. 72-73 
 
TfL‟s 2005/06 Business Plan outlines operating revenues of around £5 billion.  Fares make up 
approximately 45% of these, while London‟s Congestion Charge grosses around £250 million, or 
5% of revenues.  The remaining government operating subsidy in London comes almost 
entirely as direct grant from the Central Government.  In fact, the UK essentially has no 
government between the very local level and the national government.  TfL‟s consequent 
dependence on central government grants is unique among the peer agencies analyzed here, 
and this threatens the agency‟s fiscal flexibility and structurally discourages risk-taking.  Section 
6.6.2 discusses this issue in further detail. 
6.4.13 Madrid (CRTM) 
The Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid (CRTM) was founded in 1987 as a single 
organizing authority for public transport in the region of Madrid.  The CRTM oversees Metro de 
Madrid which runs urban rail, Municipal de Transportes de Madrid which runs local buses and 
other services, and various other service operators.  Since the creation of the CRTM, capacity 
has expanded, and public transport ridership in Madrid has risen from around 950 million 
annual passengers in 1986 to 1.54 billion in 2003. 
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Table 40.  2003 Madrid CRTM Operating Revenues (€ millions) 
Farebox Revenues € 623.1 48% Fares
Transfer from Region of Madrid € 414.3 32% Regional
Central Government of Spain € 143.6 11% Federal
Transfer from City of Madrid € 110.7 9% Local
Other Revenues € 4.8 0% Other
Total Operating Revenues € 1,296.5  
Source: CRTM, 2003, 58 
 
Fares make up just under 50% of all operating revenues, while transfers from the region of 
Madrid account for an additional 32%.  The central government of Spain and the City of Madrid 
each contribute roughly 10%, for a total operating budget of €1,297 in 2003.  So while taxes are 
not allocated to CRTM explicitly, the majority of subsidy is from the region of Madrid, whose 
revenues are in turn derived from shares of national taxes on personal income, consumption 
(VAT), and business (S&P, 2005, 2).   
6.4.14 Barcelona (ATM) 
In the mid-1990s, a regional consensus was reached between State of Spain, the Region of 
Catalonia, and the City Council of Barcelona that a regional approach to public transport 
finance and operations was the best way forward (TiS.pt, 2003, 6).  Against a backdrop of 
devolution of powers from the Central Government to the regions in Spain, the Autoritat del 
Transport Metropolità (ATM) was formed as a voluntary consortium of all municipalities and 
administrations that provide transport in Catalonia (EMTA, undated) including the urban 
operators Entitat Metropolitana del Transport (EMT), Transports de Barcelona, and Ferrocarril 
Metropolità de Barcelona, who operate on 4-year contracts. 
 
Table 41.  2003 Barcelona ATM Operating Revenues (€ millions) 
Farebox Revenues € 330.0 46% Fares
Transfer from Region of Catalonia € 148.9 21% Regional
Central Government of Spain € 118.0 16% Federal
Local Municipalities € 120.0 17% Local
Total Operating Revenues € 716.8  
Source: ATM, 2004 
 
Barcelona recovers around 45% of costs through fares, and the remaining deficit is divided 
roughly evenly between the central government of Spain, the region of Catalonia, and local 
municipalities.  ATM appears to depend on its sponsor governments for the amount and 
division of this subsidy amount each year from the governments‟ general revenues, although it 
is unclear how this amount is agreed upon. 
6.4.15 Toronto (TTC) 
Although the TTC‟s finances are currently in a state of flux, Toronto is notable for its past 
financial arrangements.  As shown in Figure 32, from around 1978 to 1988, Toronto operated 
under the expectation that fares cover 68% of operating costs, with remaining subsidies split 
between the Province of Ontario (16%) and the City of Toronto (16%).  During this period which 
also coincided with an economic boom in the city, ridership grew 37%, capacity by 23%, and 
fares remained approximately steady (TTC, 2003, 17). 
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Figure 32.  Toronto TTC Historical Ridership, Capacity, and Fares  
 
Source: Soberman, 1997; TTC, 2003; TTC, 2005 
 
Table 42.  2004 Toronto TTC Operating Revenues ($ millions CAD) 
Farebox Revenues 685.4$            69% Fares
City of Toronto Contributions 182.0$            18% Local
Province of Ontario 70.0$              7% State
Other Revenues 53.4$              5% Other
Total Operating Revenues 990.9$             
 Source: TTC, 2005  
 
However, this funding mechanism has since ended, and TTC appears to depend primarily on 
the City of Toronto for operating subsidies.  Fare revenues continue to be very high by 
international standards, although the base fare was only $2.00 CAD in 2005 (TTC, 2005).   This 
apparently high fare recovery ratio may indicate low unit costs, or an inconsistency in the way 
the TTC handles debt – further research is needed.  In 2005, the provincial government 
dedicated a portion of the gas tax to the TTC, which has been used for capital projects. 
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Figure 33.  Source of Operating Revenues at Selected Transit Agencies 
Source of Recurring Operating Revenues
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6.5 How Others Do It: Observations 
While the operating revenue structures across these 15 cities vary widely, some major themes 
do emerge.  Figure 33 summarizes the results of the preceding case studies. 
6.5.1 Fares 
It appears that most large transit agencies recover between a quarter and a third of their 
expenses through passenger fares, while very large systems like London, New York, Madrid 
reach 50%.  Toronto appears to be unique among its peers in this analysis for sustaining a fare 
recovery ratio closer to 70%.  With the exceptions of Portland and Toronto, nominal fares are 
rarely tied to inflation either by statute or in practice, and fares tend to be increased infrequently 
and in large increments. 
6.5.2 Central Government 
The U.S. federal government contributes little to operating funds, although federal support 
plays a greater role in smaller or newer systems such as Portland.  In Europe, central 
governments usually fund 10-20% of operating expenses, and central and provincial operating 
support may be returning in Canada.  London is unique among its peers in its reliance on 
central government for nearly all of its operating subsidies. 
6.5.3 Sales Tax 
Many U.S. transit agencies rely heavily on a dedicated sales tax, where the state levies a general 
sales tax and returns a percentage of the proceeds collected to the transit agency.  The 
jurisdictions from which sales taxes are dedicated vary significantly, often creating large 
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discrepancies between taxes collected and transit services delivered.  For example, the MBTA 
receives sales taxes from everywhere in Massachusetts, thus receiving a portion of taxes on 
transactions well beyond its service district.  By contrast, some counties right next to a MARTA 
station in Atlanta do not pay sales taxes to the transit agency.  Other sales tax districts better 
align with services provided, such as LACMTA, WMATA, and SEPTA. 
6.5.4 Payroll Tax 
Portland and Paris are unique in this study for generating the operating subsidies from payroll 
taxes.  While Paris‟ rate is much higher than that of Portland (1.4-2.6% compared to 0.6% of 
wages), both cities rely on these revenues for the majority of their operating subsidies. 
6.5.5 Automobile Taxes and Fees 
Several transit agencies derive revenues directly from taxes and fees on private autos.  Muni 
receives some of the City of San Francisco‟s parking revenues, Transport for London receives 
congestion-charging revenues, and New York MTA is allotted toll revenues from bridges and 
tunnels into Manhattan.  Other agencies achieve the same effect without an explicit linkage: the 
contributions to WMATA from the counties it serves originate mostly from gas tax revenues. 
6.5.6 Incremental vs. Allocative 
While many transit agencies receive portions of a sales or other tax, it is important to 
distinguish between an increment added to an existing tax, and the government simply 
deciding to dedicate a portion of existing tax revenues to transit.  For example, citizens living 
around the BART and LACMTA transit network agreed to raise their tax rate and dedicate its 
yield to transit.  Those Californians now pay higher sales taxes.  The MBTA‟s Forward Funding, 
on the other hand, merely dedicated some sales tax revenues to transit without altering the base 
sales tax rate – the shift was allocative, not incremental. 
6.5.7 Differential Rates 
Very few large transit systems generate revenues from taxes with differential rates for urban 
and suburban inhabitants.  Paris and Chicago are the two exceptions to the rule in this analysis, 
where residents closer in to the central city pay higher tax rates than those closer to the 
metropolitan fringe.  New York charges an additional mortgage tax on transactions occurring 
within Manhattan only.  Most other systems either tax at one rate for transit, or not at all. 
 
Although no explicit tax rates are involved, other transit systems do achieve the same effect of 
taxing those closer to the city more than those further out.  For instance, Boston‟s local 
assessments charge each municipality a fee based on population, which effectively imposes 
higher rates on the inner cities and suburbs.  WMATA and NY MTA receive less subsidies from 
outlying counties than from inner areas. 
6.6 How Others Do It: Practical Lessons Learned 
Understanding how some other big cities pay for their transit systems, what lessons can be 
learned from the experiences in the U.S. and abroad?  Based on the preceding synopses, I 
theorize that transit subsidy mechanisms should ideally adhere to these desirable principles: 
1. Public subsidy should be less than or equal to the social benefits. 
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2. Revenues should be generated so as to align the magnitude and incidence of transit‟s 
burdens with its beneficiaries.  The benefit-cost ratio for each beneficiary should be 
similar. 
3. The subsidy structure should be tailored as closely as possible to the underlying 
mechanism for transit‟s benefits. 
4. The subsidy mechanism should provide long-term, stable revenues that rise at or above 
inflation. 
Section 7.4 address the question of public transportation‟s net social benefits.  Here, I highlight 
the best practices through which other cities attempt to achieve objectives 2, 3, and 4. 
6.6.1 Diverse Beneficiaries Suggest Diverse Revenues 
This thesis suggests a variety of beneficiaries of public transportation, implying that a closely-
tailored subsidy structure would include a similar variety of revenue sources.  The experience 
of other transit revenue structures suggests that this arrangement has practical as well as 
theoretical appeal.  Any good investor will distribute her capital across a number of stocks to 
spread her risk, and transit agencies are no exception.  Most agencies have some control over 
their fare revenues, yet depend on others at some level for the rest.  To spread the risk of one 
funding source going sour, transit agencies should seek to derive major revenues from at least 
two or three different sources, preferably even more.  For instance, the MBTA gets revenues 
from roughly two sources: state sales taxes, and local assessments which are largely paid from 
property taxes.  Madrid and Barcelona‟s funds originate from three levels of jurisdictions, all of 
which share revenues and which are derived from a mix of Value-Added Tax, income tax, and 
business taxes.  New York‟s operating subsidies come from a wide variety of taxes and 
jurisdictions ultimately based on the real estate market, businesses, petroleum use, and a sales 
tax in southern Connecticut, suburban New York State, the outer boroughs, and Manhattan 
itself. 
 
By contrast, excessive reliance on a single source for operating subsidies is theoretically less 
than ideal, and risky and frustrating in practice.  For example, MARTA gets nearly all of its 
revenues from a dedicated sales tax, yet its future is threatened by a potential reduction in the 
sales tax rate, so the agency has no other revenue source to fall back on besides fares.  SEPTA is 
currently balancing its budget with one-time infusions of flexed highway funds at the state 
level, but the agency cannot rely on these funds to continue indefinitely.  Transport for London 
is currently frustrated that it must rely almost exclusively on grants from the UK central 
government for long-term business plans (Transport for London, 2005). 
 
Indeed, the most robust transit agencies in this analysis have been able to respond to cutbacks 
in subsidy from one source by substituting other sources.  In Europe, these shifts often took 
place in the context of political decentralization, where the devolution of fiscal autonomy from 
central governments to regions appears to have caused an increased level of transit capital 
funding (Favero, 2006).  U.S. transit agencies have responded to the cutback in federal operating 
subsidies with higher state and local funds. 
6.6.2 Stable Revenues Means “Locking In” Long-Term Responsibility 
From a practical perspective, the risk of paying for public transportation with a diverse pool of 
revenue sources is that each source may feel free to opt out of the arrangement, or that the logic 
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of collective action will fail to produce funding increases when and if expanded service is 
desirable. 
 
Of the agencies studied here, transit systems appear to succeed when they can rely on a stable 
funding stream whose year-on-year variations are small.  The explanations for this may range 
from inflexible labor contracts, the difficulty of fare increases, or the multi-year funding 
required for infrastructure.  London Transport, the predecessor to Transport for London, was 
funded by the UK National Treasury through a bi-annual budget process whereby funding 
fluctuated widely.  The resulting atmosphere of start-stop funding made strategic investment 
decisions difficult and long-term planning difficult.  Toronto TTC faced similar challenges in the 
late 1980s when the provincial government of Ontario ended their operating subsidies.  The 
TTC raised fares and the City of Toronto stepped up funding to try and make up the difference, 
but overall subsidies declined, and service cuts and fare increases led to ridership losses.   
 
Regardless, without stable funding commitments, sponsor governments can engage in a game 
of chicken: no jurisdiction wanting to fund transit, and all sides using the others‟ inaction as an 
excuse for their own – with the end result being no action at all.  If a transit funding structure 
produces these outcomes, the entire region could end up with less public transit than it would 
Pareto-optimally otherwise produce. 
 
The balance of evidence from other cities suggests that a good way to mitigate this problem is to 
identify the beneficiaries responsible for transit subsidy, and “lock in” or dedicate this source 
with a long-term arrangement outside of annual budget processes.  Many cities studied here use 
systems of formulas or dedicated proportions of taxes, whereby responsibility for transit 
funding is divided amongst jurisdictions via a common understanding of burden.  Dedication 
of revenues approximates a long-term contract between the transit agency and the budget-
making legislature.  European transit agencies appear to sign multi-year funding agreements 
with their sponsor governments, with effective results.  Voter referenda such as Los Angeles‟ 
Propositions A and C seem to bypass the Legislature almost entirely, forming a direct contract 
between taxpayers and transit.  London‟s recent Prudential Borrowing regime has committed 
the UK Treasury to a five-year borrowing plan for capital investment. 
 
The experience in London also shows that getting sponsor governments to commit to a set 
funding stream is a prerequisite to empower local initiative for more transit funding.  After the 
Congestion Charge succeeded in raising around £200 million for Transport for London in its 
first year, the UK Central Government proposed to reduce the agency‟s grant by the same 
amount for the following year, leaving TfL frustrated that its entrepreneurship might be 
undermined (TfL, 2005).  If jurisdictions decide to tax themselves for transit revenues, they need 
guarantees that any new money will be a true increment to transit funding. 
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Figure 34.  Stability of Historical Transit Operating Subsidies in Selected Cities 
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6.6.3 Closely-Tailored Revenues Means Looking Beyond the Sales Tax 
Many of the cities presented here rely on sales taxes, which poses theoretical and practical 
difficulties.  Theoretically, sales taxes are not closely tailored to the underlying mechanisms of 
transit‟s social benefits, and their ability to stand as “proxies” for these benefits may diminish in 
the future. 
 
Practically, although the sales tax yield in a healthy economy has historically outpaced inflation, 
this may not be true in the future.  First, the growth of internet retail purchases shelters a 
growing portion of economic activity in the U.S. from local sales taxes.  Second, a post-
manufacturing, globalizing economy may tend to consume fewer taxed goods and more 
untaxed services, further slowing sales tax receipts (Boston Globe Editorial, 2007).  Third, 
discretionary spending on consumer goods may decline quickly during an economic 
slowdown, yet cities rely on public transit to provide low-cost mobility even in hard times.  In 
addition, sales taxes tend to be regressive, exacting a higher proportion of income from those 
least able to pay. 
6.6.4 Closely-Tailored Revenues Means Looking Beyond the Gas Tax 
Some of the transit systems in cities surveyed here receive revenues exacted from the 
automobile system.  Muni receives parking revenues from the City of San Francisco, London 
transit riders benefit from the congestion charging scheme, and transit in New York is cross-
subsidized by toll revenues on auto access to Manhattan.  Other cities fund transit from auto 
taxes in less direct ways: the Pennsylvania government has flexed highway dollars funded from 
gas taxes to plug SEPTA‟s operating budget, the U.S. Federal Government contributes some gas 
tax-backed to preventive maintenance activities, the District of Columbia uses gas tax revenues 
to fund WMATA, and Canadian provinces may soon dedicate a portion of gas taxes to transit.  
In theory, it is rational to tax automobiles to pay for public transit on second best grounds.  If 
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transit helps mitigate the environmental and congestion externalities of autos, it is reasonable to 
ask auto drivers and society to pay for the benefits received. 
 
However, a gas tax may be a poor mechanism to do so, because consumption of fuel is only a 
weak proxy for the benefits of public transit.  Ideally, an automobile tax to fund transit should 
be closely tailored to the basis of why automobile travel is harmful, and in the amount to which 
transit benefits auto drivers.  In earlier chapters, I showed that transit helps mitigate some of the 
external costs of the automobile system, but that emissions and safety costs are a function of 
total mileage driven, while congestion (and some safety) costs depend on traffic density and are 
concentrated in space and time.   A gas tax will be a good proxy for transit‟s mobility and safety 
benefits only, and only insofar as fuel consumption corresponds to total miles driven, which in 
turn will be only loosely related to the congestion and mobility benefits that transit provides.   
 
Practically speaking, gas tax revenues may not keep pace with the needs of the transit system, 
for a number of reasons.  Rising fuel efficiency may mean that less gasoline is required to drive 
the same distances.  Fuel price fluctuations and the introduction of alternative fuels may 
dampen demand for gasoline.  Politically, although gasoline costs are only 20% of the cost of 
auto ownership, gasoline is one of the few variable costs of driving, 23 making demand fairly 
inelastic.  The consequent political difficulty of raising gas taxes to keep pace with inflation may 
tend to undermine revenues. 
6.7 How Others Do It: Conclusion 
The structure of operating revenues in large public transit agencies in North America and 
Western Europe varies widely, but several common themes do emerge.  Fares are rarely tied to 
inflation, and usually make up around a third of revenues, but can range between 25-50% of 
revenues.  The farebox recovery ratio is often the result of a policy decision or voter preference, 
and using it as an efficiency indicator can have harmful results.  Except for London, central 
governments play a small role in funding transit operations. 
 
Beyond fares and federal revenues, transit systems rely on a wide range of taxes, fees, auto 
charges, and dedicated revenue streams to pay for their daily operations.  Based on a survey of 
15 transit agencies‟ finances, I suggest that the best funding structures are those where: transit‟s 
beneficiaries shoulder its financial burden in roughly similar proportions; the subsidy 
mechanism is closely tailored to the needs and benefits of transit; and the revenues are 
delivered to the agency in a stable manner.  I conclude by recommending that transit funding 
structures be based on a range of diverse sources, should “lock in” long-term funding 
commitments from sponsor governments, and should look beyond the sales and gas taxes for 
revenues that are perhaps better proxies for transit‟s benefits, including funds from the 
automobile system. 
                                                     
23 The American Automobile Association (2007) estimates that a typical driver (medium sedan, 15,000 
miles per year) spends 52.5 cents per mile to own a car, of which 9.4 cents is spent on gasoline.  Variable 
costs (gas, maintenance, and tires) make up 14.9 cents per mile of the total. 
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7 Conclusion: New Directions for Transit Finance in Chicago 
The purpose of this thesis is to suggest a framework for funding transit, and to recommend a 
range of potential funding mechanisms for the public transportation system in Chicago based 
on an understanding of how transit should and can be publicly funded.  After quantifying the 
magnitude of some of transit‟s social benefits in the Chicago region, I highlighted practices from 
transit agencies around the world that upheld the theoretical principles and practical concerns 
of public transportation finance. 
 
This final chapter combines the results of previous chapters to present an approximate cost-
benefit analysis of Chicago‟s transit system, and to map out the distribution of these benefits for 
comparison with the current RTA funding structure.  In broad terms, I find that transit‟s key 
benefits probably outweigh its subsidies – by approximately 50% by my central estimates - and 
that the group which is benefiting the most compared to their current contribution to operations 
is auto drivers, and perhaps downtown property owners.  Based on these results, and drawing 
on the lessons learned from transit funding abroad, I offer recommendations for a new funding 
instrument, emphasizing roadway tolls as a particularly theoretically and practically appealing 
policy alternative. 
7.1 Assessing Chicago’s Current Funding Structure 
In this section, I assess the structural characteristics, magnitude, and incidence of the current 
transit subsidy system in Chicago against the principles and practices of successful transit 
funding identified in previous chapters. 
 
The current RTA funding regime faces a number of structural difficulties.  First, although a 
diverse set of beneficiaries and a prudent risk-spreading strategy would ideally imply a range 
of revenue sources and sponsors, Chicago relies on essentially one funding source: the 
dedicated sales tax, as defined by the state.  The state‟s match of this amount is drawn primarily 
from state sales tax and income taxes. 
 
Second, although the 1983 RTA law has generated stable revenues protected from annual 
budgetmaking, their formulaic distribution has produced uneven results for the three service 
boards, and a peculiarity of the structure has eliminated the incentive to raise additional funds 
for transit.  While perhaps originally intended to empower the RTA to plan regionally, the 15% 
of revenues reserved for the Regional Transit Authority‟s discretion discourages local initiative 
or risk-taking to add additional funds to transit, since any added increment can be frustrated by 
an equal offset in discretionary funds.  As a result, Chicago may have less transit than it would 
have otherwise Pareto-optimally produced. 
 
Third, the sales tax alone appears to be an inadequate proxy for the wide range of social benefits 
provided by transit services in the Chicago region.  Some of the benefits of a public 
transportation network are avoided costs of the automobile system, mobility benefits to riders, 
and agglomeration benefits to the economy.  An ideal funding mechanism for transit would 
latch onto the underlying cause of these external costs from the automobile, and tax according 
to transit‟s ability to mitigate them.  A sales tax is probably peripheral to many of these benefits. 
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7.2 Evaluating Chicago’s Current Transit Funding Amount 
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 I quantify several major social benefits of public transportation in 
Chicago: air pollution, congestion relief, mobility benefits, and safety.  These high and low 
estimates of results are summarized in Table 43, along with a central estimate. 
 
Table 43.  Summary of Social Benefits of Chicago Transit in a Typical Year 
Type of Benefit Low ($2005) High ($2005) 
Central  
(Midpoint) 
Estimate 
Air Quality $26 $536 $281 
Safety $291 $631 $461 
Congestion Relief $323 $1,577 $950 
Mobility Benefits $528 $1,150 $839 
Total $1,168 $3,894 $2,531 
Current Subsidy to RTA (2005)   $1,096 
 
Overall, I find that the benefits of public transportation in Chicago outweigh its subsidy.  
Confirming the findings of the Moving Beyond Congestion campaign, however, my central 
estimates conclude that the real goods and services that Chicago obtains from publicly 
subsidizing its transit system are greater than they would otherwise be in the absence of transit.  
If transit were eliminated in Chicago, taxpayers would regain roughly $1.1 billion in annual 
subsidy, but lose a durable asset which is providing roughly $2.5 billion in social welfare 
benefits in a typical year.  From a social benefit-cost perspective, public subsidy to operate 
transit is likely justified. 
7.2.1 Comparison with MBC Analysis 
In its Final Report, the Moving Beyond Congestion campaign performs a benefit-cost analysis 
on transit operations which differs from my own in several respects (RTA, 2007b, 73).  They 
conclude that the RTA‟s 30-year operating need of $10 billion would save nearly $29 billion in 
social costs.  Because unit costs appear to have been eliminated from the published tables, 
comparison is difficult.  Notably, the MBC‟s report differs in structure: the MBC presents the 
cumulative social costs of continuing Chicago‟s current funding arrangements (assuming, 
crucially, that a 1% revenue loss translates into a 1.5% service and ridership loss) over a 30-year 
time period, as a net present value.  My analysis presents a typical year, undiscounted.  On the 
whole, although our methodologies differ in several ways, my findings agree with MBC that the 
loss of transit would result in high congestion costs to motorists, and our conclusions are 
broadly similar. 
7.3 Evaluating Chicago’s Current Transit Funding Incidence 
In view of transit finance, it is important to know not only whether transit is justifiable 
enterprise, but whether the subsidy mechanisms generally distribute the financial burden of 
transit to its beneficiaries in similar proportions.  To answer this question, this thesis makes a 
rough estimate of the incidence of benefits, in support of the theoretical framework described in 
Table 1 in section 1.5.1.  Because incidence in a complex market is difficult to determine, I make 
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several simplifying assumptions for each benefit type.  Where appropriate, I further divide 
benefits between the CTA Service District (approximately the City of Chicago), and the rest of 
the region (suburban Cook County and the collar counties).  I assume that passenger-trips by 
service board approximate the origins of transit riders, and that the impacts of all Metra and 
Pace trips accrue to outside the CTA service district. 
7.3.1 Emissions 
As shown in chapter 3, transit reduces air pollution in two ways: by moving passengers more 
efficiently than autos, and by improving automobile efficiency through congestion relief.  I 
assume that the benefits of emissions reductions accrue to three jurisdictions depending on the 
type of pollutant.  I classify carbon monoxide as local, ground-level pollutants (NOx, VOCs, etc.) 
as metropolitan, and greenhouse gases as national.  Direct reductions from efficiency accrue to 
the origin of transit trips, while indirect reductions through congestion relief are credited to the 
location of congestion. 
7.3.2 Safety 
Transit‟s effect on safety is threefold.  First, when mass transit takes cares off the road, overall 
chances of crashing declines, a benefit which I assume accrues to motorists.  Second, since a 
portion of these benefits are external in the form of reduced medical and emergency response 
costs, I assume that the state of Illinois also receives a benefit.  Third, train and bus operations 
create modest safety risks of their own, the external costs of which I presume imposes a cost on 
the towns served by transit.  I assume that the balance of these costs is internalized to the RTA 
service boards in the form of insurance. 
7.3.3 Congestion 
Chapter 5 estimated that public transit saves congestion costs, a benefit which I assign to 
motorists.  I further divide this benefit based on modeling results on the location of congestion 
and the origin of the autos causing it.  As shown in section 5.10.1, modeling analysis reveals that 
although congestion is concentrated in the City of Chicago, the majority of the drivers causing 
and experiencing it originate from outside the CTA‟s service district (Murga, 2007).  Thus the 
majority of transit riders are riding transit where their addition to the roadways would be the 
most damaging, and the majority of transit‟s congestion benefits accrue to suburban drivers. 
7.3.4 Mobility Benefits  
Transit provides considerable benefits to those onboard, for various reasons: by saving car 
ownership costs for choice riders, by providing those unable to drive access to opportunities, 
and by providing an equitable baseline of mobility to all.  I assign these benefits to passengers 
based on passenger-trips by service board as in section 7.3.1, even though the downstream 
incidence of these benefits may be more complex. 
 
This methodology is summarized in Table 44. 
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Table 44.  Basis for Calculating Incidence of Chicago Transit Benefits  
Benefit of RTA Transit Basis for Division of Benefits
CTA 
Service 
Area
Collar & 
Suburban 
Cook
General 
Metro 
Area
State or 
World
Less time and gas spent in congestion Origin of congestion-causing trip 18% 82% 0% 0%
Less local pollution from congestion Location of congestion 61% 39% 0% 0%
Less ground-level pollutants Metropolitan 0% 0% 100% 0%
Less local pollution from efficiency Origin of transit trips 82% 18% 0% 0%
Less greenhouse gases State/World 0% 0% 0% 100%
Consumer surplus of riders Origin of transit trips 82% 18% 0% 0%
Fewer accidents with other autos Location of all vehicle travel 57% 43% 0% 0%
External safety costs of transit (negative) Origin of transit riders 82% 18% 0% 0%
Lower medical and emergency costs State 0% 0% 0% 100%
Location of Beneficiary
 
7.4 Chicago’s Dilemma 
The challenge facing Chicago is that current RTA operating revenues are inadequate to pay for 
existing operations.  The region may soon be forced to choose between raising fares, cutting 
service, and increasing funding.  In this thesis, I assessed the overall value of public 
transportation to the region, and found that a conservative analysis justifies added funding to 
maintain current levels of service.  The immediate issue at hand is that the inadequacy of 
current revenues threatens to reduce service.  The insufficiency of current RTA funding is not 
per se a reason to change transit funding, the current crisis has forced the issue.  Because I 
concluded that transit‟s benefits likely outweigh its costs, increasing subsidy to preserve the 
social benefits is theoretically justified. 
 
However, this thesis leaves to future research the thorny question of whether the optimal transit 
subsidy amount should be equal to the social benefits it produces.  Theoretically, financial 
literature suggests that one should invest in an enterprise up to the point where the internal rate 
of return equals the discount rate: that is, where costs equal benefits.  In Chicago, however, a 
significantly higher RTA subsidy would mean that the service boards could likely cut fares, 
expand service, or invest in new infrastructure, which could implicate capital resources (my 
analysis is limited to operating revenues) and would in turn alter the initial calculation of social 
benefits.  Practically, government cannot undertake every project whose benefits exceed costs, 
because citizens‟ unwillingness to submit to taxation as well as the marginal welfare losses 
associated with raising public funds through taxation (Snow and Warren, 1996; Allgood and 
Snow, 1998) tend to limit available resources.  The availability of federal funding for cost-
effective capital investments would appear to make these investments promising.  The effect of 
adding a dimension of capital funds on the optimal transit funding principles explored here is a 
major area of future research.  But because eligibility for capital discretionary funds require 
demonstration of the fiscal capacity to pay the increased operating costs, this thesis provides a 
building block for the analysis of expanding transit capacity through capital investment. 
 
As policymakers in Chicago seek to alter the existing transit finance arrangement by potentially 
changing the 1983 RTA Act, they have few best practices or principles of optimal funding to 
guide them.  Practically speaking, then, how should this additional subsidy be funded?  Who 
should pay more?   
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7.5 Results: How the Current RTA Statute Compares 
To help answer this immediate question, I compare the incidence of benefits in Chicago with the 
current funding arrangement to determine which jurisdiction or group, if any, may be receiving 
benefits disproportionate to the burden they bear.  I use the central estimates calculated in 
earlier chapters. 
 
Table 45. The Size and Incidence of Social Benefits of Transit (Central Estimates) 
Quantifiable 
Benefit ($m) Auto Drivers
Directly Served 
Communities
General 
Metropolitan Area State or World Total
Congestion
Less time and gas 
spent in 
congestion
Less local 
pollution from 
congestion
Less ground-level 
pollution from 
congestion
Less GHGs from 
avoided 
congestion
$950 $11 $27 $75 $1,063
Economic ---
Mobility benefits 
to riders
--- ---
$839 $839
Safety
Fewer accidents 
with other autos
Increased safety 
costs of transit
---
Lower medical + 
emergency costs
$375 -$29 $116 $462
Emissions ---
Less local 
pollution from 
efficiency
Different/Less 
ground-level 
pollution
Less GHGs from 
efficiency
$3 -$6 $170 $167
Total: $1,325 $824 $21 $361 $2,532
Beneficiary 
 
 
Table 45 summarizes the magnitude and incidence of transit‟s benefits in Chicago.  Taking these 
numbers as control totals for the assumptions in Table 44, the overall incidence is further 
divided between the CTA service area and the rest of the metropolitan area.  The results are 
displayed and compared to the current RTA subsidies in Table 46 and Figure 35. 
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Table 46.  Incidence of Transit Benefits (Central Estimates) Compared to Current RTA Funding 
Benefit of RTA Transit ($ millions)
CTA 
Service 
Area
Collar & 
Suburban 
Cook
General 
Metro 
Area
State or 
World Total
Less time and gas spent in congestion 171$       779$       -$        -$        950$        
Less local pollution from congestion 7$           4$           -$        -$        11$          
Less ground-level pollutants -$        -$        21$         -$        21$          
Less local pollution from efficiency 3$           1$           -$        -$        3$            
Less greenhouse gases -$        -$        -$        245$       245$        
Consumer surplus of riders 688$       151$       -$        -$        839$        
Fewer accidents with other autos 214$       161$       -$        -$        375$        
External safety costs of transit (negative) (24)$        (5)$          -$        -$        (29)$         
Lower medical and emergency costs -$        -$        -$        116$       116$        
Total Benefits from RTA Transit (Central Estimates) 1,058$    1,091$    21$         361$       2,532$     
42% 43% 1% 14%
Current RTA Public Funding 587$       113$       176$       220$       1,096$     
54% 10% 16% 20%
Location of Beneficiary
 
 
Figure 35.  Incidence of Transit Benefits Compared to Current RTA Funding 
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The incidence of the current transit funding structure in Chicago compares favorably to the 
incidence of its benefits in several respects, but falls short in other areas. 
 
The RTA sales tax structure generally aligns tax revenues to the origins of transit riders.  That is, 
jurisdictions are paying sales tax to transit roughly according to its value to passengers, and the 
origins of those passengers.    In 2005, the RTA received 84% of its sales tax revenues from Cook 
County, and 16% from the Collar Counties – similar to 82% of passenger trips on the CTA and 
the remaining 18% on suburban Pace and Metra.  I measure rider benefits as $839 million, and 
sales tax receipts from the six counties totaled $587 million in 2005.  This comparison is very 
rough, and could be refined with further research, but the general conclusion holds: the size 
and incidence of the sales tax roughly reflects passengers‟ mobility benefits. 
 
On the theory that the benefits of mobility eventually accrue to riders‟ destinations as well as 
their origins, this finding may suggest that transit passengers‟ destinations are receiving 
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benefits they do not explicitly pay for.  If most passengers are traveling to and from the Loop, 
this might be an argument for expanded transit funding from downtown businesses.  As 
mentioned in section 6.4, a payroll tax has worked well in Paris and Portland, but this is an area 
for future research. 
 
The state of Illinois‟ contribution to public transit, via its 25% match of sales tax revenues 
(which I label “metropolitan”) and supplemental funds from general revenues, roughly 
corresponds to the emissions and safety benefits it receives.  Some of the benefits of reducing 
auto collisions on the roadways accrue to the state in avoided costs for health care programs, 
state police, and the Department of Transportation.  In addition, air pollution reductions accrue 
to everyone in the region, so the logical beneficiary is probably the state government. 
 
Chicago‟s transit finance mechanism falls short in two areas.  First, the benefits of greenhouse 
gas reductions should theoretically accrue to everyone in the world – yet it is impractical to 
fund transit from a world government.  But unlike ground-level pollutants which impose costs 
on a regional level, the nature of atmospheric air pollution means that an emission of carbon 
dioxide anywhere is problem everywhere.  In a theoretical sense, greenhouses gases may best 
be dealt with at a global scale.  However, state and national governments have begun taking an 
interest in reducing greenhouse gases, so the beneficiary of the 1.2 million tons of carbon 
emissions avoided by public transit in Chicago may be the state of Illinois or the U.S. federal 
government.  This might be an argument for increased state or federal funding for transit 
operations.  Depending on the structure of future potential greenhouse gas regulation, the RTA 
and its service boards might endeavor to sell carbon offset “credits” for revenues.  Illinois 
Governor Blagojevich‟s greenhouse gas initiative may be an opportunity for the state to pioneer 
in this previously unexplored policy arena. 
 
More importantly, my findings suggest that suburban auto drivers in Chicago are receiving 
greater benefits from transit than they currently pay for.  I estimated that public transportation 
is currently improving the safety and congestion of roads to the tune of over $1 billion per year, 
yet autos explicitly contribute little money to transit operations.24  In addition, I estimate that 
the beneficiaries of congestion relief are drivers who originated outside of the CTA service area 
or outside of Cook County, and that the beneficiaries of improved traffic safety are auto drivers 
throughout the region. 
7.6 New Directions for Transit Subsidy in Chicago  
As transit policymakers consider changes to the 1983 RTA Act to preserve current transit 
services, my findings suggest that a particularly theoretically appealing revenue source is 
motorists.  Based on a relatively comprehensive review of transit‟s social benefits in Chicago, 
and after comparing the amount and incidence of these benefits with the RTA statute, this thesis 
concludes that automobile drivers currently receive disproportionately more benefits than they 
pay. 
 
                                                     
24 It may be argued that some of the “State Financial Assistance” might be derived indirectly from gas or 
other automobile taxes, even though they are appropriated from general revenues.  Illinois does generate 
significant revenues from taxes on private vehicles which are not earmarked for roads.  Regardless of the 
incidence, the amount of discretionary state funds is small relative to transit‟s benefits to the auto. 
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Bearing in mind the practical lessons learned from other transit agencies, I offer several policy 
alternatives to structure a new funding mechanism based on revenues from the automobile 
system.  It is important to distinguish between taxing automobiles to 1) make auto drivers face 
the marginal social costs of their actions, and 2) provide funding to a transit system for the 
social benefits it provides (Gillen, 1997, 199).  I focus only on the second, and leave exploration 
of the first to future research. 
7.6.1 Option 1: Increase the Sales Tax 
As the MBC campaign report suggests, an additional 0.25% sales tax on all counties in the RTA 
Region, on an incremental or allocative basis, would yield around $270 million per year (RTA, 
2007b) and generally resolve the current gap in operating funding.  Since the collection 
mechanisms are already in place, implementing such a policy would likely be straightforward. 
 
However, this option has low theoretical appeal.  A sales tax is not narrowly tailored to 
automobiles, nor is it tailored to the particular automobiles who currently derive significant 
benefits from public transportation.  An across-the-board sales tax hike would hit all current 
payees equally, yet this analysis has shown that transit‟s benefit to motorist has a suburban 
focus, implying that an increase to the sales tax would exact more from the central city than is 
warranted.  Alternatively, an increase only to the collar counties‟ sales tax would need to be 
fairly high to raise similar revenues.  Taxing all sales in the suburban areas for the externalities 
of a smaller subset of downtown commuters might be politically infeasible. 
7.6.2 Option 2: Increase the Gas Tax 
Extrapolating from MBC‟s final report, adding a 4-8% tax on gasoline in the six-county region 
might generate $260-520 million per year.  This policy would be straightforward to administer, 
and its collection mechanism is already in place. 
 
However, a gas tax suffers from several practical difficulties, as described in section 6.6.4, that 
are likely to undermine its effectiveness as a revenue source.  Theoretically, the price or use of 
gasoline is only loosely related to the congestion and mobility benefits that transit in Chicago 
provides.  Drivers consume gas no matter where or when they drive, but transit‟s congestion 
benefits occur in very peaked spatial and temporal patterns.  Moreover, drivers already pay for 
the primary share of the cost of the highway network through gas taxes, while the commercial 
beneficiaries of the roadway access system do not shoulder its costs directly.  Given motorists‟ 
anger at recent fuel price increases, it may be more feasible to generate revenues by other 
means.  Ideally, an automobile tax to fund transit should be levied on the basis of why 
automobile travel is harmful, and the degree to which transit can mitigate this harm for drivers.  
A sustainable funding structure for transit should latch onto the root tendency to consume auto 
travel, and tax according to how well transit mitigates the resulting costs.  The consumption of 
gasoline is a moderate proxy for this. 
7.6.3 Option 3: Mileage-Based “Pay-As-You-Drive” Fees  
Variable car fees, similar to the structure of pay-as-you-drive insurance, makes several 
improvements to the gasoline tax.  Such a program would present less visible costs to the 
driver, perhaps increasing its political viability.  Unlike the gas tax, future fuel efficiency would 
not undermine this program‟s effectiveness, and charges could capture the accident externality 
described in section 4.1.  It may be a small step to tie miles driven to a standard emissions 
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profile based on vehicle type, and a “polluter pays” surcharge could be added to this scheme in 
the future. 
 
However, pay-as-you-drive programs also have downsides.  The collection mechanisms are 
only partially in place, and initial administration costs could be high.  A cost placed on each 
vehicle mile traveled equally is a close proxy for transit‟s safety benefits, but an imperfect one 
for the congestion benefits that transit provides.  Practically, the entire RTA district or state of 
Illinois would need to switch to a variable insurance program at the same time to reap its full 
benefits, since allowing high-mileage drivers to remain on fixed rate insurance plans 
undermines the savings to low-mileage drivers.  Politically, the optimal difference between low- 
and high-mileage drivers might be wide, causing a political backlash from high-mileage drivers 
who might have to pay considerably more. 
7.6.4 Option 4: Parking Tax 
A tax on parking to fund RTA transit services could be more narrowly tailored to downtown 
auto drivers who are benefiting from the transit system.  The City of San Francisco effectively 
contributes $130 million per year in parking proceeds to transit.  Furthermore, the portion of a 
parking tax that falls on downtown businesses could be justified based on the value they receive 
from accessing transit passengers.  For a detailed discussion of a parking tax to pay for transit in 
Chicago, see Misiak (2005). 
7.6.5 Option 5: Road Tolls 
Adding congestion-based tolls to roadways in the Chicago metropolitan region is perhaps the 
most theoretically satisfying way presented here to finance a gap in transit funding.  Although a 
major drawback to expanded tolls would be the capital costs of adding toll facilities, emerging 
technologies could potentially reduce these costs to more viable proportions. 
 
This thesis suggests that public transportation is providing substantial benefits to auto users 
that they do not pay, and that of all transit beneficiaries, drivers may be paying the least relative 
to what they receive.  However, these safety and congestion benefits seem to be especially 
concentrated in certain areas at specific times.  Unlike variable pay-as-you-drive fees, gas taxes, 
or sales taxes, therefore, tolls can be very closely tied to the congestion relief, safety, and 
mobility that transit offers. 
 
It is important to distinguish between charging automobiles to motivate behavior, such as 
making drivers face the marginal social costs of their decisions, and charging automobiles to 
meet financial goals, such as compensating transit for its social benefits, or generating enough 
revenues for a construction project.   
 
In the first instance, economic theory states that an optimal congestion toll should be charged to 
force auto drivers to face the marginal social costs of their decisions.  This toll should equal the 
difference between social costs and private costs where marginal social cost equals marginal 
willingness to pay, illustrated by the small vertical line in Figure 36.  This analysis contains the 
basic ingredients to estimate this amount for Chicago.  Taking the first derivative of the 
congestion cost function I estimated in section 5.6 yields the marginal social cost curve.  The 
with- and without-transit equilibriums form the demand curve for auto travel with respect to 
congestion costs.  Thus, the analysis suggests that an economically optimal toll for Chicago 
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would therefore average around 8¢ per vehicle mile, with higher tolls on the peak than the off-
peak.  This finding also suggests that in its current condition, every new car accommodated on 
Chicago roads at the current distribution of travel patterns now imposes marginal external 
congestion costs to the tune of 41¢ per mile. 
 
Figure 36.  Optimal Roadway Tolls for Chicago 
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In the second instance, tolling can also be designed to compensate transit for the benefits it 
provides, which has particular relevance to a new funding structure in Chicago.  Since I 
quantify the value of those safety and congestion benefits with a range, Table 47 estimates the 
average toll amounts that would be needed to adequately compensate transit (approximately 
$400 million). 
 
Table 47.  Hypothetical Road Toll Amounts for Ideal Transit Funding 
Toll Applied to:  
VMT 
(mill.) Road Type 
Optimal Toll 
per Mile  
60,512  All Roads 0.6¢ 
30,300  Interstates and Principal Arterials 1.4¢ 
18,043  Interstate Highways only 2.2¢ 
 
Since tolling every road would be impractical, Chicago might look to simply toll existing 
interstate highways, or perhaps some principal arterials as well, especially since VMT is 
disproportionately concentrated on these high-volume roadways.  My research suggests that an 
average toll of around 2¢ per vehicle mile, similar to current toll levels in the region (Illinois 
State Toll Highway Authority, 2007), would generate approximately $400 million per year with 
negligible VMT reductions, and would fall well below the “optimal” toll level of 8¢ per mile. 
 
Roadway tolls in Chicago would likely encounter political resistance, primarily because they 
may price some drivers out of the market.  However, the dedication of revenues to transit could 
compensate for this decreased mobility.  If such a system were to emulate the successful 
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congestion charging regime in London, it would ideally be accompanied by improved capacity 
and quality on the public transportation system.  In this situation, drivers discouraged from the 
roadways by the tolls would likely enjoy adequate alternatives to driving.  Indeed, the 
experience of London suggests that congestion-based auto fees to improve public transit enjoy a 
synergy of theoretical and political appeal. 
 
Roadway tolls to fund transit in Chicago would be a sustainable, growing revenue source for 
transit, and it would be drawn from those who should ideally be paying more.  History has 
shown that auto travel demand is rising and is projected to continue growing (CATS, 2005, 5.2).  
From the RTA‟s perspective, the value of its services to bypass and relieve congestion will only 
grow as traffic and demand continue to grow in Chicago, and a dedicated source of toll 
revenues would allow it to capture the value it creates. 
7.7 Thesis Conclusion 
As an oft-overlooked piece of urban policy in America, the finance of public transportation 
systems holds great potential to be a part of the solution to the difficult problems facing cities.  
Transit funding varies widely in the U.S. and Western Europe, and these important structures 
often bear little relation to the needs and benefits of public transportation.  Chicago, for 
example, appears to be on the brink of changing the way it allocates resources to its public 
transport, yet can rely on little theoretical guidance on where any new revenues should come 
from, and why.  To fill this apparent void, this thesis attempted to offer a more rational 
approach to the finance of transit, based on the various environmental, safety, congestion, and 
mobility benefits a public transportation provides, and used Chicago as a case study to do so. 
 
My findings concluded that the benefits of transit in Chicago probably outweigh its costs, and 
that most of the beneficiaries of public transport are paying subsidies roughly in accordance 
with their benefits with the exception of motorists and possibly commercial interests who 
benefit from the roadway access system.  By comparing the size and incidence of transit‟s 
benefits to its current costs, I find evidence that auto drivers are receiving more benefits than 
they pay for, primarily in the form of congestion relief.  Most transit passengers are on board 
where congestion is the most concentrated, and where their addition to the roadways would 
cause high marginal costs.  Auto drivers in Chicago stand much to lose in the reduction of 
transit services, yet they contribute little directly to its funding.  If they may be legitimately 
asked to step up to the plate and contribute a more equal share to the finance of public 
transport, I offer a range of instruments to do so, suggesting that one particularly theoretically 
and financially appealing instrument may be roadway tolls. 
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